U.S. Strategy in the Gulf: Intervention against Liberation



edited by
Leila Meo

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U.S. Strategy in the Gulf: Intervention against Liberation

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Leila Meo

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

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Negotiated access to U.S. RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

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

Map adapted from *Washington Post*, Nov. 28, 1979 by Art for People.
First published in *MERIP REPORTS*, No. 85.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

With publication of Monograph No. 14 AAUG continues a tradition of bringing to the American reading public perspectives on the Middle East that are not readily available in general literature, yet are crucial to understanding America's inability so far to relate to the peoples of this region in a mutually beneficial way.

The focus of this monograph is the Arabian-Persian Gulf, an area of the Middle East considered by successive American Presidents since World War II as vital to U.S. strategic and economic interests. Both the location and the oil wealth of the area have played an important role in U.S. global strategy. Middle East oil became a U.S. economic interest some 25 years before it became a strategic interest. Behind America's pursuit of oil after World War I was the long cherished foreign policy principle of the "Open Door" which asserted U.S. rights to compete on equal terms with other nations for commercial relations with any country. The principle of the "Open Door" had been successfully applied at the turn of the century against the European powers' monopolistic trade practices in the Far East. After World War I the "Open Door" principle was again successfully invoked against British attempts to exclude U.S. business from sharing in the development of the oil resources of the Middle East. After World War II U.S. interest in Middle East oil as a commercial asset was coupled with a new concern for the oil as a strategic resource to fuel America's far-flung military arm in wartime and in peace and to transform America's war-ravaged NATO allies in Europe into strong nations able to withstand the perceived Soviet threat.

Following the reconstruction of Western Europe, Middle East oil was valued by the United States for several reasons. It continued to fuel

the industrial growth of the European allies and of Japan, America's newly democratized friend in the Far East. Middle East oil was also vital to maintaining NATO's military arm, and in the bipolarized world of super power confrontations it became to successive Administrations a strategic asset that had to be denied at all costs to the Soviet Union. In addition, of course, there were the staggering profits that American (and European) oil companies reaped from cheap Arab and Iranian oil before the process of nationalization set in (after the Arab defeat and loss of territory to Israel in the 1967 war). For the United States Government the dollars raked in by the oil companies helped to offset the outflow of dollars for military assistance programs and U.S. military bases abroad.

World War II brought home to Washington the realization that the larger Middle East—from the Atlantic shores of Morocco to the northern and eastern frontiers of Iran—and Middle East oil were both strategic assets of the West vital to Western security interests and to the rapidly expanding U.S. economy. During the war, the Middle East and its oil were defended successfully against the encroachments of fascism; they would now have to be defended against what was perceived to be the encroachments of communism, but was in fact the movements for decolonization that swept the Middle East, Africa and Asia in the post-war period. The United States, which had participated in the defense of the Middle East and of Middle East oil with its major ally Britain, felt called upon in the post-war years to assume greater and greater military responsibilities in the area as British power and capability to do so declined.

Beginning in the fifties we see a series of efforts pursued by successive Presidents to co-opt Middle Eastern states into a Western military alliance against the Soviet Union. But only a few governments were seriously interested and joined. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan formally joined Britain in 1955-56 in the American-sponsored Baghdad Pact. When Iraq pulled out of the Pact after the monarchy was toppled by a nationalist army coup in 1958, the Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and had the same purpose: defense against the Soviet Union. Pakistan, it turned out, was more interested in acquiring Western weapons under CENTO to pursue its territorial conflict with India than to protect itself against the claimed Soviet threat. As recent events have shown, nationalism in Iran was loath to ally itself with the West despite its suspicions about Soviet intentions. But it was the Shah of Iran, returned to the throne in 1953 by a CIA-engineered coup against nationalist Premier Mossadeq, who joined CENTO and

used American weapons to build up a royal dictatorship at home. His relations with his Soviet neighbor in time became friendly and included some mutually advantageous trade links. Of all the Middle East CENTO members, it appeared that Turkey alone was genuinely interested in a Western military alliance against the Soviet Union. The historic conflicts between the former Ottoman and Czarist empires over territory had left the Turks suspicious of Soviet intentions.

The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, which came in the wake of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Nasser's Egypt, was directed primarily at the Arab world and had two purposes: Firstly, to isolate nationalist Egypt and Syria who had purchased Soviet arms after arms had been denied them by the West; and, secondly, to corral the other Arab states into a series of treaties with the U.S. against "communist-inspired" invasions or coups. Britain, a partner to the Baghdad Pact, had been discredited in Arab eyes by its invasion of Egypt in 1956. Through the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was the brainchild of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the United States was now going to take a direct role in rooting out "communist revolution" in the Arab world. Secretary Dulles broadly hinted that both Syria and Egypt would be targeted as exporters of this revolution and subversion to other Arab countries.

Contrary to Dulles' theory, the Arab world at that time felt profoundly threatened by expansionist zionism allied with resurgent British and French imperialism, and thus largely welcomed Soviet diplomatic and moral support against both these threats. Yet Washington, looking through fogged glasses, was trying to make the Arabs substitute a non-existent Soviet threat for a very real imperialist-zionist threat, the effects of which the Arabs had just experienced. If in the hope of receiving U.S. arms some pro-West Arab regimes made friendly noises at the Eisenhower Doctrine when its traveling salesman, Ambassador James P. Richards, visited the Middle East, there was only one Arab leader who formally accepted the Doctrine: President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon. Chamoun had provoked strong public opposition in Lebanon over his internal and regional politics, and needed the ruse of the "threat of international communism" to get American backing for his assuming a constitutionally-banned second presidential term. When in the summer of 1958 America finally heeded Chamoun's plea and landed the Marines in Beirut to protect Lebanon from the "threat of international communism" American diplomats found no such threat to exist. The internal crisis had been caused by the clashing interests of political feudalists and by Chamoun's digression from Lebanon's

traditional neutralist policy. America assisted in bringing peace with no renewal, however, for the Chamoun presidency. It could have been done without wasting taxpayers' money on the Marine landing.

U.S. preoccupation with what it saw as the communist threat to its interests continued to color its view of Third World liberation movements and their nationalist objectives. They were treated as pawns in a U.S.-Soviet chess game, their homelands the board on which the game was played. The Middle East, lying at the juncture of three continents was a particularly important part of the chessboard, its countries and waterways providing strategic access to Africa and Asia and, of course, to its own oil. Oil had to be kept out of Soviet hands and kept flowing northward to Europe, westward to the United States and eastward to Japan and to fuel first the U.S. war effort in Korea and later the longer-term U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

In the sixties, while the United States was busy escalating the Vietnam war in the hope of defeating the Vietnamese National Liberation Front once and for all, Washington devised a pattern to keep the Soviets at bay in the access area of the Middle East. The white chessmen (pro-West regimes) were armed according to their size and/or capability to ward off any possible advances on the board by the black chessmen (regimes seen as radical nationalist or pro-Soviet). In the hands of the pro-West regimes, the arms, of course, had another useful purpose, to suppress any nationalist uprising against the established order.

The policy of arming individual regimes for safeguarding American interests in the access area of the Middle East—and particularly the Arabian-Persian Gulf area—was carried on into the mid-seventies after the Vietnam war was over. The American people had had their fill of direct involvement in Vietnam and so Washington had to rely on states willing to play local policeman. In the Gulf area, the Shah's Iran, already well militarized through CENTO, began to receive even greater shipments of U.S. weapons in the wake of British military withdrawal from the Gulf and the southern reaches of the Arabian Peninsula in the early seventies. The Shah aspired to the role of Super Policeman. Saudi Arabia also began to receive larger shipments of U.S. arms which it demanded both out of fear of growing Iranian power and insurrectionist movements against feudal regimes on its own periphery. In Washington's eyes, selling arms that needed to be updated and replenished periodically was also a good way of recouping petrodollars that had begun to accumulate in the hands of Gulf oil states in the wake of oil nationalization and higher oil prices.

Yet the United States could not entirely rest at ease relying on local policemen to protect its interests in the Middle East. In the seventies successive Administrations also began to dust off and embellish an old concept which was first proposed in the fifties—that of the American "fire brigade" (akin to the use of the Marines in Lebanon). The "fire brigade" would rush from near or distant bases to either preempt threats to U.S. interests or to put out revolutionary fires that had already begun. The "fire brigade" units were intended particularly for putting out fires in the Arabian-Persian Gulf. The importance of keeping this area under American hegemony is underlined by the amount of oil it supplies to the non-Communist world and by the wealth of its oil reserves. "It cannot be forgotten," says an Arab study, that

> the oil produced in the Gulf area represents two-thirds of OPEC production and half the quantity on sale in the world market. It also provides Japan with about 80 per cent of its oil needs, and around 65 per cent and 15 per cent respectively of those of Western Europe and America. Not to mention that the oil reserve in this area amounts to 70 per cent of the world's total. The existence of oil thus increases the importance of the area, which must remain for a long time, a cockpit of events.[1]

The monograph we present here is a collection of individual papers by recognized American scholars. Their studies deal with different aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World, but focus in particular on the Arabian-Persian Gulf area. Originally presented at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Annual Conventions of AAUG, the papers address themselves each in its own way to U.S. assumptions, rationalizations and policy objectives that critically affect this area of the world and to U.S. relations with it. One must conclude in reading these papers that the U.S. relationship with the Arab world and with Iran has not been a happy one; that U.S. policy in the area has lost touch both with the realities of the region and with its own avowed principles of self-determination and democracy.

Where did we go wrong? Perhaps a little background to the U.S. presence in the Middle East will help in introducing these papers and the questions they raise and answer on U.S. policy.

In the aftermath of World War I, America witnessed the greed and hypocrisy of its wartime allies Britain and France in negotiating a final peace in the Middle East. The war, it seemed, had been fought, after all not to liberate peoples and spread the democratic gospel but to

extend the British and French empires to areas of the world formerly controlled by the German and Ottoman empires. In areas outside of Europe only lip service was paid to President Wilson's 14-point proclamation of 8 January 1918 which emphasized that peace should be built on the right of liberated peoples to self determination.

An American mission, the King-Crane, sent to the Middle East during the Paris Peace Conference, found that the Ottomans' former Arab provinces of Syria and Iraq aspired to immediate independence and economic union, and vehemently objected to the partition of the Syrian homeland and to the separation and transformation of its Palestinian southern region into a Zionist settler state. But the King-Crane report was suppressed, while Britain and France divided up the Arab homeland between themselves and set up the League of Nations mandates system as a screen to camouflage their imperial acquisitions. Nevertheless, the charade required that they use the language of the international law that they pretended to uphold, and so the League's Covenant proclaimed in its Article 22 that the mandated territories of the Middle East—Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq—"have reached a stage of development where their *existence as independent nations* can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone" (emphasis added).

Before it turned its back on the mandated Arab lands in the interwar years and on the nationalist uprisings that French and British colonialist policies provoked, the United States government responded to Zionist pressure by endorsing the Zionist inspired Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which "one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third."[2] In a letter dated August 31, 1918 and addressed to the American Zionist leader Rabbi Stephen Wise, President Wilson approved the Zionist movement and the British plan for "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."[3] Thus with a stroke of the pen he negated his own principle of self-determination. Had he waited a year, President Wilson would have learned from the report of his own King-Crane Commission that if the principle of *self determination*

> is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—*nearly nine-tenths of the whole*—are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme. The tables show that there was no one thing

> upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law (emphasis added).[4]

With similar obliviousness to Palestinian rights and wishes and in response to American Zionist pressures, the U.S. House and Senate in joint resolution on June 30, 1922, approved the Balfour Declaration and "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."[5] From that point on Congress as a whole, and with few exceptions, marched down the road of wholehearted support for "the Zionists," who, according to the King-Crane report, "looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish [i.e. Arab] inhabitants of Palestine."[6]

The works of many scholars tell the story of the role played by the United States in realizing the Zionist project of dispossessing and dispersing the Palestinian Arab majority and transforming a major part of their homeland, about 80 per cent, into an exclusivist Jewish state where only Jews have first class citizenship. Indeed, the U.S. government commitment to Israel has gone so far as to give Israel both financial and military muscle to continue the process of absorption of Arab lands—the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan—and the oppression and expulsion of their Arab inhabitants. To add insult to injury, as Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger in 1975 gave Israel veto power over U.S. recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and admission of the PLO to peace negotiations over Palestine. Thus the U.S. Government deliberately buried its head in the sand, denying the democratic reality that the PLO is the sole representative that the Palestinians themselves have chosen and the world community, for the exception of the United States and Israel, has recognized as such.

One might ask, what has the Palestine Question to do with U.S. interests and policies in the Arabian-Persian Gulf? The answer is that the two issues are inseparable, even though successive Administrations have attempted to divide and compartmentalize the Middle East in order to deal with it more effectively.

But if Balkanization of the Arab homeland by European imperialism has resulted in the physical separation of the Arab people by the boundaries of a score of nation states, it has not stopped the flow of ideas via the press, television, movies, and especially the transistor

radio from one end of the Arab world to the other. Like other areas of the Third World, the communications revolution in the Middle East has in fact put in touch mass movements that are at various stages of liberating their peoples from class and external oppression which exists despite formal independence. That the Palestinian people have been denied even this formal independence through Western and particularly American support of Zionist designs on their homeland is known and resented throughout the Arab world, and even in non-Arab Iran where Zionism had supported the Shah's oppression of his own people. Even though the Soviet Union for reasons of self-interest had joined the West in voting in the United Nations in 1947 for fragmentation of a Palestine that had been provisionally recognized by the League of Nations as an *independent nation*, the Arabs have continued to blame the West for Palestinian dispossession and statelessness for the past 33 years. After all, Zionist designs on Arab Palestine were encouraged and nurtured in the West and formed part and parcel of imperialism's thrust into and colonization of Africa and Asia to exploit and displace native populations.

It is not likely that the Arab people, from the Atlantic to the Gulf, will see the Soviet Union as the real threat in the Middle East when Israel with unlimited U.S. military and financial aid has consistently defied U.N. resolutions on restoration of Palestinian rights, has encroached on other Arab lands, and has used its command of Arab skies and its oversupply of U.S. bombs and bombers to kill and maim hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in Beirut and elsewhere, and to destroy Iraq's nuclear reactor, which had been established under international control for development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is not likely that the Arab people will see the Soviet Union as a threat when in their midst an aggressive Israel is known to have developed the atomic bomb.

Thus, along with Israel, the United States itself has assumed the role of villain in the Middle East. The reasons are obvious: Since 1967 Israeli weapons that have brought death to thousands of Arab civilians in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon were all marked "Made in the United States." Though under treaty obligations to use these weapons for defensive purposes only, Israel has with impunity used them against civilian targets. Arab public opinion finds U.S. policy insulting when the United States only mildly reprimands Israel for its most recent outrages against Iraq and on the city of Beirut and merely postpones shipment to Israel of F-15 and F-16 fighter planes as a sop to the Arabs! Arab public opinion finds American logic illogical when Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and

Jordan, all in turn victimized by Israeli aggression and all signers of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, are patronized by Washington, while Israel, the non-signer of the treaty, possessor of the atomic bomb, and marked by a long record of state terrorism against the Arabs[7] is coddled by Washington.

The initial foreign policy pronouncements of the Reagan Administration point to the revival of concepts pursued 25 years ago by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower Administration. Dulles pictured Soviet communism as on the march out to conquer the world; he saw nationalist liberation movements as creations and tools of international communism. He adopted the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" to prevent the Soviets from encroaching on the non-communist world. He divided the rest of the world into pro-Soviet (i.e. pro-communism) or pro-West (i.e. pro-democracy) and he condemned the neutralism of the Third World nations that did not want to be sucked into his confrontational politics as being tools of communism. To the Third World nations—still struggling against the last vestiges of imperialism—unequal treaty alliances with the West and economic exploitation by the West—the "Soviet threat" that Dulles posed was not credible. Today, the "Soviet threat" is still not credible in the eyes of the Arab people. Based on Arab experience, what is credible is the Israeli threat. President Reagan's policy to build a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states against what he perceives as the Soviet threat to the area will therefore not have the support of the Arab people. Dulles had gone down that road before and found a dead end.

The first of the contributors to this monograph, Michael Parenti, analyzes in "The Mythology of U.S. Interventionism" the wide gap that exists between how Washington portrays Soviet power in the Third World and the realities of Third World existence. In a democracy like ours, it is imperative that the people in whose name foreign policy is made look more closely at how it is made and for what purposes, rather than accept official explanations of U.S. policy. Dr. Parenti's article provides thought-provoking insights into the rationalizations of U.S. foreign policy, and helps the reader to appreciate more fully the contributions of the other scholars.

Our next contributor, Thomas M. Ricks, deals with the U.S. involvement in Iran in a paper entitled "U.S. Military Missions to Iran, 1943-1978: The Political Economy of Military Assistance." Professor Ricks' detailed and thorough work demonstrates unequivocally how both the people and the economy of Iran were subordinated over a 35-

year period to U.S. policy objectives of coopting and keeping that country in a military alliance against the Soviet Union. The U.S. involvement in Iran is an instructive lesson in how *not* to meddle in other nations' affairs. By helping to bring the Shah back to power in 1953, the U.S. must shoulder some of the responsibility for the imposition of a police state on the Iranian people, for the persecution of all liberal opposition to the Shah's regime, and the death or flight of liberal leaders. In view of what has happened during the Shah's years in power, the chaos that exists in the wake of the 1979 revolution and the ascendancy of the mullahs become understandable.

Where Professor Ricks concentrates on Iran, our next contributors, Professor James Petras and Roberto Korzeniewicz in a paper entitled "U.S. Policy Towards the Middle East," look at the region as a whole. They define the role played by private U.S. economic interests there in the evolution and refinement of U.S. political and military objectives. As nations begin to chafe under the burden of economic exploitation and seek economic liberation through strikes, demonstrations, and even revolutionary movements, U.S. policy rhetoric begins to emphasize the "threat of communism to the free world" and the need to protect Middle East oil, "the lifeblood of the democratic West against the Soviet threat." The Middle East has thus been transformed into a strategic asset of the West. The selling of the "Soviet threat" to governments in the Arabian-Persian Gulf area has diverted much of their petrodollar earnings from constructive internal and regional development into the purchase of expensive military hardware that periodically becomes obsolete and must be replaced at even higher costs. The beneficiaries of the "Soviet threat" are the military industrial complex in the United States and the arms industry in Europe—both of which compete for the Arab and Iranian petrodollar. But the greatest beneficiary of the "Soviet threat" policy is of course Israel:

> Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the U.S. government has sold $9.3 billion worth of military equipment and services to Israel. Over the past few years, *Congress has "forgiven" nearly half of Israel's debt for the purchase of such military equipment.* No other country in the world in recent years has obtained weapons from the United States under such easy terms. (Emphasis added.)[8]

By reason of the massive economic and military aid it receives, Israel has become a drain on U.S. tax dollars. Why all this overwhelming generosity, which no other nation receives? Professor Petras and

Roberto Korzeniewicz give us at least part of the answer: "Israel's relevance to military strategic planners revolves around its role as a political contraceptive against revolutionary nationalist upheavals in the Middle East."

In the eyes of the Arab and Iranian masses the United States is now the imperial power *par excellence* and Israel its Middle East spearhead. If Zionist strategems were responsible in capturing U.S. support for Israel on the Question of Palestine, U.S. economic interests in the Middle East were responsible for Washington's gradual thrust to extend U.S. hegemony over the area. The pioneering effort in securing these economic interests must be credited to American oil companies and to the Department of State. Working together after World War I, they forced open the door that Britain had closed against American participation in the development of Middle East oil, and in twenty years secured extensive oil concessions in the area. Thus, by the end of the 1930s American oil companies shared in the production of oil in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Though all concessions were profitable, the most rewarding concession proved to be the one first obtained in Saudi Arabia in 1933 by Standard Oil of California (Socal). In 1938 Socal discovered such a bounty of oil that it brought in three partners to assist in the production, transportation, and marketing of the Saudi oil. In 1939 the Saudi Government gave a new concession to the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) which had been formed by the original four partners. They included, along with their shares: Standard Oil of California (30 per cent), Texaco (30 per cent), Standard of New Jersey (later Exxon—30 per cent), and Socony-Vacuum (later Mobil Oil—10 per cent).

On the eve of World War II, American oil interests in the Arabian-Persian Gulf were well secured. The U.S. oil giants had obtained 42 per cent of the area's known oil reserves.[9] They enjoyed concessions, either singly or in partnership in Iraq and all along the western shores of the Gulf. Only Iranian oil remained out of their reach. However, in 1954, following the coup against Premier Mossadeq, American interests were given a whopping 40 per cent share in Iranian oil. The prelude to all this was the impoverishment of Iran by a British decreed international boycott of Iranian oil intended to torpedo Mossadeq's popularly supported nationalization of Iranian oil. The return of the Shah to the throne permitted the formation of a new foreign consortium with an Iranian name—Iranian Oil Exploration and Producing Company—to camouflage foreign control of the country's oil. Five American oil giants, Gulf, Mobil, Standard of California, and Exxon, each received a 7 per cent

share in the consortium for a total of 35 per cent, while the remaining 5 per cent of the American share was divided up among seven smaller U.S. companies. A National Security Council report had earlier advised the U.S. Attorney General that the "security interests of the United States" required U.S. oil company participation in order to reactivate the Iranian oil industry "and to provide therefrom to the friendly Government of Iran substantial revenues on terms which will protect the interests of the western world in the petroleum resources of the Middle East."[10]

America's oil interests in the Iranian consortium were acquired mainly at British expense, although of course all foreign acquisitions were made at Iranian expense. The new acquisitions, added to other American oil concessions in the area, hastened Washington's thrust to extend its hegemony over the Gulf and the broader Middle East. As already noted, the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt in 1956 discredited Britain as defender of Western interests in the area. As a result, Washington found itself playing a more direct role in protecting Middle East oil as a "strategic asset of the West."

As with Britain, the U.S. flag followed first U.S. trade, and later U.S. strategic interests. However, the American flag has been made as invisible as possible. Because in the age of the United Nations colonialism has been discredited, military and economic aid programs with their attendant inflated staffs of "technical advisors" have become the U.S. means of indirect control of undemocratic governments in the Middle East, replacing the more blatant methods of control exercised by the former colonial powers. Indirect control is cheaper for the United States because the host country pays for the various aid programs. Indirect control also has the added advantage of giving the illusion that the host government has retained its sovereignty and its freedom of decision. Professor Ricks' article is particularly instructive in this respect.

This brings us to the final contributor to the monograph, Michael T. Klare. If manipulation of local governments and the assigning of roles among them as surrogate policemen is one way of protecting American economic and strategic interests in the Middle East, these methods cannot be relied on one hundred per cent. Allies cannot be trusted either to take care of themselves or to remain loyal. In the Arab world particularly, no matter how pro-West Arab governments can be, their survival is better assured by accommodating major trends of Arab public opinion, no matter how autocratic they (the governments) may be. Thus the instrument of the U.S. "fire brigade" we have mentioned earlier is created. It consists of American forces speeded to the scene of

revolution or of betrayal from bases near or far to safeguard American interests. In the article on "U.S. Military Planning for Arabian-Persian and Third World Conflicts," Dr. Klare deals with both the concept and instrument of the "fire brigade" at its various stages of evolution. He emphasizes its most recent packaging by the Carter Administration as the Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.). The R.D.F. as an instrument of U.S. policy in the Arabian-Persian Gulf area is being adopted by the Reagan Administration. The Government is considering acquiring and developing the Egyptian Red Sea base of Ras Banas as a jumping off point for the R.D.F. In his second article, "The U.S. Role in Energy Wars in the Arabian-Persian Gulf," Dr. Klare examines alternate U.S. strategies, including use of the R.D.F., in safeguarding Western access to the oil of the area. He considers the scenarios of possible U.S. military involvement in the area projected by U.S. planners and by those who would advise them, and he concludes that options for intervention have been expanded from preventing or responding to a direct Soviet threat to Middle East oil, to preempting any possible nationalist threat to withhold oil from the West.

Whether in the end U.S. intervention is feasible or not, Washington's thinking poses an intolerable threat to the rights of smaller nations to control their own national resources and to determine their own destiny. Whether it calls Middle East governments "moderate" or "radical," "pro-American" or "pro-Soviet" and smiles or frowns on them accordingly, Washington to date has not been in tune with the popular forces of liberation. Through its policies, the United States has identified itself with class oppression, foreign exploitation, and Zionist expansionism.

If such policies may temporarily delay the liberation of the peoples of the Middle East who have been treated and still are being treated as pawns in the game of power politics, they can *not* stop the inexorable drive toward popular liberation. What these policies will certainly do is to put America on the wrong side of history and to endanger the well-being of the American people as well, by placing military might abroad ahead of social welfare at home and by increasing the possibility of another Vietnam-style intervention, with all its tragic consequences.

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October 1981

FOOTNOTES

1. Arab Research Center, *Oil and Security in the Arab Gulf*, Arab Papers, No. 5, London, 1980, p. 3.

2. Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917-1948*, as quoted in Robert John and Sami Hadawi, *The Palestine Diary 1914-1945*, Vol. 1. New York: New World Press, 1970, p. 86.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

4. "Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission with Regard to Syria-Palestine and Iraq," (August 28, 1919), in George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961. Reprint, p. 449.

5. *The Palestine Diary*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

6. "Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission . . .", *op. cit.*, pp. 448-449.

7. See Livia Rokach, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism*. AAUG Information Paper Series, No. 23. Belmont, MA: 1980. The study is based on the Personal Diary of Moshe Sharett, who had served as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Israel, and reveals through quotes from the Diary that Israel used terror as an instrument of national policy both for driving the Palestinian Arabs out of their homeland and for expanding its borders. The study further reveals, through the Diary and other Israeli documents that in the West Israel's propaganda campaign camouflaged its policy of terror as defense against "Arab provocation."

8. Daniel Southerland, "Why Israel is America's No. 1 Weapons Customer," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 30, 1981.

9. Joe Stork, *Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975, p. 27.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

The Mythology of U.S. Interventionism

MICHAEL PARENTI

The history of the United States has been one of territorial and economic expansionism, with the benefits going mostly to the U.S. business class in the form of growing investments and enormous profits. The American people have had to pay the costs of empire, supporting a huge military establishment with their taxes, while suffering the loss of jobs, the neglect of domestic services and the loss of tens of thousands of American lives in overseas military ventures.

The greatest costs, of course, have been borne by the peoples of the Third World who have endured poverty, pillage, disease, dispossession, exploitation, illiteracy and, at times, the wholescale destruction of their lands, cultures and their lives.

As a relative latecomer to the practice of colonialism, the United States could not match the older European powers in the acquisition of overseas territories. But the U.S. was the earliest and most consummate practitioner of neoimperialism or neocolonialism. Almost a half-century before the British thought to give a colonized land its nominal independence, as in India—while continuing to exploit its labor and resources, and dominate its markets and trade—the United States had perfected this practice in Cuba and elsewhere.

In places like the Philippines, Haiti and Nicaragua, and when dealing with the Native American Indian nations, U.S. imperialism proved itself as brutal as the French in Indochina, the Belgians in the Congo, the Portuguese in Angola, the Italians in Libya, the Germans in Southwest Africa and the British almost everywhere else. Not long ago, U.S. military forces delivered a destruction upon Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia that surpassed anything perpetuated by the older colonizers. And today, the U.S. counterinsurgency apparatus and surrogate secur-

ity forces in Latin America and elsewhere sustain a system of political assassination, torture and repression unequaled in technological sophistication and ruthlessness.

All this is common knowledge to critics of U.S. policy but most Americans would be astonished to hear of it. The American public has been taught that their country, unlike other nations, has escaped the sins of empire and has been a champion of peace and justice among nations. This enormous gap between what the United States does in the world and what Americans think their nation is doing is one of the great propaganda accomplishments of the dominant political mythology. (Although, it should be noted, that despite this propaganda barrage, large sectors of the public have throughout U.S. history displayed an anti-interventionist sentiment—facilely labeled "isolationism" by the imperialists—which most markedly expressed itself during the Vietnam era.)

Before analyzing the interventionalist mythology, let us give some further consideration to the policies it seeks to justify. Having emerged from World War II as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world, the U.S. assumed many of the burdens and most of the advantages of neocolonialism previously held by the other western nations. At the same time, there arose nationalist and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America sophisticated enough in ideology and tactics to achieve some dramatic revolutionary victories.

The conjunction—or maybe collision is a better word—of these two historical developments, the emergence of U.S. global hegemony and the growth of Third World social revolutions—by no means an accidental meeting of forces—has loomed as the primary area of struggle for U.S. foreign policy and remains the major impetus to U.S. interventionism.

While not making light of the various conflicts that have arisen between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (many of which have related to these same Third World struggles), the major contradiction in the world today, I maintain, is between the needs of global capitalism and the revolutionary and nationalistic resistance of the Third World. In a grander style, it might be said that the central conflict in the world is between capitalism and socialism, a struggle that is being waged in almost every nation under western imperialism and between the socialist and capitalist nations. Yet the primary challenge to the U.S. multinational corporate system comes from the revolutionary ferment of the underdeveloped (or overexploited) world and not from "Soviet expansion-

ism." Contrary to the view that the Soviets are inexorably advancing from country to country, the U.S.S.R. has suffered setbacks in China, Indonesia, Egypt, Somalia, India and Iraq far more serious than any advances in lesser countries. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that every advance made by the Soviets poses a threat to the United States.[1]

As already mentioned, the U.S. has been able to conduct its counterrevolutionary interventionism only by making substantial demands upon its own people. These demands have never been particularly popular. Just about every opinion survey over the last fifteen years—up until the jingoist hysteria of 1980—shows substantial majorities of Americans (1) have felt too much money was being spent on military appropriations, (2) have been against committing U.S. troops to foreign wars, (3) have strongly opposed the draft.[2]

A major problem for the U.S. ruling class, then, is the way the American people keep drifting off into reality and the way they repeatedly must be brought back to face the harsh illusions propagated by their rulers. Most Americans believe in the presumedly virtuous intentions of their nation but not in the necessity of continual interventions abroad. They are preoccupied with the task of economically surviving in this insecure and troubled society. So the system's academicians, media pundits, Pentagon and CIA opinion molders, White House policymakers and corporate leaders, along with representatives from all the other supposedly autonomous institutions of U.S. "pluralist" society, move with remarkably single-minded orchestration to justify U.S. policy to the world and to the American populace, drawing the public away from its distractions with reality and toward a more concerted focus on the mythology of U.S. interventionism.

On the remaining pages I would like to sketch some of the basic themes of the interventionist ideology.

From Altruism to Material Self-Interest

As already noted, a major theme of the American interventionist mythology is the assumption of virtuous motivation. The United States covers the globe with its fleets and military bases—and now, with its rapid deployment forces—because it seeks to "help" others. Supposedly at great sacrifice to itself, the United States aims to bring "stability" and "security" to other nations so that they might enjoy a better life and keep free from the ravages of revolution and commu-

nism. This theme enjoyed fulsome replay throughout the Vietnam conflict even though by the end of the war neither its propagators nor the public believed it. It is a modernized version of the "white man's burden," employing that particularly outrageous disregard for the truth which enables the colonizers to reverse the role of victim and victimizer.

In these hard times when altruism, or the pretense of altruism, is not well appreciated by most U.S. citizens—who believe that charity should begin at home—the interventionist mythologists talk less about defending and helping all the helpless "little peoples" of the world and more about looking out for Number One, and protecting "U.S. interests." Occasionally policymakers will specify what these interests really are. Dwight Eisenhower was neither the first nor last president to make it perfectly clear that "a serious and explicit purpose of our foreign policy [is] the encouragement of a hospitable climate for investment in foreign nations."[3]

More often policymakers and opinion molders give no specific definition to U.S. interests so that such interests might remain all the more inclusive and elastic, as the occasion dictates. "U.S. interests" are said to include not just the investments of business but the needs of all Americans, not just Exxon's profits but our entire way of life. Hence, far-off countries, previously unknown to most Americans, suddenly become vital to "our" interests. To protect "our" oil in the Middle East and "our" resources and "our" markets elsewhere, *our* sons (and maybe even daughters) might have to participate in overseas military ventures.

Appeals to material self-interest are not a new thing. Listen to the crass utterances of President Lyndon Johnson made before a cheering Junior Chamber of Commerce audience in 1966: "We own half the trucks in the world. We own almost half of the radios in the world. We own a third of all the electricity . . ." But the rest of the world, he added, wants the same things. "Now I would like to see them enjoy the blessings that we enjoy. But don't you help them exchange places with us, because I don't want to be where they are."[4]

Today as the economic crisis worsens, this kind of zero-sum consumer appeal is heard with increasing frequency. Rather than carry the standard of democracy into the world, we are now told we must protect our standard of living from the world. However, it is not merely a matter of trucks and radios but of oil, the energy and "life blood of the economy." And every time fuel bills and gas prices skyrocket, the interventionist mythologists present this as evidence of how the Iranian-PLO-Lybian-Iraqi-South Yemenite-Soviet Red Menace is undermining

our economic life.

The threat to American living standards is a real one, of course, and the suffering is real, especially among lower income groups. What is unreal is the way the threat is treated as coming from some foreign source rather than from a crisis within the capitalist economic system itself.

Inverted Morality and Double Standards

The moral code usually applied to a nation's activities does not operate quite the same as the one pertaining to individual behavior. The U.S. interventionist mythology gives dismaying demonstration of this. The ethics governing individual morality contain some measure of self-restraint or even self-sacrifice. Individual morality is predicated on the realization that sin, i.e., unjust and harmful behavior toward others, is always within human potential. To err is human and to sin is all too human. But the interventionist crusade is something more than human. It makes a nationalist appeal which not only transcends but inverts the individual moral code.[5] The individual should or should not do certain things (as in "Thou shalt not . . .") even at a cost to self-interest. To act *only* for one's self-interest is immoral. But the interventionists suffer no such restraint. Far from being immoral, it is considered the highest morality for national leaders to take any and all measures that might be necessary to advance U.S. interests, the only limitations being those imposed by power and desire. Thus, as an individual act, to murder someone for self-interested gain is immoral, but when done in "defense of our nation's interests," it is heroic and admirable.

There is, then, no limitation on ruling class self-interest when that interest is advanced in the name of the nation, and no sense of how broadly the U.S. ruling elites define their own interests and how narrowly they define the interests of others. Often they fail to recognize that other nations even have legitimate interests.

The Carter Doctrine gives clear example of this. The Doctrine declares that Middle East oil is so vital to the United States that the U.S. is ready to use force to protect access to that supply. Force against whom? Most likely against any revolutionary movement that threatens the capitalist social order in the Arabian-Persian Gulf area. In so many words, the Carter Doctrine is saying that it would be an act of aggression against the U.S. should any indigenous population lay claim to its own natural resources. Thus the "legitimate national interests" of

the United States extend into the very entrails of another nation, while indigenous peoples are not recognized as having interests of their own—not if these compete with U.S. desires. Third World peoples cannot even make a claim to their own natural resources without being branded as "aggressors" and "terrorists."

More often, the cold warrior mythologists tell us that the threat to "our" oil comes from the Soviet Union. Moscow might try for a share of the oil we have declared to be exclusively ours. Here we see that the inverted morality is a double standard of morality when applied to other nations. The grab for oil is a crusade worthy of a "doctrine" when it involves a U.S. claim, but it is a naked aggression when involving a Soviet claim. The Soviets are expected to be indifferent to their survival needs, while we, because it *is* a matter of survival, are justified in going to war over the matter. The double standard of morality demands a higher level of peace-loving restraint, reasonableness and sacrifice from our venal enemies than from our noble selves.

In any case, remember that it is the ruling classes of Western capitalist nations—above all, the United States—which control Middle Eastern oil supplies. Neither the Soviets nor any other socialist nation owns oil wells or refineries in that area, nor have they ever attempted to make a "grab" or even a "claim" to Arab-Persian oil. The worrisome Soviet "claim" seems to exist only in the festering imaginations of the cold warriors. In May 1981 the CIA released a report which conveniently predicted that Soviet oil production will peak and decline by 1985, thus giving the U.S.S.R. good reason to covet Mideast oil. The truth is that the Soviet Union has an oil surplus and is the greatest exporter of oil in the world—while the United States is the greatest importer. The Soviets have untapped reserves and potentially oil-rich regions yet to be explored. This is grudgingly admitted by U.S. experts who doubt the CIA "study."[6]

The moralistic facade of the interventionist posture is evident in the very use of a term like "doctrine." American foreign policy has had no shortage of "doctrines." We have had the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine and now the Carter Doctrine. A doctrine is a sacred teaching, a creed or fundamental tenet. What all the above "doctrines" have in common is that they are none of these. They are nothing more than policies or policy proclamations issued by U.S. leaders to legitimate U.S. expansionism or threats of force or both. By using such an elevated term as "doctrine," the ruling elites hope to cloak their interests in the mantle of morality, to elevate an imperialist power policy to the level of a hallowed principle.

The Giant Red Menace

The central purpose of the interventionist mythology is to deny that a great struggle is going on between U.S. economic imperialism and Third World liberation struggles. Instead, U.S. interventionism is portrayed as just so many defensive moves to counter the expansionist designs of a major communist power, usually the Soviet Union. The American people would balk at sending their sons off to die for Exxon, Chase Manhattan and ITT. So the ruling elites tell us that interventions are for "American interests," for our "national security," for our very survival and well-being. We supposedly are not fighting to make the world safe for capitalism but are trying to prevent one or another communist power from enslaving us.

Yet it is not easy to convince the people that, for instance, a tiny nation like Vietnam is a threat to U.S. security. The image of the Vietnamese getting into their PT boats and crossing the Pacific to invade California would be rejected by all but the most phobic. So official propagandists conjure up the image of a manipulative Giant Red Menace and its puppet regime. When asked why we were in Vietnam, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said it was to stop the Chinese. Similar sentiments were voiced by President Johnson and Vice-President Humphrey. *China* was the manipulative menace behind it all.[7]

Now that China, driven by its obsessive anti-Sovietism, pursues an overtly pro-fascist foreign policy, the cold war propagandists once more focus on the Soviet Union. And we are asked to believe that Angolans, Mozambiquians and others have faced death and destruction in valiant armed struggle not for themselves but because they are the mindless puppets of Moscow—a racist, anti-communist image of Third World peoples which the neocolonialists have no trouble accepting but which any reflective person would find incredible.

When Angola was liberated by MPLA forces, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan announced that the Atlantic was being turned into a "Soviet lake." And other cold warriors in Congress, faced with the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, alerted us to the notion that the Sandinistas were the puppets of the Cubans who, in turn, were the puppets of the Soviets. And throughout all the ferment in the Middle East there are people like Senator Henry Jackson who keep warning us that the Soviet Union is the real danger behind Iran and Iraq (even as both are locked in combat), and behind the PLO and behind every rebellious stirring in that region and in just about every other restive area of the globe.

As the mythology teaches us, U.S. interventionism is nothing more, and nothing less, than a defense against Soviet power. Not U.S. multinational corporate imperialism but "Soviet expansionism" is the cause of today's strife.

More recently Secretary Haig and others in the Reagan Administration, with a generous and uncritical assist from the news media, have conjured up the specter of a Moscow-directed "international terrorist network."[8] "Terrorism" is defined as including everything from airline hijacking to popular insurgencies and is deemed by cold war propagandists to be a practice peculiar to leftists. In May 1981, ex-CIA director William Colby, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, noted that while the Soviets may have had a hand in supplying and training guerrillas, there was little evidence that the Kremlin masterminded terrorist acts around the world. And there was even less proof that terrorism was a factor within the United States, according to testimony offered by FBI official Lee Colwell.[9]

Evidence or not, "international terrorism" has replaced "international communism" as the monolithic menace which justifies political repression at home, a repressive interventionalism abroad, and bloated military budgets for the Pentagon.

The puppet theory of Third World interventionism, which claims that the United States is really fighting the Soviet Menace whenever American weapons are used to kill Latino, Asian and Arab peoples, has been supplemented with a new and equally improbable formulation. U.S. strategists have long presumed that any war with the Soviet Union would be total, nuclear and of short duration, but in 1981 the Reagan administration made public the view that such a war might be limited, non-nuclear and of protracted duration, fought with conventional weapons in several parts of the world simultaneously. Not only "Moscow's puppets" but Moscow itself might be the adversary in the Middle East, the Far East or wherever. Under the guise of preparing for an improbable multi-front conventional war with the Soviets, U.S. militarists are equipping themselves for more extensive interventions in the Third World—which is where the protracted, non-nuclear wars are being fought. Once more the Giant Red Menace is used as a cover for U.S. Imperialism—and for increased military spending. "The new strategy would require investing huge sums of money in weapons and ammunition, transport, equipment and supplies. It would also require a vast mobilization of manpower and revitalization of the defense industry, [Reagan Administration] officials said."[10]

The Domestic Function of the Red Menace Myth

Supposedly the military budget is a response to the Giant Red Menace. More accurately, the budget is a response that goes looking for a crisis. In 1980 the Carter administration suddenly discovered a "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba which posed a potentially fatal threat to U.S. security and therefore justified massive increases in armaments spending. Subsequent investigation quickly revealed that the brigade was not really a combat-ready unit and that, in any case, it had been in Cuba for 19 years. Fortunately for the militarists, the Soviets did intervene in Afghanistan later that same year, providing an apparently plausible justification for greater arms spending. I say "apparently" because the increases were being urged by the military-industrial complex more than a year *before* the Soviets crossed the Afghanistan border, and President Carter's greatly escalated arms budget was at the government printers one month *before* the Soviet intervention.

As the above would suggest, increases in arms appropriations are less a response to international crisis (real or fabricated) than to imperatives built into the U.S. corporate economy. Military spending is the single most important source of public funding for private investment and profit. Taking into account the multiplier effect of a dollar spent and the network of subsidiary services that feed on the military dollar, possibly a fifth of all economic activity in the United States is dependent on military expenditures. Recently business publications like the *Wall Street Journal* and *Business Week* have openly treated military spending for what it is—a stimulant for a depressed economy, a WPA project for capitalism.[11]

American military-industrial interests have repeatedly conjured up the specter of Soviet weapons supremacy in order to maintain their hold over the public purse. In 1956, the American people were alerted to a dangerous "bomber gap"; in 1950, it was a "missile gap," in 1967, an "antiballistic missile gap," in 1975 a gap in the deployment of "multiple independently targeted nuclear warheads" (MIRVs). In each instance, it was subsequently discovered—after enormous leaps in military appropriations—that no such gap existed and that U.S. capabilities were superior to the Soviet Union's. Today, Pentagon officials and their kept publicists and Congressional spokesmen bombard us with stories of U.S. military forces so sadly deficient in supplies and weaponry as to evoke images of Valley Forge.

Anyone who reads the financial pages might understand that the real crisis is not from without but from within the system. The corporate

economy is beset by stagflation, recession, overcapitalization, declining investment opportunities and the ever-present threat of a falling rate of profit. By conjuring up the image of a foreign menace, the ruling class and its opinionmakers hope to still the restive voices of protest at home. The Red Scare of 1919-1920, and the McCarthyism of the 1950s served that purpose. The message is simple: do not agitate for jobs, unions, better wages and human services. The tiger is at the gate, and hearth and home are under siege. The dissenters must be contained, and the people must "lower their expectations."

The capitalist economy is in a condition of chronic malaise. It can no longer deliver the goods; it can no longer promise more and better things for all. The costs of its deterioration and stagnation must be borne by the middle and low income strata. To justify the need for still more public subsidization of big business and more cutbacks for the rest of us, the cold warriors propagate a siege psychology, sounding the alarm: "The Russians are coming!" So they hope to keep the public committed to interventionism abroad and resigned to economic sacrifice at home. It is a ploy used by rulers throughout history. Unable to bring order and equity to the economy, the ruling class settles for a different kind of order, one which muffles protest and class conflict and directs popular concerns toward external and often irrelevant foes.

The Rational Function of Myths

A myth is not an idle tale or a fanciful story, rather it is a powerful cultural force used to legitimate existing social relations. The interventionist mythology does just that, by emphasizing a community of interests between ruling class interventionists and the American people when in fact there is none, and by blurring over the question of who pays and who profits from imperialism.

The mythology has been with us for so long that there is a question about what portion of it has become internalized by the public so as to be considered part of the political culture, and what part must be repeatedly propagated by the interventionists. The interventionist mythology, like all other cultural beliefs, does not just float about in space. It must be mediated through a social structure. What impresses me is how volatile American public opinion is in regard to interventionism and cold war. Just when we thought detente was an established fact, the ruling elites were able to swing public opinion back into a cold war mentality. Then, just before the 1980 elections, at what

seemed the height of cold war hysteria—as columnists in *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* unhesitatingly talked about the likelihood of war between the superpowers—public opinion suddenly shifted away from nuclear confrontation and macho diplomacy, forcing Carter and Reagan to outdo each other in their professions of peace and moderation.

In a recent book, William Appleman Williams scolds the American people for having become addicted to the conditions of empire.[12] It seems "we" like empire. "We" live beyond our means and need empire as part of our way of life. "We" exploit the rest of the world and don't know how to get back to a simpler life. The implication is that "we" decided to send troops into Central America and Vietnam and overthrow Allende in Chile and Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatamala. And "we" urged the building of a global network of military and counterinsurgency bases. And "we" supported the Shah, trained the SAVAK torturers and carpet-bombed Indochina. In truth, ordinary Americans have seldom known about these things until after the fact, or—on the rare occasions they were informed—have opposed intervention or have not given very enthusiastic support.

For Williams, the imperialist ideology and policy are a product of mass thinking. Actually it is the other way around: mass thinking is a product of imperialist ideological manipulation—and at that, not always a stable and predictable product.

Within ruling class circles there are differences of opinion regarding interventionist policy. There are conservatives who complain that U.S. policy is plagued by weakness and lacks toughness and guts and all the other John Wayne virtues. And there are liberals who say U.S. policy is foolish and relies too heavily on military solutions and should be more flexible and cooptive when advancing the interests of the U.S. (read, U.S. capitalism).

I maintain that U.S. foreign policy is neither weak nor foolish, that it is rational and quite successful in reproducing the conditions for the continued international expropriation of wealth, and that while it has suffered serious defeats and will suffer more, the people who run U.S. foreign policy know what they are doing and why they are doing it.

If the mythology seems irrational, this does not mean that the policies it seeks to justify are irrational from the standpoint of the class interests of those who pursue such policies. This is true of domestic myths and policies as well as those pertaining to foreign policy. Once we understand this, we move from a liberal complaint to a radical analysis. We understand how seemingly irrational notions and arrange-

ments, ones that are harmful, wasteful, indeed, destructive of human and social values—and irrational from a human and social viewpoint—are not irrational for capitalism and imperialism because these latter forces have no dedication to human and social values. Capitalism has no loyalty to anything but itself. Once we understand that, we can see the cruel rationality of the seemingly irrational myths that capitalism peddles.

Sometimes what we see as irrational is really the discrepancy between what the myth wants us to believe and what is true. But again this does not mean the interests that are served are stupid or irrational, as the liberals like to complain. There is a difference between confusion and deception, and a difference between stupidity and subterfuge. Once we understand the underlying rational class interests of the cold warriors, we will be less mystified by their myths.

* * *

FOOTNOTES

1. For a good discussion of these points see The Editors, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1980s," *Monthly Review*, April 1980, pp. 1-12.

2. See the discussion of American public opinion in my *Democracy for the Few* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 43-46. Because of the public's strong disinclination to support the draft and commit troops to foreign interventions, U.S. policymakers have sought to shift more of the dirty tasks of armed intervention to "sub-imperialist" client states like Brazil, Iran (under the Shah) and Israel.

3. *The New York Times*, February 3, 1953.

4. See the discussion in my *The Anti-Communist Impulse* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 302.

5. For an interesting discussion of this and related points, see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny, A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963, originally published in 1935).

6. *Newsday*, May 10, 1981, and the *Daily World*, May 20, 1981. An Exxon report published in *World Energy Outlook*, December 1980, contradicts the CIA prognosis by estimating that the U.S.S.R. will be an oil exporter through the year 2000.

7. Similar opinions were held by other top officials in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. See *The New York Times*, July 29, 1965, October 13, 1967, and February 9, 1966.

8. See for instance the *Washington Post* editorial, January 27, 1981.

9. *Newsweek*, May 4, 1981, and the *Washington Post*, April 20, 1981.

10. *The New York Times*, April 19, 1981.

11. For an extended djscussion of this point see my "More Bucks for the Bang. *Progressive*, July 1980, pp. 27-30.

12. *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

U.S. Military Missions to Iran, 1943-1978: The Political Economy of Military Assistance

THOMAS M. RICKS

> Aid to Iran is not recommended primarily because Iran needs economic aid, but because it offers the most effective means of forcing the Iranians in spite of themselves to put their house in order.
>
> Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State, UM D-97
> April 21, 1950 in *Foreign Relations of the United States*:
> Vol. V (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 516.

> The largest, most pervasive source of technical assistance, on manpower problems was the United States foreign aid program, both civilian and military. There was hardly an agency or program of the Iranian Government concerned with training or education that did not have its Point IV experts or U.S. contract group.
>
> George Baldwin
> *Planning and Development in Iran*
> (New York, 1967), p. 145.

> Taken on balance, all U.S. foreign assistance is ultimately military or paramilitary in nature, even its ostensibly economic aid: it is designed primarily to enable foreign countries to support a military superstructure capable of saving the United States the cost of having to provide military service with its own armed forces.
>
> Michael Hudson, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid,"
> in *The Myth of Aid*, by Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson
> (New York, 1971), p. 80.

From the months of May to November 1942, the United States Department of State and the Iranian Government concluded a series of

agreements on the sending of American advisors to Iran. Three missions were designed to leave immediately for Iran despite the difficulties in obtaining skilled personnel in the midst of World War II. In October 1942, Major General Clarence S. Ridley arrived in Tehran as advisor to the Iranian Army while Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf along with Lieutenant Colonel Philip T. Boone and Captain William Preston as advisors to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie had preceded Ridley's mission by two months. Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh soon followed in January 1943 with six assistants as advisors in "virtually all fields of Iranian government finance."[1] The three American advisory teams were only the beginning of such missions to wartime and post-World War II Iran.

Iran Molded to Serve U.S. Needs in War and Peace

The nature and purposes of the military and financial missions of Ridley, Schwarzkopf, and Millspaugh were, in the short term, related directly to the needs of the various Allied war efforts against Nazi Germany in the Middle East, such as to the Cairo-based and British-operated Middle East Supply Center and to the Persian Gulf and American-operated Persian Gulf Service Command.[2] The latter was under the command of General Donald H. Connolly. The long-term purpose of the three missions, however, related directly to the United States-Iran post-World War II relations. Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of the Near Eastern Affairs and later Ambassador to Iran, remarked in August 1942 that "we shall soon be in the position of actually 'running' Iran through our impressive body of American advisers eagerly sought by the Iranian Government and urgently recmended by the British Government."[3] More explicit than Murray was the October 1942 letter from Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, to President Roosevelt in which he detailed six missions including those of Ridley, Schwarzkopf, and Millspaugh noting the special significance of General Ridley's military mission:

> The work of these various missions will be of great benefit since the officers and experts we have sent to Iran will not only be able to exert considerable personal influence upon Iranian opinion in a sense favorable to the general cause of the United Nations, but they will also be able to assist in the rehabilitation of the country which would seem to be a fundamental requisite for the ultimate

> conversion of Iran into an active and willing partner on our side. I feel now more than ever that the United States Army mission to work with the Iranian Army could in fact play an extremely important role in this work.[4]

Correspondence between the Department of State and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning other American missions referred to wide-ranging requests for specialists in entomology, rubber cultivation and municipalities, an advisor for the Iranian National Bank (Bank Melli), a teacher of mechanics for agricultural schools, a specialist in artesian-well drilling, engineers for agricultural irrigation "and an American to lead the Boy Scout movement in Iran"! While considered "less important Iranian requests," the 1942 shopping list for American assistance did embrace practically every phase of Iranian governmental and financial institutions in addition to Iran's rural and urban police, paramilitary, and military forces. Unlike most missions, however, the Ridley Mission to the Iranian Army and the Schwarzkopf Mission to the rural police, or Gendarmerie continued well beyond the end of World War II; the Millspaugh Mission was continued via American consulting firms and the Plan Organization.

The Schwarzkopf Mission known by 1943 as GENMISH, or Gendarmerie Mission Headquarters, continued from 1942 to 1976, thus becoming the oldest paramilitary/police mission to Iran or to a Middle Eastern country. The additional factor of "executive" rather than "advisory" power officially conferred upon Schwarzkopf and GENMISH by the November 1943 U.S.-Iran Agreement added new implications to the mission implicitly noted by Murray and Welles a year earlier. Just as the Millspaugh Mission of 1942-1945, the "executive clause" of the GENMISH Agreement was later changed; in September 1948, Article 20 of the GENMISH Agreement was amended and the GENMISH mission was restricted to an "advisory" role alone.

On the other hand, General Ridley only maintained an "advisory" function with the Iranian Army from 1942 to 1945. That function was altered, however, soon after the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 and the official commitment of the United States to prevent communist (Soviet) penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean region, particularly into Greece and Turkey. In October 1947, Iran was added to the list of key countries (Italy, Greece, and Turkey) to receive military assistance and, at the same time, ARMISH, or U.S. Army Military Headquarters was established. ARMISH was a direct descendent of the Ridley Mission with considerably more responsibilities and greater affect for Iran.

By 1950, MAAG, or Military Assistance Advisory Group was established at the same time as Iran's military assistance program expanded; as with ARMISH, the creation of MAAG coincided with increased military and economic assistance to Iran as part of the Truman administration's continued efforts to battle "communism" while primarily protecting and promoting American corporate interests abroad. Finally, in 1973, TAFTs, or Technical Assistance Field Teams which had originally been formed in 1968, completed the military missions to Iran bringing with its establishment additional military and economic benefits more in the form of sophisticated arms sales (FMS, or Foreign Military Sales and CMS, or Commercial Military Sales) than grants, credits, or loans.[5] The cash sales and TAFT training programs were possible in 1973 only with the increased oil revenues that had followed the 1973 oil price rise. As with ARMISH and then MAAG, consolidated in 1962 into ARMISH-MAAG, TAFTs were created at the time of increased concern over the weaknesses in the U.S. economy as well as over the progress of the Vietnam war, the European economic resurgence, and China-Soviet issues. The continued containment of the Communist Bloc and the impending collapse of the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam led to the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine of July 1969 and a decision to use sophisticated arms sales to counter U.S. balance of payments problems. The TAFTs in Iran was both a political and an economic response by the United States to the home economy and "Asian dilemma"; Iran was to be further incorporated into America's global Maginot line.

It is possible, therefore, to periodize the history of U.S. military missions in Iran according to the economic and political interests of the United States within Iran and the region and to the political and military exigencies of American global interests:

1. **1943-1946** World War II and Iran as part of the "Middle East Theatre," U.S. and British joint commands in the Persian Gulf region, the 1944 to 1946 U.S. and Soviet oil concessions crisis, the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, Morrison-Knudsen, Itl. in 1946.

GENMISH or Gendarmerie Military Mission in 1943-1976.

Ridley Mission as a continuation of Wheeler & Greely in 1942-1945.

Persian Gulf Service Command of General Donald H. Connolly, 1943-1945.

U.S. Financial Mission of Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, 1943-1945.

2. **1947-1949** Truman Administration, recovery of Europe, and U.S. global reach via military credits and grants: Truman Doctrine, 1947, CIA established, 1947, General Marshall's Plan for Europe, 1948 and NATO, 1949. In Iran, Overseas Consultants, Inc. 1948 and Plan Organization in 1949 with Mutual Defense Assistance Program in 1949. Greek Civil War, 1946-1949.

ARMISH or U.S. Army Military Mission in 1947-1978.

3. **1950-1962** Point Four's "bold new program" in 1950, Mutual Security Act in 1951 following Korean War and "loss" of China. Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, Nasser and the Suez Canal, Qassem's coup in Baghdad, 1958, Baghdad Pact, 1955 and CENTO in 1959. For Iran, Mossadegh Period, 1951-53, CIA-assisted coup, 1953, American oil companies into Iran, 1954, Harvard Advisory Group and 3rd Seven-Year Plan, 1958-1962, U.S.-Iran Mutual Defense Treaty, 1959, Industrial Mining and Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI), 1959, Peace Corps/Iran in 1962, Extraterritorial Legal Status to U.S. Military Advisors, 1962-1964.

MAAG or Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iran, 1950-1978. ARMISH-MAAG consolidation, 1958-1962.

SAVAK set up by CIA and Israelis, 1957/Rangers by MAAG, 1958.

4. **1963-1978** Laos and Vietnam; "wars without end" in Indochina, Cuba and Latin America, African liberation movements, Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine, 1969, OPEC to 1973 "crisis," October War, 1973, arms sales and Carter Human

Rights policy. In Iran, 1963 Uprising, Iranian guerrilla movements, 1965-1976 particularly, 1970 U.S. bankers in Tehran, 1971 Siyahkal Uprising, 2500 Anniversary of Monarchy, 1971; 1973 events in March (arms sales), in June (Lt.Col. Hawkin's death by People's Mujahidin), in Oct. (Middle East war and oil price rise), in Dec. (Iranian troops in Oman with Jordanian and British troops), 1977-79 years of demonstrations.

TAFT or Technical Assistance Field Team in Iran, 1973-1978.

"White-collar" mercenaries in Iran, 1973-1978.

The wartime "running" of Iran noted by Wallace Murray was only part of the hope that Iran would become "an active and willing partner on our [U.S.] side" according to Sumner Welles. The feeling expressed by the Under Secretary of State in 1942 that "the United States Army mission to work with the Iranian Army could in fact play an extremely important role in this work [a pro-U.S. Iran]" was both prophetic as well as planned.

Iran "Stabilized" for U.S. Commercial and Financial Interests

In December 1943, following the Tehran Conference between Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin Roosevelt, the American President outlined to his ambassador-at-large, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, "a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations" adding that "I was rather thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unselfish American policy."[6] At the same time as the Roosevelt visit to Tehran, Dr. Millspaugh, Director of the U.S. Financial Mission to Iran, outlined on the President's request, a 20-year U.S. aid program to Iran supporting Roosevelt's basic propositions adding that:

> Iran, because of its situation, its problems and its friendly feeling toward the United States, is (or can be made) something in the

> nature of a clinic—an experiment station—for the President's post-war policies—his aim to develop and stabilize backward areas.[7]

Both Millspaugh and Roosevelt could not have foreseen all the implications of their plans. Nevertheless, the post-World War II policy which did emerge was a policy intimately tied to the U.S. military assistance programs; programs which assisted in the restructing of the economy on behalf of U.S. industrial and financial interests. The escalation of U.S. military missions from 1943 to 1978 encompassed arms sales, training programs, and increasing numbers of American advisors both military and civilian. With the expansion of the arms sales from grants in aid to credit and then to cash sales, the training programs and numbers of Americans increased proportionately. In time, the military missions from 1943 to 1978 involved U.S. administrative, financial, military and intelligence agencies in one form or another. The missions had become an interventionary force in Iran and in the region. According to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in a letter to the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, on October 17, 1945, the issue of the U.S. military missions in Iran was already an essentially critical aspect of post-World War II U.S. foreign policy:

> Continuance of the Military Missions to Iran, at the request of the Iranian Government, is considered to be in the national interest of the United States. Strengthening of Iran's internal security forces by the American Missions contributes to the stabilization of Iran and, thereby, to its reconstruction as a sound member of the international community. By increasing the ability of the Iranian Government to maintain order and security, it is hoped to remove any pretext for British or Soviet intervention in Iran's affairs . . . The stabilization of Iran, moreover, will serve to lay a sound foundation for the development of American commercial, petroleum, and aviation interests, in the Middle East.[8]

From Independent State to Colonial Appendage

U.S. military missions to Iran from GENMISH in 1943 through the 1962 consolidation of ARMISH with MAAG and the 1973 arrival of TAFT rendered valuable service to the multinationals and their global corporate interests through assisting in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.[9] From 1943 to 1978, the missions assisted the U.S. foreign policy of (1) holding the oil regions for the United States, European and

Japanese corporate interests, (2) preventing (and containing) the Soviet Union from access to the oil region, (3) gaining access to Iranian air space for intelligence gathering, to the land space for agribusiness, and to Iranian labor and markets for "modernization" and (4) assisting in the conversion of that country into a military "satellite" as part of the U.S. global "shield." While State Department cables and memoranda spoke of Iran and U.S. interests in Iran in slightly different language, the content of the various cables and memoranda was essentially the same as the abovementioned summation.[10]

U.S. foreign policy and the military missions were thus, in one way or another, an integral part of the post-World War II "global reach" of the multinational corporations. Both worked towards strengthening the Pahlavi monarchy, establishing essential U.S. programs and training projects, such as MAAG and Point Four, to maintain law and order and preserve Iran's "political integrity" thus controlling all internal opposition while ensuring markets, private investments, assembly industries, and oil exports. While an examination of the corporations and their activities in Iran is beyond the scope of this work, an examination of the purposes of the military missions is not.

Co-optation of Elites, Control of Masses

The military missions to Iran basically organized and trained Iran's rural and urban police as well as paramilitary and military forces along the lines of American police and military organizations in order to maintain social and political order within the country.[11] Secondly, they created and experimented with forms of police control of the national movements as well as all individual opposition to the Shah through the establishment of a rural police/paramilitary force, urban police and riot squads, a secret police, or SAVAK, and an urban counterinsurgency unit within the Army's airborne division.[12] Thirdly, they supported and protected the ruling elites within Iran's aristocratic, military, and land-owning classes thus maintaining the social *status quo* with selective changes over time when United States political and economic interests so required; examples can be found in the wartime GENMISH program of recruitment among the tribal people, the Point Four projects, Plan Organization's programs, or the Imperial Iranian Air Force *homafars* (civilian technicians).[13] In addition, the military missions continually expanded their operations with the administration of loans, grants, and credits as military and economic aid, such as in October 1947 following

aid programs to Greece and Turkey as part of the Truman Doctrine, or in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act program to Iran in May 1950 and again in April 1952.[14] The missions included by 1969 the introduction of technical assistance field teams, or TAFTs thus expanding U.S. military assistance into sophisticated weapons training and equipment maintenance.[15] Finally, the U.S. military advisors usualy associated with ARMISH-MAAG acted more often in a "salesman's role" rather than as military trainers after the 1973 increase in arms sales; the petrodollar boom resulting from increased oil production and prices was profitable both to the oil and to the arms corporations.[16]

U.S. military missions were not, therefore, merely assistance programs isolated from U.S. corporate interests or unrelated to U.S. world-wide geo-political interests. Without question, they formed an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in containment of the USSR while supporting the multinational corporations in their search for "optimum operating conditions" and "favorable investment climate." The quest led inexorably both to the formation of "stable governments" and to the propping up of "mildly authoritarian rulers." Inevitably, such governments meeting the standards of multinational corporations also occupied strategic geographical positions or contained strategic natural resources and large populations. Iran was, beyond doubt, the best example for favorable investment, agribusiness experimentation, commodity goods market, and military missions. Not only did it occupy a strategic position on the Soviet periphery and along the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, it possessed one of the largest reserves of world oil and maintained the world's largest refinery. Along with Brazil, the Philippines, and South Africa, Iran too became a "regional influential" for U.S. industries, banking institutions, and military missions. In the course of testimony on a new executive agreement on U.S. base rights in Spain, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Senate Committee in 1970 that

> Overseas forces, the presence of elements of U.S. armed forces, joint planning, joint exercises, or extensive military assistance programs represent to host governments more valid assurances of U.S. commitment than any treaty or agreement. Furthermore, any or all of the above instances of U.S. military presence all but guarantee some involvement by the U.S. in the internal affairs of the host government.[17]

The role of the military missions in Iran during World War II was only the beginning of an intervention more clearly justified by the later

doctrines of Presidents Truman (1947), Eisenhower (1957), Kennedy (1962), and Nixon (1969). Similar to the interrelationship between Third World land reforms and the multinational corporate interests, the missions assisted the corporations in supporting some Iranian institutions while altering others.[18] The missions' principal purpose was to prevent revolution while allowing capital investment, limited industrialization, and the export of petrodollars. Such "finetuning" was not without risks as can so well be documented from the list of reforms-turned-revolutions. Ultimately, the military missions like the land reforms in Iran only delayed the popular challenges to Pahlavi dictatorial rule and their brand of "modernization."

U.S. Officers and Advisors Outrank Iranian Counterparts

On November 27, 1943, the United States agreed to send a U.S. Army mission to Iran effective October 2, 1942 "to advise and assist the Ministry of Interior in the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie" with the U.S. officers maintaining "precedence over all Iranian Gendarmerie officers of the same rank."[19] The Minister of Interior was charged with appointing the chief of the Mission "as head of the Imperial Organization of the Iranian Gendarmerie" from the American officers also to maintain rank "precedence over all officers of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie."[20] According to Article 20 of the November Agreement, the American chief of the Mission was also granted the right to recommend to the Iranian Minister of Interior "the appointment, promotion, demotion, or dismissal of any employee of the Gendarmerie" with no other authority having "the right to interfere."[21] Finally, Iran agreed that no officers of other countries will serve in the Gendarmerie while members of the United States military mission were engaged.

The November Agreement of 1943 concluded the establishment of GENMISH, or Gendarmerie Military Mission; a mission first mentioned in State Department diplomatic records on January 6, 1942 in response to a request from Iran for an advisor to their police force. It was then mentioned on several occasions between January and October 1942 that an advisor to the Iranian police was desirable for the Wheeler Mission of December 1941, for that mission's transport of supplies to the Soviet Union, and as "a valuable source of information to our legation at Tehran regarding the conditions in Iran."[22] While the

powers granted to GENMISH in November 1943 were not only *advisory* but also *executive*, the uses of the mission and its personnel were not limited to the wartime allied effort of "bridge to victory." GENMISH became a target of increasing opposition for its "intelligence" activities as well as for its "executive" function within the Iranian Government.

The principal object of both popular and organized opposition was Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the first chief of GENMISH. Wallace Murray, State Department's Advisor on Political Relations, described Colonel Schwarzkopf's qualifications to Louis Dreyfus, the U.S. Minister in Iran in an August 24, 1942 letter. Murray stated that Schwarzkopf was "exceptionally qualified for the job" due to his personality, his fifteen years of experience as "founder and head of the New Jersey State Police" and as a graduate of West Point recently returned to the regular Army.[23] With his equally qualified assistants, Lieutenant Colonel Philip T. Boone and Captain William Preston, Schwarzkopf spent June and July 1942 in Washington, D.C., preparing for the Mission's August departure. In the meantime, State Department informed Dreyfus in Tehran that L. Stephen Timmerman was preparing to leave for Iran in September 1942 as City Police Advisor while Schwarzkopf was assigned to the rural police, or Gendarmerie; the January 1942 job request ultimately was divided between Timmerman and Schwarzkopf. Along with Timmerman, James P. Sheridan was also being sent in September 1942 as the Food and Supply Advisor. The arrival of the two American advisors did not however prevent the December 1942 "bread riots" in Tehran; Timmerman even reported that the Tehran police handled themselves well. Colonel Schwarzkopf's Mission in August 1942, defined in October 1942 and finally confirmed officially in November 1943, also did not prevent tribal or peasant uprisings from occurring. The overall effect of GENMISH was long-term while the political and popular suspicions and opposition were felt almost immediately.

From 1942 to 1946, Schwarzkopf and his assistants reorganized, trained, armed, and commanded Iran's 20,000 rural police/paramilitary force from the Gendarmerie headquarters in Tehran. By March 1943, Schwarzkopf and his assistants had submitted a 200-page reorganization plan of the Gendarmerie to the Ministry of Interior with considerable detail on "basic and staff organization" as well as "district and regimental organization." Hindered at that time by his "unofficial" advisory status due to the delays in formalization of his mission, Schwarzkopf had already found his relationship with certain Iranian military a difficult one. In March 1943, for example, General Agveli, head

of the Gendarmerie, encouraged his subordinates to "withhold action" with Schwarzkopf, failed to support the Mission's suggestions, carried on a whisper campaign against the U.S. advisor, and withheld vital information from Schwarzkopf and his assistants.[24]

U.S. Enjoys "Very Broad Powers" Over Iranian Gendarmerie

While the November 27, 1943 GENMISH Agreement solved Schwarzkopf's chain-of-command problems by giving him "executive" power and placing the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of Interior, the Shah and the Iranian Army command were greatly displeased with the arrangement. According to the Office of Strategic Services, the Shah was "incensed" at the granting of the "very broad powers" to Schwarzkopf while Generals Riazi, Razmara, Ansari, and Hedayat (former and future Ministers of War and Chiefs of Staff) continued to work for the return of the Gendarmerie to the Army's control.[25] Despite the formidable opposition from within Iran, however, the unflagging support from State Department and Allied Command was sufficient to carry Schwarzkopf's GENMISH through the war not only as an "independent" police/paramilitary unit but also as one of the most successful "advisory" missions to Iran. The successful reorganization, recruitment, and training programs were noticed particularly by Sir Clarmont P. Skrine. His April 1943 visits from Mashhad, capital-city of the northeastern province of Khurasan, to Tehran brought to his attention the "scale and comprehensiveness of the American intervention" by the Spring of 1943. After noting the work of the Persian Gulf Command, General Ridley's Mission to the Iranian Army, and other American missions to police administration, irrigation, agricultural education, and public health, Skrine then wrote:

> By far the most successful, however, of the missions sent by the U.S. to help Persia in her war-time plight was that of Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf . . . His assignment was to reorganize the Gendarmerie, which he and his team of handpicked American officers did most thoroughly and in a remarkably short time.[26]

By 1944, the Schwarzkopf mission along with General Ridley's Iranian Army advisory mission had "stabilized" Iran's rural and urban areas. In two 1944 intelligence reports from Cairo and from Tehran, the

coordination between the Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions as well as the noticeable improvement in both the Army and the Gendarmerie were stressed. In November 1943 and again in March 1944, the Soviet military notified Colonel Schwarzkopf of their intentions of withdrawing Russian troops along Iran's northwestern border from Maku to Mahabad, a border separating northern Iranian Kurdistan from Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan. Schwarzkopf proposed a plan to place six battalions of Iranian Army in "base camps to guarantee quiet along the border where the armed Kurds form a great majority of the population" while nine companies (of about 150 men each) of Gendarmerie "patrol the roads and village posts."[27] The general purpose of the Schwarzkopf plan was to use the Iranian Army to subdue the region by disarming the Kurds and setting up base camps. The Gendarmerie "can only maintain security after the area is put under control of the army."[28]

The incident is noteworthy in explaining the role of the Iranian rural police/paramilitary as envisaged by Schwarzkopf at the time of Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan, Iran, and during the period of increased Kurdish nationalism. In the end, however, while the Soviets twice proposed to abandon the strategic border area in Iranian Kurdistan to Iranian military and police/paramilitary forces, the Soviet proposal and Colonel Schwarzkopf's plans came to naught due principally to "a very half-hearted reception by the Shah and the Chief of Staff, General Riazi."[29] The earlier pique over the separation of the Gendarmerie from the Ministry of War and the "executive" powers granted to Schwarzkopf accounted for much of that reception.

In December 1944, the Military Attaché in the United States Embassy in Tehran reported that despite "rebellious tribesmen in various remote sections of the country," Allied troop withdrawals will not affect the central government's stability due to "the Army and the greatly improved Gendarmerie."[30] The Report states further that General Ridley's mission "of an advisory nature primarily concerned with improving the administrative functioning of the Iranian Army" has improved the Army as "the main bulwark of the central government, and particularly of the Shah"; Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission "has a definite effect in discouraging brigandage and in promoting security along the routes" and therefore is also "a decided strength factor in maintaining stability and law and order in the country."[31] The Report concluded that "the Army and Gendarmerie are capable of eventually putting down any tribal disorders or rebellions [and] . . . capable of dealing effectively with any disorders or violence which may break out in urban centers."[32]

Russians: From "Hot-War Allies to Cold-War Rivals"

The national movements for autonomy in 1946 Azerbaijan as well as Soviet delays in troop withdrawal from Northern Iran and the heightened activism of the Tudeh (Masses) Party of Iran were all challenges to the central government and to the Shah; they were also challenges to Allied and United States interests in particular. While the Iranian Parliament struggled with the Tudeh Party, Allied and Soviet oil concessions, and Azerbaijan, the American-organized and trained Army and Gendarmerie were clearly instrumental in the resolution of those issues of 1944 to 1946. The observations of Sir Clarmont Skrine are particularly instructive. In reflecting back upon 1946, he states that:

> It was the vigorous American intervention, the financial, military and gendarmerie Missions [of Millspaugh, Ridley, and Schwarzkopf], the apparent U.S. drive to capture the Persian market, and above all the efforts of Socony-Vacuum and Shell to secure oil-prospecting rights that changed the Russians in Persia from hot-war allies to cold-war rivals, if not enemies . . . Colonel Schwarzkopf's Gendarmerie and the improved discipline and armament of the regular troops were two of the best cards in the Prime Minister's hand [in 1946].[33]

By December 1946, Soviet troops were out of Iran, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and the Turkish Republic of Tabriz had collapsed, and Iran's (and the Shah's) political integrity preserved. In the fall of that year, General Ridley was replaced by General Robert W. Grow and, in June 1948, Colonel Schwarzkopf was followed as Chief of GENMISH by General James R. Pierce. The two men most directly responsible for the improvements in Iran's Army and Gendarmerie and indirectly responsible for the Soviet departure and collapse of the national movements in Azerbaijan had passed from Iran, at least temporarily. The later General Schwarzkopf returned to Iran in the summer of 1953 to participate in the overthrow of the popular nationalist government of Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh; the participation of Schwarzkopf in the CIA-supported *coup* of August 19, 1953 was necessary for its successful conclusion due to Schwarzkopf's 1942-1948 ties with the rural police and his continued friendship with such military notables of 1953 as General Fazlollah Zahedi.[34]

By the Spring of 1947, new issues had also replaced the old ones of World War II. The combination of the 1947 Truman Doctrine to support the anti-communist governments of Greece and Turkey, the

1948 Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe, and the 1949 announcement of the "Point Four" Program for technical assistance to the "underdeveloped countries" as well as the signing of the North Atlantic Pact (NATO) for American-European mutual security were all evidences of new global directions in America's post-World War II role. In each case, the doctrines, plans, and mutual security pacts of the 1947 to 1949 period directly affected Iran. Beginning with the establishment of ARMISH, or the U.S. Army Mission to Iran to organize, train and assist Iran's military assistance program (MAP), the escalation of American involvement in Iran was reflected in Iran's inclusion in the Truman Doctrine, the contracting of Morrison-Knudsen and the Overseas Consultants, Inc. to conduct surveys and suggest a comprehensive development plan for Iran, and the role of Max Weston Thornburg in Iran's 1949 Plan Organization and Seven-Year Plan. While generally unplanned and rarely coordinated, the overall effect of the post-World War II global interests of American financial and industrial corporations, particularly the oil corporations, directly affected the military missions in Iran. The first important alteration was the restructuring of the Ridley Mission to the Iranian Army's administration and financial management.

New U.S. Multiple Missions Tighten Controls

On October 6, 1947, the U.S. Army Mission, or ARMISH became the official military mission to the Iranian Army succeeding the limited advisory mission of General Clarence S. Ridley. As the successor to Ridley and the Chief of the mission, General Robert W. Grow became the new head of ARMISH in Theran with the signing of the U.S.-Iran Military Mission Agreement. The purpose was to enhance "the efficiency of the Iranian Army" through cooperation with the Ministry of War and the Iranian Army command. The American officers, approved jointly by Iran and the United States, were assigned to the Advisory Department of the Iranian Ministry of War, a department under the command of the American chief of mission. The officers were to maintain their rank held in the U.S. Army with "precedence over all Iranian Army officers of the same rank" while executing their mission "to advise and assist the Ministry of War of Iran . . . with respect to plans, problems concerning organization, administrative principles and training methods."[35] The American officers' duties involved the General Staff and all departments of the Ministry of War in Tehran "except

tactical and strategical plans or operations against a foreign enemy, which are not related to the duties of the Mission."[36] As with the GENMISH Agreement of November 1943, the ARMISH Agreement bound the Government of Iran to consultation with the United States on the employment of any personnel "of other foreign government for duties of any nature connected with the Iranian Army."[37]

In 1949, a number of alterations, necessitated by the replacement of the War Department by the Departments of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, occurred in the ARMISH Agreement. The principal change was the inclusion of the phrase "United States Air Force" along with the United States Army into the original text thus expanding (and clarifying) the Mission's officer corps. The Army and Air Force Mission to the Iranian Army continued to be called ARMISH even after the 1958 to 1962 consolidation with MAAG, or Military Assistance Advisory Group; from 1962 to 1979, the two advisory missions were referred to as ARMISH-MAAG and carried essentially the same functions originally prescribed until the February 1979 collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy and the Imperial Guard.

The principal reasons, according to the State Department, for the creation of ARMISH were threefold: (1) the "extension of the Truman Doctrine" to include Iran as a "bastion in both the political and strategic sense, which, if breached, would create a situation, the virtually inevitable result of which would be Soviet domination of the entire Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East;"[38] (2) the inclusion of Iran in a military assistance program similar to Korea and the Philippines in 1947; and (3) the continuation of U.S. military assistance "aimed at internal security, not national defense, of Iran."[39] The combination of strategic position on the Soviet periphery, an oil-based economy favorable to the credit and loan arrangements of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or "World Bank," and a history of political struggle for national independence against the monarchy and foreign capital necessitated the changes from General Ridley's advisory mission of 1942 to General Grow's ARMISH in 1947.

Along with ARMISH, moreover, State Department continually prescribed social and economic reforms in place of an expanding military and police budget which limited internal economic development; limitations found in the Marshall Plan for European recovery. The first step towards such reforms was made on December 17, 1946 when Iran signed a contract with an American firm, Morrison-Knudsen International Engineering Company. The firm, also under contract with Afghanistan, was to survey Iran's economic potentials and prepare a

report within six months; the cost of the survey ($100,000) seemed adequate to cover the expenses of seven or eight experts to investigate Iran's irrigation, dams, agriculture, transportation, power and fuel, industry, mining and communication in order to secure loans from Export-Import Bank or World Bank.[40] The July 1947 *Report on Programs for the Development of Iran* by Morrison-Knudsen recommended concentration on agriculture, then roads, railways, sea and air ports, and a private Persian oil company. While the Prime Minister's Permanent Commission headed by Dr. Ali Amini revised the Report by 1949, State Department discussions with Morrison-Knudsen, and World Bank continued into August 1948 until it was agreed that further recommendations on Iran's economic and social conditions be made by another survey team.

Oil Executives Become U.S. Advisors

On October 7, 1948, Overseas Consultants, Inc., or OCI, signed a contract with Iran to conduct another survey of its economic and social conditions; the American engineering firms participating in OCI had completed surveys in post-World War II Germany and Japan. An associate of the Standard group of oil companies, OCI was chaired by the former vice-president of California Texas Oil Company and former petroleum advisor to the State Department, Max Weston Thornburg. Like many other American "oil men," Thornburg held executive positions in oil corporations at the same time advising the State Department on its post-World War II oil policy.[41] He also became like men such as Torkild Rieber, George C. McGhee, A. A. Curtice, Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Walter Levy, intimately involved in the "reconstruction and development" of Middle Eastern countries; in the case of Thornburg and the others noted above, all were closely involved in Iran's economic and political development during the crucial years of 1945 to 1955. At the same time, Thornburg and the other "oil men" were advising State Department, private consulting firms, World Bank, and even Iran itself.[42] Due to his 1940 to 1943 advising to State Department and his consulting for Iran's Supreme Planning Council in 1946 to 1948, Max Thornburg not only suggested the hiring of Morrison-Knudsen, he also headed and promoted the Overseas Consultants, Inc. in 1948.

Arriving in Iran in March 1949 along with a team of twelve OCI engineers, Thornburg worked for six months before completing the five-volume report contracted for and promised. The August 22, 1949

Report on Seven Year Development Plan for the Plan Organization of the Imperial Government of Iran offered further recommendations for Iran's Seven-Year Plan which had been approved by the *majlis* or Parliament on February 15, 1949. With the approved budget of $650 million partially funded by Iran's oil revenues and partially by a World Bank loan, OCI and Max Thornburg detailed plans for the implementation of the Seven-Year Plan.[43] By December 1950, however, OCI had withdrawn from the Plan Organization with Thornburg himself leaving Iran in January 1951. Both departures were principally due to the political turbulence arising out of the 1949-1951 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's dispute with the Iranian Parliament, particularly with Dr. Mossadegh's Nationalization Bill. By May 1951, the Parliament had declared Iran's oilfields under Iranian control and a major portion of the Seven-Year Plan's funds changed hands.

Aid to Iran Linked to U.S. Objectives

On September 22, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote the Iranian Ambassador, Hussein Ala, that Iran would receive both economic and military assistance including technical advisors in agriculture, public health, education, and industrial training under the Smith-Mundt and Point Four programs. Furthermore, Acheson noted:

> It is the opinion of this Government that early implementation of the Seven-Year Program by the Government of Iran through the use of resources presently available to it is the next possible means of raising the standard of living of the Iranian people, thereby contributing to Iran's resistance to the aggression mentioned in the Ambassador's note under reference.[44]

The Secretary's assurance of support for the oil-revenue based and World Bank funded Seven-Year Plan in order to contribute to Iran's resistance to Soviet aggression was similar to Ambassador John C. Wiley's August 1949 letter to Secretary Acheson concerning ARMISH and the purposes of the Military Assistance Program, or MAP to Iran. Noting the importance of the U.S. advisory missions to Iran and the need for MAP, Wiley pointed out that:

> No one imagines that now or in future Iranian Army could prevent Soviet invasion. As we understand it, object of MAP from military point of view is to insure internal security and to increase cost of

> invasion in terms of personnel and time required, and possibly to maintain with tribal assistance some form of prolonged resistance particularly in southern mountains.[45]

The Seven-Year Plan and the Military Assistance Program were both viewed therefore by State Department as countermeasures to Soviet incursions into the region's oilfields; they were also measures of counterrevolution to any changes within the political structure of the Iranian Government, namely the institution of the monarchy.[46] The commitment to Iran's "stability" as a "bastion" in support of United States economic and political interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East meant commitment to the monarchy through economic and military loans, credits, and grants. The Seven-Year Plan under Max Thornburg's guidance was soon complimented by the Point Four program under William E. Warne's directorship (1951-1955). The need for economic development and social reform as the "first and most important line defense against U.S.S.R.," according to Secretary of State Acheson, was already indicated in the "internal security" clause of Article 8 in the 1947 ARMISH Agreement.[47] Advising and training the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie during World War II had been upgraded in 1947 to a *permanent* mission of U.S. Army and Air Force personnel within Iran's Ministry of War. By 1949, General Vernon Evans, chief of ARMISH and successor to General John W. Grow, spent nearly as much time on MAP and regional military coordination as on the organizing and training of the Iranian Army, so important had military aid in the form of loans and grants become to Iran's internal security. In addition, just as MAP followed the establishment of the Marshall Plan for European Recovery, so too ARMISH followed the establishment of the North Atlantic Pact; between 1955 and 1958, regional mutual defense alliances were formed by the United States, Iran, and its regional neighbors in a much more explicit reproduction of the NATO arrangement.

Iran's Nationalism and Neutralism Deemed as Dangerous as Communism

Two events in 1950 indicated that the U.S. military missions to Iran were undergoing a third phase of development. In May 1950, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) were established; the latter was to

implement the former. In October 1950, the Technical Cooperation Mission to Iran, or "Point Four" was signed into force by the United States and Iran. As with ARMISH and the Seven-Year Plan between 1947 and 1949, the MAAG and Point Four agreements were further commitments to Iran's "stability" and "internal security"; that is, commitments to the increase of capital-intensive development and the preservation of the monarchy. Such a policy meant, in time, a collision and confrontation with every national movement for change and self-reliance. Such collisions and confrontations, moreover, were consistently flagged as "evidence" of Soviet infiltration and thus opposed from the outset by the multinationals and State Department. "Hence," according to Gabriel Kolko, "nationalism and modest but genuine reform were quite as great an enemy as bolshevism."[48] By 1951, State Department officials had gone one step further following the nationalization of the Iranian oilfields by Parliament and the emergence of Dr. Mossadegh as a major challenge to the Shah. George C. McGhee, an "oil man" as well as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that "The situation in Iran is [May 4, 1951] without question the most dangerous in the area for which I am responsible. I think it is safe to say Iran is the weak spot on the entire periphery of Russia."[49] McGhee added that unless efforts were made in reestablishing the orientation toward the West which once existed in Iran," Iran may "turn more and more to, not association with Russia . . . but a type of neutralism which means we cannot count on Iran as a cog in the system of collective security that we are attempting to build."[50] In time, the MAAG and Point 4 programs successfully combatted such "neutralism" so dangerous to U.S. economic and political interests. The 1953 CIA-assisted *coup* accomplished the task.

Iran Committed to U.S. Defense Targets

In comparison with GENMISH and ARMISH, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, or MAAG was by far the most important U.S. military mission to Iran. MAAG like the previous missions strengthened the existing military command structure as well as increased the efficiency of the Army and Gendarmerie through training programs and arms purchases. Unlike the previous missions, however, MAAG facilitated extensive military and financial assistance, created new military and paramilitary command structures and participated in commercial

as well as governmental arms sales. From 1953 to 1979, MAAG became involved in every branch of Iran's military and police forces and affected nearly every facet of Iran's economy. As a result of MAAG, Iran was finally and firmly placed in the same U.S. military assistance category as Greece and Turkey after years of vacillation on State Department's part as to whether Iran belonged with the Eastern Mediterranean countries or with the East Asian nations of Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Iran's regional position became more clearly defined than ever before with the establishment of MAAG in 1950, and Iran assumed greater importance in such alliances as the 1955 Baghdad Pact and the 1958 Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. To a considerable extent, the U.S. military missions "came of age" with the establishment of MAAG and Iran became a "regional influential."

On May 23, 1950, the U.S.-Iran Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed and the Military Assistance Advisory Group created. Essentially, the Agreement bound the United States to grant to Iran "such equipment, materials, and services as the Government of the United States may authorize" subject to the terms and conditions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.[51] In return, Iran agreed, according to Article 4, that:

> The Government of Iran, after giving due consideration to reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Iran, which are to be determined by the Iranian Government itself, agrees to facilitate the production, transport, export and transfer to the Government of the United States of America, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as to the value, method of payment, et cetera, as may be agreed upon, of *raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Iran.*[52]

Finally, in order to implement the Agreement and to facilitate the military assistance, MAAG was created as "technical personnel" with a permanent status in Iran.

The importance of MAAG, therefore, rested on its function of providing technical advice on new arms purchases, new training projects and related equipment maintenance programs as prescribed by expanding U.S. military and economic assistance. Secondly, MAAG's tasks were tied to a new form of military aid, that is, to the military *grant* based on Iran's natural resources, primarily oil, not just

loans as in the previous MAP arrangements. MAAG was thus much more than an advisory support mission; MAAG was from the outset a part of a long-term military sales program involving the training and maintenance of increasingly sophisticated weaponry in defense of NATO interests as well as those of the United States and Iran.[53] The military assistance program which MAAG administered, moreover, was *possible only in exchange* for Iran's raw materials and semi-processed goods.

The monarchy, ruling families, and Iranian military had thus mortgaged key Iranian resources and manufactured goods as well as processes in exchange for their own future and, they believed, that of Iran. In the midst of increasing difficulties with England over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with the Soviet Union over the American advisory missions, American oil interests, and the American supported Seven-Year Plan, Iran's signature on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement might be interpreted as Iran's leap out of the stranglehold of the British-Russian rivalry and an embrace of a "neutral power"; many interpret the events of 1950 to 1962 in precisely that manner. However, the increasing not decreasing cooperation between England and the United States, on the one hand, and the increasing hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States, on the other, partially revealed an aggressive global foreign policy in Washington, D.C. Other evidence of the assertive post-World War II role of the United States in Iran in addition to the Truman Doctrine, the ARMISH Agreement, and Iran's Seven-Year Plan was certainly the May 1950 MAAG Mission and the beginnings of exchanging resources and semi-processed goods for arms; an exchange so clearly part of the later MAAG and other assistance teams throughout the 1970's. In October 1950, therefore, the signing of another technical assistance program albeit a civilian not military one came as no surprise to observers. The Technical Cooperation Mission, or, as it was popularly known, "Point Four," was like MAAG a *grant* program of technical aid in exchange for Iranian skilled labor and the use of local resources.

Point Four Aid Opens Door to U.S. Capital Investment

As with the May 1950 military assistance program, Point Four was a turning point in Iranian-U.S. relations; called a "bold new program" for global capital investment, technical assistance, and "growth of underdeveloped areas," Point Four's program for rural

improvement was as much an attempt to preserve Iran's economic and political structure as a bulwark against communism (socialism) as it was an expansion of U.S. capital on a global scale.[54] A healthy, educated and productive rural Iran was as important as an armed, trained and secure monarchy; while MAAG was to attend to the latter function, Point Four looked to the former.

The agreement for the Technical Cooperation Mission on Rural Improvement was signed by Prime Minister Ali Razmara and Ambassador Henry T. Grady and entered into force on October 19, 1950; President Truman's "bold new program" of January 20, 1949 was at last realized and, once more, Iran was the "test case." Committed to a program "for the exchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to promote the economic development of Iran" upon the request of the Iranian Government, the United States was bound to "an improvement in the living conditions and productivity of the residents of the rural areas."[55] Articles 2 and 3, furthermore, specified the American commitment to the establishment of "demonstration and training centers" with the eventual extension "to those public and private landholdings" where necessary. The rural school teachers, agricultural experts, health and sanitation experts as well as land, buildings, and equipment were to be supplied by the Government of Iran.[56]

In return, the United States agreed to provide technicians in education, agriculture, and health to supply direction and any equipment not produced or manufactured in Iran. Also, to place the mission on a permanent basis, an Iranian-United States Joint Commission for Rural Improvement was established with seven members on the Commission; four were to be Iranian and three American. While the Commission coordinated the demonstration and training centers, it also was responsible for harmonizing operations of other agencies; the coordination included working closely with the Plan Organization and the Seven-Year Plan.[57]

By January 1952, Point Four was ready to begin its technical assistance mission in earnest under the directorship of William E. Warne and with a grant of $23 million; the mission was considered "as a part of the diplomatic mission . . . for the purpose of enjoying the privileges and immunities accorded to that mission."[58] Warne, whose role from 1951 to 1955 as the first country director is well described in his own personal account, stated that "fundamentally, Point 4 was designed to help strengthen Iran's economy and to help underwrite her political integrity."[59] State Department, furthermore, spoke of the relationship between Point Four and private investment when it noted that:

> Private investment from the United States can thus make a fundamental contribution to economic development abroad. However, in relation to United States income and savings and in relation to the need for American development capital abroad, recent levels of net private capital flow abroad seem low. It is apparent that the rate at which United States private capital is invested abroad will need to be greater than at present, and that capital will need to flow into more diversified areas of investment if substantial progress toward the objectives of Point Four Program is to be made.[60]

Finally, while describing the two-fold character of Point Four, as technical, scientific and managerial knowledge as well as the creation of productive enterprises, President Truman wrote in his June 24, 1949 message to Congress that:

> Technical assistance is necessary to lay the groundwork for productive investment. Investment, in turn, brings with it technical assistance. In general, however, technical surveys of resources and of the possibilities of economic development must precede substantial capital investment. Furthermore, in many of the areas concerned, technical assistance in improving sanitation, communications, or education is required to create conditions in which capital investment can be fruitful.[61]

MAAG and Point Four were, therefore, related not only to military assistance and rural improvement but also to American capital investment in Iran's economy in order to extract capital and preserve the monarchy. Even while a trusted ally of the United States, however, the grants of aid were often limited in amounts and under strict Embassy control through the "eye-dropper" technique; a limited amount given out at one time. In a detailed memorandum on the "Political and Economic Factors Involved in Military Assistance to Iran in FY 1951," the State Department stated that:

> The primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent its domination by Soviet Russia, and to strengthen its orientation toward the West. Our policy lays first emphasis on economic and social development to strengthen the country's resistance to communism. Principal reliance in this connection is placed upon the Iranian seven-year program which is expected to draw largely upon the country's own financial resources for its implementation. American aid to Iran in the economic and social fields, as now planned, will be confined to technical assistance under the Point Four, Smith-Mundt and Fulbright programs. A second facet to the

> implementation of our policy is to develop Iranian self-confidence and power to resist by providing military assistance under MAP.[62]

Secretary of State Dean Acheson pointed out one further implication in the Iranian military assistance programs. During an extended briefing to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in January 1952, Acheson criticized the 511 (a) clause in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which provided that no military, economic, or technical assistance could be supplied Iran unless Iran agreed to make the fullest contribution of its resources, including oil, to "a common defense effort" with the United States.[63] Dr. Mossadegh refused to sign the agreement on the grounds that he would be trading one "master" (England) for another. Acheson, finding the requirement meaningless as well as a "red herring" for strong-headed nationalists like Dr. Mossadegh, concluded:

> The result of that is we now have to stop shipping anything further in the form of military equipment. That would not be so bad if it did not affect the status of the military missions. The military missions have been there [Iran] for almost 10 years. They are very important as to maintaining the loyalty and discipline of the army and gendarmerie. With those American officers all through this thing you know right away if there is trouble brewing. You have a high degree of loyalty, and the loyalty is to the Shah. If they get kicked out [by Mossadegh], we will have real trouble . . . To aid countries, like Iran, we could say truthfully, since we are not saying it publicly, what we are really trying to do is to get people into those countries. It is not anything they want from us. It is something we want from them. We want to get these people in there, and therefore putting conditions on it makes it harder to do it.[64]

Military Missions' Role in Coup and in Training of SAVAK

In 1953, Dr. Mossadegh's government was toppled by a CIA-assisted *coup*. The overthrow of Iran's popular leader and the subsequent alterations to the nationalization bill of 1951 were not accomplished solely by the CIA or General Fazlollah Zahedi. The participation of the GENMISH-trained Gendarmerie, the ARMISH-organized army and the instrumental role of MAAG all proved critical in the August 1953 events. The leading role of the CIA against Mossadegh and Iranian "neutralism" was clearly supported by the U.S. military missions; the return of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to Tehran in July 1953 was

seen as further evidence of the missions' involvement in the *coup*.

In May 1954, Major General George C. Stewart of the U.S. Army and Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Pentagon testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that:

> I think it can be said—and I do say it—that if it had not been for what the MAAG and the Army mission had done in creating confidence and friendship among the Iranian armed forces, that Iran today would be behind the Iron Curtain.[65]

General Stewart, in describing in detail the events of August 19, 1953 and the part MAAG played in the overthrow of Mossedegh's Government, testified:

> Now when this crisis [August 16, 1953 departure of the Shah from Iran] came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis blankets, boats, uniforms, electric generators, and medical supplies that permitted and created an atmosphere in which they could support the Shah . . . The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program . . . had it not been for this program, a government unfriendly to the United States probably would now be in power.[66]

While the testimony of General Stewart confirms the short-term importance of ARMISH and MAAG, Senator Hubert Humphrey's frequently-quoted statement of April 1961 demonstrated the overall effect of twenty years of military and police assistance programs from GENMISH to ARMISH-MAAG. In reacting to a statement from an Iranian general, Senator Humphrey exclaimed:

> Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army told one of our people. He said the Army was in good shape, thanks to U.S. aid—it was now capable of coping with the civilian population. That Army isn't going to fight the Russians. It's planning to fight the Iranian people.[67]

Between 1958 and 1962, two events indicated that the U.S. military missions' commitment to Iran's internal security and to the Army's ability in "coping with the civilian population" were increasingly

important to the United States and to the Monarchy. The establishment of SAVAK, or the Organization for State Intelligence and Security, in 1957 "with American aid and technical assistance"[68] along with the 1958 to 1962 consolidation of ARMISH with MAAG were essential for Iran's internal security for three reasons: (1) "for uncovering and combatting anti-regime activities within the country" such as collecting information on counterespionage, anti-government activities, political parties, incipient group violence, and subversive organizations and individuals;[69] (2) "providing advice and assistance on military matters to the Government of Iran" through ARMISH-MAAG advisors; and (3) assisting Iran in "administering the U.S. security assistance activities (FMS and MAP)," primarily through the Deputy Minister of War.[70] By the early 1970's, ARMISH-MAAG's primary functions were more specifically defined as advising the Iranian Armed Forces on weapons procurement, assisting in FMS, or Foreign Military Sales, and assisting Iran in assimilating equipment purchased from the United States.[71]

The establishment of SAVAK and consolidation of the U.S. military missions to Iran were complimented by a vigorous and renewed interest in social reforms. From 1958 to 1962, the Harvard Advisory Group, under the directorship of Edward S. Mason of Harvard University, advised and cooperated with Iran's Economic Bureau in the Plan Organization; the latter was also founded in 1958 and headed by Khosrow Farmanfarmaian. Financed by a four-year Ford Foundation grant, the Harvard Advisory Group worked on the Plan Organization's Third Seven-Year Plan (1962-1967) alongside other American advisory groups, such as the Governmental Affairs Institute, Inc., George Fry Associates, and Point Four.[72] By September 1962, the Third Plan was begun. While it continued to 1967, covering one of the most controversial periods of American advising, Pahlavi reform and street clashes with the Iranian population, the Third Plan advisors had as much trouble with plans, budgets, and staff as had the 1945-1949 "founding fathers." Furthermore, one of the Harvard Advisory Group members noted that:

> During the past fifteen years Iran has received huge amounts of economic aid, including technical assistance. More aid has gone to Iran than to any country in the Western hemisphere, to any country in Africa, or to any other country in the Middle East except Turkey.[73]

In spite of the multibillion dollar economic and military aid from the United States alone between 1950 and 1964, including Point Four

technical assistance, as well as the fact that there was "scarcely any area of institution-building that has not had the benefit, or at least the presence, of one or more foreign experts,"[74] Iran was "not nearly as far along the road of industrial modernization as India, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, Nationalist China, or even Turkey."[75]

U.S. Privileges and Police State Methods Provoke Popular Unrest

By 1962, the Kennedy Administration's focus on counterinsurgency in Laos and Vietnam, and concerns over Cuba signalled increased conflict between the United States and national movements in the agrarian Third World. Iran was no exception to the conflicts. The 1954 to 1962 post-Mossadegh "reforms," and U.S. military and financial advisory groups did little to halt the demands for radical change among the rural and urban populations. According to one observer of post-Mossadegh Iran, "for years now" the feeling that the Shah was not legitimate led many to conclude that everyone was waiting for a crisis whose arrival "will surprise nobody."[76]

Due partially to the increase in hostility to the Shah's reforms and to the rise in numbers of civilian as well as military U.S. advisors, discussions began once more in early 1962 over the possibility of extraterritorial legal status for the American advisors in Iran. It was also clear that ARMISH-MAAG advisors were becoming involved in an increasing number of traffic accidents and fatalities, particularly during the years of 1961 and 1962. Thus, in 1962, the Embassy formally requested diplomatic immunity for American military and dependents in Iran.

By March 1963, Iran's Foreign Ministry declared that diplomatic privileges for "senior American military advisors" had been approved. On October 13, 1964, the Parliament included American military advisors as personnel under diplomatic immunity.[77] While dependents of U.S. military advisors were not specifically mentioned in the October law, there is no doubt that their inclusion was implied. Partially as a result of the Third Plan and the January 1963 "White Revolution" and partially as a result of President Kennedy's military and economic aid program to Iran and the possibilities of the Shah's support for extraterritorial legal privileges, Ayatollah Khomeini vigorously opposed the Pahlavi Government.[78]

The June 1963 arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini by SAVAK touched

off the worst rioting in recent memory. The clashes with SAVAK, the Gendarmerie, and the Iranian Army, all trained and organized by the U.S. military missions, were bloody and intense. Certain areas of Tehran, Qum, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad became virtual battle grounds, such as Tehran's central bazaar and Qum's theological school.[79] One commentator on those events noted the role of the police and military in successfully preserving Iran's monarchy and "political integrity":

> Security units of the Army stationed in or near Tehran, particularly the paratroopers, were well-equipped, and officered by men carefully screened for their loyalty to the Shah. The reliability of both organizations (SAVAK and the Iranian Army) was to be tested when severe rioting broke out in June 1963, and both withstood the test remarkably well.[80]

Between 1963 and 1973, the Shah's police, intelligence agencies, and military played an increasing role in maintaining law and order in direct response to the increasingly defiant and hostile actions of the population. While Iran's image to the outside world was brushed more frequently with the concepts of "modernized" and "stable," it was clear to some observers that the security and intelligence agencies were increasingly busy in their functions as noted in Senator Humphrey's 1961 exclamation.

Sophisticated Weapons Make Shah U.S. Surrogate in the Gulf

By January 1973, moreover, the last of the U.S. military missions was accepted by the Iranian Government. The Technical Assistance Field Team, or TAFT Agreement bound the United States to the sending of "552 personnel at the cost of $16.6 million" to provide "in-country instruction to foreign personnel on specific equipment, technology, weapons and supporting systems" on a scale beyond mobile training teams, or MTT and ARMISH-MAAG.[81] TAFT became necessary by 1973 following Iran's request for increases in U.S. arms sales to Iran and the May 1972 visit of President Nixon to Iran; the visit and the 1972 Congressional request to limit MAAG personnel coincided with the Shah's interest in increased arms sales. Finally, to avoid possible confusion of purposes, the Department of Defense distinguished the TAFT's from the MAAG's in three critical areas: (1) ARMISH-MAAG in

Iran continued to concern itself with long-term advisory and staff functions whereas the TAFT's were to be "short-term" teams focusing "on the introduction of new equipment and associated with logistics systems"; (2) Iran assumed 70 per cent of the MAAG's costs while undertaking "all expenses associated with the TAFT's"; and (3) while MAAG was usually located in Tehran, 40 per cent of the TAFT's were located in the provinces.[82]

The significance of TAFT's in Iran in 1973 does not become clear unless it is also stated that the TAFT's were increasingly and primarily involved in the sophisticated weaponry of the billion-dollar range. While Iran was capable with its 1972 oil revenues to purchase arms and police equipment from the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union, it was not until the oil prices were raised *substantially* that Iran could afford the more sophisticated weapons and logistical systems it was to acquire from 1973 to 1979. Secondly, like ARMISH-MAAG, the TAFT's were under the command of the Chief of ARMISH-MAAG, or CARMISH in Tehran who, in turn, operated "under the direct military command of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) and under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Iran" as well as the representative of the Department of Defense.[83] Lastly, due to the changes in the global defense systems and the war in Vietnam, President Nixon along with his principal advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, announced the "Nixon Doctrine" in Guam in July 1969. The need for international security in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean perimeters in particular drew the attention of U.S. policy makers to the needs of Iran in regard to sophisticated weaponry and to the possibilities of Iran as a surrogate U.S. force in the region, or as a "regional influential." The sale of arms, financed like the Seven-Year plans and the U.S. military advisory missions by oil revenues, necessitated the eventual introduction of the Technical Assistance Field Teams. From 1973 to 1979, the arrival of the TAFT's as "short-term" (twelve to eighteen months) technical advisors was joined by private U.S. companies also engaged in the sale of weapons, logistical systems, weapons and equipment training, and technology.[84] While hearings were held in Congress over such sales as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft, or AWACS, or the F-16s, it was generally clear that the TAFT's, as essential features of the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine, were not "short-term." Rather, if the major military programs in Iran were to be completed successfully, it was clear that the TAFT's "will continue to play essential roles in the areas of training, logistics, and maintenance until well into the 1980's."[85] In addition, it was also clear that private

companies as well as TAFT's were located principally in Central and Southern Iran with a Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean focus, not a Northern Iran and Soviet Union focus.

With the increase of oil prices *and* revenues after 1973, Iran's billion-dollar "wish list" grew in leaps and bounds. With the expansion of the sophisticated weapons programs, particularly the U.S. military mission of TAFT, as well as the increased role of ARMISH-MAAG in the contracting and selling of American weaponry and training programs to Iran, there arose the natural influx of American personnel and their dependents. In a February 10, 1977 Report to the Senate by Senator Ribicoff, several important problems were cited relating to the U.S. military missions to Iran. Among the several problems noted by Senators Culver and Eagleton were the sudden increase in American personnel and dependents into Iran causing inflated housing costs and rentals, the emergence of a "new class of retired military personnel" in key governmental positions, and the volume of sales of America's highly sophisticated weaponry arsenal.[86] Principal among the objections to U.S. policy of arms sales to Iran was the following statement:

> With few exceptions we found the military forces of Iran unable to effectively utilize the American weapons purchased for them without an excessive degree of U.S. technical assistance. It is our view that equipment received which cannot be operated and maintained by Iranian forces would do little to enhance Iran's wartime defensive capability were the United States to remove its citizens at the outset of hostile actions.[87]

Iranian Society Subordinated to U.S. Interests

In short, while the MAAG's provided internal security for Iran in order to preserve its "political integrity" against internal (nationalist) or external (Soviet) subversion, the TAFT's along with the "white-collar mercenaries" provided external security for Iran and the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region against intra-regional as well as inter-regional subversion. In both cases, military assistance accompanied economic readjustments of Iran's oil revenues; in the first case, the restructuring of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company into the National Iranian Oil Company with sizable American oil interests and, in the second, the escalation of oil prices in order to generate sufficient oil revenue to purchase the highly sophisticated *and* expensive weaponry and logistics systems of

American arms and technology industries. While the 1950 MAAG Agreement insured the monarchy and the eventual overthrow of Mossadegh's nationalist government as well as the establishment of the Security Police, or SAVAK and the Airborne anti-guerrilla force, or Rangers, the 1973 TAFT Agreement insured U.S. corporate and military interests in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean through the integration of Iran's ARMISH-MAAG and GENMISH-trained military and police units into the global Maginot line against the Soviet Union, regional national liberation movements, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), and national movements, such as the Kurdish and Iranian movements of the 1960's and early 1970's.

U.S. military missions to Iran from 1943 to 1973 fulfilled a number of key functions both for the Shah and the Iranian ruling families and for U.S. corporate and military interests. While clearly not seen as counter-revolutionary or repressive by the individuals in the military missions, or viewed as solely supportive of the hated monarchy and U.S. corporations, the military missions of Schwarzkopf, Ridley, ARMISH, MAAG and TAFT did in effect serve a multitude of interests and purposes. One observer of Iran noted that while many of the Shah's critics found every aspect of the aid missions to have political consequences such as "land reform, police training, agricultural research, and even rural medical service" implying a "commitment to a free market economy and frequently a linkage to Western institutions," he also states that:

> When American weapons are placed on a host nation's soil, but are still operationally controlled by (private or public) American advisors, there is obviously a limitation imposed upon the host nation's sovereignty . . . It is an assembly in which some components are human and some are electro-mechanical . . . A given rifle can be used indifferently to shoot capitalists and communists, but a surveillance system, an air defense network, and an anti-submarine system all have the political allegiances of their human components.[88]

The U.S. military missions to Iran from 1943 to 1973, therefore, were clearly related to economic and political interests of the United States, Europe and other industrial nations not only in the context of World War II but also in the context of the post-war realignments, alliance systems, international agencies, and economic recovery and reconstruction programs. The missions, moreover, entailed the eventual involvement of American advisors, both civilian and military, in nearly every phase of Iranian governmental and financial institutions

related in the remostest fashion to Iran's internal and external security. From GENMISH to TAFT, the U.S. missions assisted in the economic and political restructuring of Iranian society; in time, the military missions affected the social structure as well. In effect, the missions were an intervention of another kind.

Postscript: June 1981

The February 1979 Revolution ended the Pahlavi monarchy. It did not end U.S. military assistance to Iran. While weapons and spare parts were no longer shipped to Iran's ports, the training programs, military command and organization, and American advisors were still in place. The February Revolution only curtailed U.S. military assistance and even that for a short period of time.

Soon after assuming control of the Provisional Government in March 1979, Mehdi Bazargan and Ibrahim Yazdi attempted to renew the military sales, arms transfers, and shipment of spare parts; transactions all dating to the Pahlavi period. Within six months, however, Bazargan and Yazdi were harshly criticized not only by the Revolutionary Council but also by the religious leadership and general population. Aside from the obvious political opportunism of some, there existed widespread concern in Iran over the renewal of military assistance by the Provisional Government of arms, spare parts, and American advisors. The popular concern and suspicion of double-dealing on the part of Bazargan and Yazdi as well as the Fall 1979 increase in American personnel at the Embassy in Tehran contributed in part to the eventual takeover of the Embassy in November 1979. Moreover, according to Eric Rouleau, the Iranian fears were not entirely ill-founded. Citing a 1977 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, Rouleau noted that according to the subcommittee:

> The Iranian army is so dependent on the U.S. that it would be extremely difficult, *if not impossible*, to alter the relations between the two countries even if "revolution in Iran should end in the replacement of the Shah by an anti-American regime."[89]

What then are some of the political and economic implications of the February Revolution for U.S. military assistance to Iran? Assuming that the Revolution indeed did not end but temporarily curtailed U.S. military assistance, what then are the consequences of continued

military assistance for Iran's Revolution and for the region? Since the 1979 overthrow of the monarchy and creation of the Islamic Republic, five factors can be identified in attempting to examine the U.S. military assistance programs: (1) Iran's Army, by far the largest and oldest American advisory program in arms purchase, spare parts supplies, officer training and advisory officers in the Middle East, remains intact and essentially an American creation, particularly in terms of weaponry, chain of command, staff and field organization, and communication systems. (2) The continued existence of Peacelog, Iran's part in the NATO and Pentagon network communication and supply system for the Middle East and Europe, demonstrates the continued tie and inclusion of Iran at the sophisticated technology level to U.S. and European interests. (3) While training programs and American advisors are no longer a part of an overt American presence in Iran, the 35 years of contacts and friendships between American and Iranian military make it quite clear that there remains a *covert American military presence* in Iran, particularly within the Iranian Army. In 1968, Defense Secretary Clifford Clark stated that training programs build good relations when he testified that:

> If we are to maintain the type of relationship we want with some of these new countries, we can do so many times through the use of military aid and in some instances through military sales. It brings us into a relationship with them that has proved valuable, particularly, as I have mentioned, when they send their younger men over here [United States] for training.[90]

(4) Despite the February Revolution, Iran's geographic, mineral, demographic, and political importance has not lessened; some may argue that Iran is more strategic today in terms of U.S.-European economic and political interests than it was under the Pahlavis given increased revolutions in the Third World, the decline in energy supplies, the continued crises of capitalism, and the Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan. In that sense, has the "Islamic Revolution" been anything more than an experiment in the politics of Islam in Iran just as Iran had been the experiment for "modernization" and military missions in the post-World War II Middle East? Have Roosevelt's and Millspaugh's aspirations implemented through GENMISH, ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT been fulfilled once more? (5) If the military missions maintained loyalty to the Shah, preserved the monarchy, and ensured capitalist development to assist the U.S. economy and to contain opposition, then how do we

characterize the Iranian military under the Islamic Republic? The demands by Ayatollah Khomeini for absolute loyalty to Islam ("100 per cent Islamic"), to the preservation of private property, and to the maintenance of the present social structure have been enforced by the newly-created Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (*pasdaran*) and the street thugs known as the God's Party faction (*hezbollahi*). The combination of the paramilitary youth on the one hand and the middle-aged thugs on the other has effectively destroyed any possible nationalist-Islamic alliance in the Republic and created the conditions for total clerical control of Iranian society. The Left, national minorities, women, and peasant-worker councils are not only being contained but also being eliminated by the Islamic Republican Party. The arrival, however, of a refurbished and rejuvenated Iranian military will certainly complete the clerical control and will complete the new repression. One characterization, therefore, of the post-Pahlavi Iran can be Islamic Republic; another can be "clerical fascism." The latter term, while accurate and valid, hides the economic ties with the United States and Europe. It is more accurate, perhaps, to indicate that Iran is becoming a more thoroughly capitalist state than even under the Pahlavis; that is, state capitalism is what Ayatollah Khomeini, the clerical leaders and traditional property owners allied with the Iranian military have now inaugurated in the last few months in Iran.

President Bani Sadr has fled the government and the country and the IRP has begun consolidating its final frontier. The role of the Iranian military in the IRP's consolidation will be extremely important. The Iranian Army, after all, has been prepared for 35 years to support the state and to contain opposition. It remains to be seen how soon the military's past role will be implemented. Capitalist development is, however, insured a place in Islamic Iran.

FOOTNOTES:

1. U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942*, vol. IV, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 262. Hereinafter *Foreign Relations: 1942*.

2. For the World War II military history of the Middle East and the military and political context of the American military advisory missions, see T. H. Vail Motter, *The Middle East Theatre: The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, United States Army in World War II Series, (Washington, D.C., 1952). Hereinafter Vail Motter, *Middle East Theatre*.

3. *Foreign Relations: 1942*, p. 242.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

5. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Military Sales to Iran, A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance*, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., July 1976, (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 34-35. Hereinafter *U.S. Military Sales* and U.S., Congress, House, *United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, and Future, Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula*, 95th Congress, 1st sess., December 1977, (Washington, D.C., 1977), pp. 133-135. Hereinafter *U.S. Arms Policies.*

6. As quoted in Vail Motter, *Middle East Theatre*, p. 445.

7. *Ibid.*

8. U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945*, vol VIII (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 534. Herinafter *Foreign Relations: 1945.*

9. Among the vast literature on the subject of Post-World War II multinational corporate interests and U.S. foreign policy, see David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (New York, 1965), pp. 82-98 and *passim*; Michael Hudson, *Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of the American Empire* (New York, 1972); Robert Engler, *The Politics of Oil: A Study of Private Power and Democratic Directions* (New York, 1961). Hereafter as Engler, *Politics of Oil; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, (New York, 1972). Hereafter as Kolko, *Limits of Power*; William Appleman Williams, "The Large Corporation and American Foreign Policy," in *Corporations and the Cold War*, edited by David Horowitz (New York, 1969), pp. 71-104; and V. G. Kiernan, *America, The New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World Hegemony* (London, 1978).

10. See U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947*, vol. V, (Washington, D.C., 1971), " 'The Pentagon Talks of 1947' Between the United States and the United Kingdom Concerning the Middle and the Eastern Mediterranean," pp. 485-626 and "U.S. Petroleum Policy in the Near East," pp. 629-668. Hereinafter *Foreign Relations: 1947*. The 1949 U.S. policy towards Iran was formulated as follows: ". . . the primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent the domination of that country by the USSR and to strengthen Iran's orientation toward the West. Secondary objectives are (1) to encourage relations between Iran and other countries calculated to elicit United Nations support for its continued independence; (2) to maintain conditions of internal security, thereby increasing respect for Iranian sovereignty and avoiding a pretext for Soviet intervention, as well as making indirect Soviet Aggression more difficult; (3) to foster an expanding economy with the purpose of alleviating economic discontent and strengthening allegiance to the central government; (4) to encourage the improvement of democratic institutions and processes in Iran so that Iranians may increasingly feel an affinity for the western world; and (5) to induce influential Iranians actively to support U.S. interests in Iran, the Middle East, and the United Nations." in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949*, vol. VI, (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 546. Hereinafter *Foreign Relations: 1949.*

11. E. A. Bayne and Richard O. Collin, "Arms and Advisors: Views from Saudi Arabia and Iran," *American Universities Field Staff Reports: Southwest Asia Series*, XIX, 1 (January, 1976), pp. 2-16 and *passim*. Hereafter Bayne and Collin, "Arms and

Advisors"; and Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad* (Washington, D.C., 1977), pp. 10-16, 41, and 53.

12. Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 288 and 298. Hereinafter Cottam, *Nationalism*; and Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 39, 43-52, 70, and 85-86. Hereinafter Zonis, *Political Elite.*

13. See Senator Cannon, "The Middle East and Iran," *Congressional Record*, Vol. 123, No. 25 (February 10, 1977), p. 18 on *homafar.*

14. Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Policy, 1943-1945*, (New York, 1968), p. 298.

15. *U.S. Military Sales*, pp. 7-8 and 34.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36 and 49, and *U.S. Arms Policies*, pp. 139-161. See Anthony Sampson, *Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed*, (New York, 1977), pp. 202-204 where he notes that "the military programmes, were now [1964] acting as salesmen." See also Chris Paine, "The Political Economy of Arms Transfers to the Middle East," *MERIP Reports*, no. 30 (August, 1974), pp. 3-25. Hereinafter Paine, "Arms Transfers." Paine concludes that "The military-industrial relationship abroad can become quite intimate: the 1971 personnel directory of the MAAG in Greece, for instance, shows a total of 72 U.S. military personnel, 38 U.S. civilians, and 57 local employees. The civilians include 'technical representatives' from General Electric, Lockheed, RCA, Northrop, Hughes Aircraft, Pratt and Whitney, General Dynamics, Grumman and Curtis Wright," p. 16.

17. As quoted in Paine, "Arms Transfers," p. 14.

18. See Gary Olson, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Third World Peasantry*, (New York, 1978), pp. 147-153; Michael Hudson, *Super Imperialism*, pp. 129-136; and Denis Goulet, "Domesticating the Third World," in *The Myth of Aid: The Hidden Agenda of the Development Reports* by Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson, (New York, 1971), pp. 48-49.

19. U.S., Department of State, *Executive Agreement Series: 1943-1944*, no. 360, (Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 3.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Foreign Relations: 1942*, p. 223.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

24. U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1943*, vol. IV, (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 514. Hereinafter *Foreign Relations: 1943.*

25. U.S., National Archives, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services*, no. 61233 "Police, Gendarmerie, and Army," February 1944, fol. 1 and no. 76263 "The Army and the Gendarmerie," 16 May 1944, fol. 1.

26. Sir Clarmont P. Skrine, *World War in Iran*, (London, 1962), p. 170. Hereinafter Skrine, *World War.*

27. U.S., National Archives, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services*, no. 73660 "USSR in the Middle East—Activities in Spring 1944," 8 May 1944, fol. 2.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. U.S., National Archives, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services*, no. 109456 "Annual Estimate of Political Stability," 19 December 1944, fol. 2.

31. *Ibid.*, fols. 2-3 and 7.

32. *Ibid.*, fol. 7.

33. Skrine, *World War*, pp. 227 and 236. In referring to the Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions success, another author states that "with the crisis over Azerbaijan in 1946, Iran dramatically fulfilled President Roosevelt's expectations that it might serve as a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and the good faith of the United Nations" (Vail Motter, *Middle East Theatre*, p. 473).

34. See Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of the CIA," *The Saturday Evening Post*, November 6, 1954, pp. 66-68 as quoted in Cottam, *Nationalism*, pp. 227-228 and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, (New York, 1964), pp. 118-119.

35. U.S., Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, no. 1666, (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 3-4.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

38. *Foreign Relations: 1947*, "The Pentagon Talks of 1947," p. 577.

39. U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948*, vol. V, (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 88. Hereinafter *Foreign Relations: 1948*. In the testimony of Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, where he states "Iran is still very much in the same basic situation as Greece and Turkey. It is one of those three countries on the Soviet periphery . . ." in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *Military Assistance Programs, Part 2*, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943-50, vol. VI, (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 100-101. Hereinafter *Military Assistance Part 2*.

40. *Foreign Relations: 1947*, p. 4. See L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics*, (London, 1955), p. 159. Hereinafter Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil*.

41. Max Weston Thornburg graduated in 1917 from the University of California as an engineer. After three years in the Army, he joined Standard Oil of California in 1920 acting as chief engineer of the manufacturing department from 1924 to 1929, as manager of the Richmond Refinery from 1929 to 1931, and as chairman of the board of engineers from 1931 to 1936; the latter was during the critical years of SOCAL's work in Saudi Arabia's oil fields. Soon after, Thornburg became vice-president of Bahrein Petroleum Company (owned by the Texas Company and Standard of California) and, from 1940 to 1943 served simultaneously as the petroleum advisor to the State Department; Thornburg's successor in State Department was Charles B. Rayner of Socony-Vacuum; the same company which was so intimately involved in the 1944 oil concession "scramble" in Southeastern Iran. In 1946, Thornburg was in Tehran consulting for the Government of Iran on a seven-year plan "for Iran's Reconstruction and Development" along with the industrialization plans. His association, while still an oil executive of his own company and living in the Persian Gulf, with the Supreme Planning Council led him to suggest Morrison-Knudsen International as a survey team of ten American engineers. From 1948 to 1951, he was chairman of Overseas Consultants, Inc. and helped complete Iran's Seven-Year Plan. He returned to Turkey in 1954-1955 to assist in Turkey's industrial

plan. Between 1954 and 1960, Thornburg taught at the University of California and was a visiting fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs; during his visit at Harvard, Thornburg prepared his book, *People and Policy in the Middle East* and worked with the Harvard Advisory Group and its draft of Iran's Third Plan under the directorship of Edward S. Mason. See Max Weston Thornburg, *People and Policy in the Middle East: A Study of Social and Political Change as a Basis for United States Policy*, (New York, 1964), pp. ix-xii; George Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran*, (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 25-28; Engler, *Politics of Oil*, pp. 281-282; and Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil*, pp. 141, and 159-161.

42. Like Max Thornburg, Torkild Rieber worked closely with international business while associated with an oil company and later consulting for the Government of Iran. Rieber was a "business man of wide interests" having been associated with the Texas Company since 1905 and its chairman from 1935 to 1940. In 1951, Rieber arrived in Tehran on December 31 as the petroleum advisor to the World Bank in the company of Hector Purdhomme, Director of IBRD's loan department; following the overthrow of the Mossadegh Government, Rieber returned to Iran as General Zahedi's advisor in 1955. See Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil*, pp. 276-277; Kolko, *Limits of Power*, p. 419; and Engler, *Politics of Oil*, pp. 200 and 431.

43. The $650 million needed to finance the Seven-Year Plan was to some from a World Bank (IBRD) loan of $250 million and from the royalties paid Iran by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company totaling $400 million. See M. A. Djamalzadeh, "An Outline of the Social and Economic Structure of Iran: II," *International Labour Review*, LXIII, no. 2 (February, 1951), p. 189.

44. *Foreign Relations: 1949*, p. 559.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 554.

46. See U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950*, vol. V, (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 466 for State Department's views of the Shah and the Seven-Year plans. Hereinafter *Foreign Relations: 1950*.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 556.

48. Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, (Boston, 1969), p. 79. In 1950, John C. Wiley, the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, wrote in support of the MAAG mission and MDAP legislation that "Iran needs an army capable primarily of maintaining order within the country, an army capable of putting down any insurrection—no matter where or by whom inspired or abetted." *Military Assistance, Part 2*, p. 192.

49. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Middle East, Africa, and Inter-American Affairs*, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56, vol. XVI, (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 53.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

51. U.S., Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 1, "Iran: Mutual Defense Assistance," TIAS no. 2071 23 May 1950, p. 420.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 421 (emphasis added).

53. For the scope of MAAG and its relationship to the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, see U.S., General Accounting Office, *Profiles of Military Assistance Advisory Groups in 15 Countries*, (Washington, D.C., 1978), pp. 26-37, and Paul Hammond, David J. Louscher, and Michael D. Salomon, "Growing Dilemmas for the Manage-

ment of Arms Sales," *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall, 1979, pp. 1-20.

54. See Gholam H. Kazemian, *Impact of U.S. Technical Aid on the Rural Development of Iran*, (Brooklyn, 1968), pp. 18-20 where the author notes both political motives and agricultural innovations of Point Four in Iran. See also George Hakim, "Point Four and the Middle East: A Middle East View," *The Middle East Journal*,, IV, no. 2 (April, 1950), p. 189 where the author states, "The fundamental premise of the Point Four Program is that United States private capital would flow to the underdeveloped countries for investment in the exploitation of their economic resources."

55. U.S., Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 1, "Iran: Technical Cooperation," TIAS no. 2139 19 October 1950, p. 727.

56. *Ibid.*

57. On January 20, 1952, the Iranian participants to the Commission were Dr. Makki, Minister of Health (chairman), Dr. Hesabi, Minister of Education, Engineer Taleghani, Minister of Agriculture, and Engineer Zanganeh, Managing Director of the Plan Organization.

58. U.S., Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 3, pt. 4, "Iran: Technical Cooperation," TIAS no. 2637 20 January 1952, p. 4742.

59. William E. Warne, *Mission for Peace: Point 4 in Iran*, (New York, 1965), p. 60.

60. U.S., Department of State, *Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas*, Publication 3719, Economic Cooperation Series 24, (Washington, D.C., 1950), p. 54.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

62. *Foreign Relations: 1950*, p. 465.

63. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Program, Part 3*, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56, vol. XI, (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 87, n. 11.

64. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *European Problems*, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56, vol. XV, (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 184.

65. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Mutual Security Act of 1954*, Hearings, 83rd Congress, 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C., 1954), p. 503.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 504 and 569-570.

67. As quoted in David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, p. 186.

68. Zonis, *Political Elite*, p. 85.

69. Harvey H. Smith, *et al.*, *Area Handbook for Iran*, (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 574.

70. U.S., General Accounting Office, *Issues Related to U.S. Military Sales and Assistance to Iran*, (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 9.

71. *U.S. Military Sales*, p. 34.

72. George Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran*, (Baltimore, 1967), pp. ix-x.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

77. Richard Pfau, "The Legal Status of American Forces in Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, XXVIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1974), pp. 149-150.

78. For two opposing interpretations of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic leaders during the 1950's and 1960's, see Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions Since 1500*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), pp. 231-255 and Willem M. Floor, "The Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XII, no. 4 (December, 1980), pp. 501-524.

79. Zonis, *Political Elite*, pp. 44-47 and 62-66, and Cottam, *Nationalism*, pp. 308-309.

80. Cottam, *Nationalism*, p. 306.

81. *U.S. Military Sales*, p. 35 and *U.S. Arms Policies*, p. 141.

82. *U.S. Military Sales*, p. 35.

83. *U.S. Arms Policies*, p. 141.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-157. See also *U.S. Military Sales*, p. 36.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

86. U.S., Congress, Senate, "The Middle East and Iran," *Congressional Record*, Proceedings, 95th Congress, 1st Session, February 10, 1977, (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 12.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

88. Bayne and Collin, "Arms and Advisors," p. 13.

89. Eric Rouleau, "The Shah's Dream of Glory: Oil Riches Underwrite Ominous Militarization in a Repressive Society," in *Iran Erupts*, edited by Ali-Reza Nobari, (Stanford, 1978), p. 85. (Emphasis added.)

90. Paine, "Arms Transfers," p. 13.

U.S. Policy Towards the Middle East

JAMES F. PETRAS and
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Introduction

A discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East must begin by taking into account the long-term, large-scale economic interests that operate in the area. These economic interests embody social classes which inform the policy-making structure that allocates resources and define strategic goals. The heterogeneity of interests, as well as their vital stakes in the region, lead to a common purpose in pressuring for a strong U.S. presence without necessarily agreeing on the form in which it will be manifested. While economic interests are of paramount importance in understanding U.S. policy, the policy-making apparatus representing those interests defines and establishes the instruments and time schedules that structures policy. While the state represents corporate interests, it is not identical with it. Moreover, the political realm has a logic of its own—within the larger economic imperatives—and the various phases of policy-making must be analyzed in their own terms.

We proceed by outlining the overarching U.S. economic interests in the region and follow with an analysis of the perceptions and perspectives of U.S. policy discussed in responsible business journals. Recent U.S. policy is then analyzed in its various phases, with equal concern with the context and consequences of each policy and its larger implications.

Economic Bases of U.S. Policy

The parameters of U.S. policy in the Middle East are set by a variety of economic interests whose cumulative effect is decisive in shaping the substantive concerns of military and strategic thinking.

Three levels of economic linkages exist between the U.S. and the Middle East: the first is structural and is found in the fact that U.S., European and Japanese economies depend on access to Middle East oil for survival. The collapse of one area would lead to a major crisis throughout the capitalist world. The second linkage is between particular capitalist segments who are directly involved in large-scale, long-term relations within the region and who are influential in having U.S. policy-makers define the defense of their corporate interests as matters of "national security." These three major segments include petroleum corporations, banking concerns and defense industries. All three segments have vast undertakings in the region and all have access to significant policy-making bodies in the government. The third linkage, the U.S. and Israel, is based on subsidies by the U.S., the result of a powerful domestic pressure group (the Israel Lobby). Moreover, Israel's relevance to military-stragegic planners revolves around its role as a political contraceptive against revolutionary nationalist upheavals in the Middle East. Thus U.S. economic interests condition military and political decisions, as well as being shaped by them. There is a dialectic inter-play between the imperatives of economic expansion and the projection of military power in the region that undermines any effort to separate the two in any practical analysis of U.S. policy.

In examining the economic relations, it is important to focus on the multiple aspects of the relations and not to single any one area and examine it in isolation. Secondly, it is important to understand the dynamic aspects of the relation, to observe the direction it is moving. Thirdly, it is important to understand the qualitative aspects of the relationship, to recognize that particular products may have more importance than quantitative ratios may indicate. Finally, it is important to understand that it is social factors that define and influence "national policy"—particular class interests and corporate groups, not abstract notions such as investment earnings as a percentage of gross national products, oil income as a percentage of total trade, etc. The interests of corporate actors establish what is vital to a country.

In considering U.S. policy, it is important to consider both the specific interests of the U.S. and the interrelated interests of its foremost allies and trading partners, Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC). U.S., EEC and Japanese trade with the Mid-East has been growing steadily over the past 20 years. Middle Eastern trade has more than doubled its share of total U.S. trade since 1960, almost tripled its share of Japanese trade and increased by nearly 50 percent of EEC trade (see Table 1).

Table 1

COMPOSITION OF MIDDLE EASTERN TRADE WITH U.S., EEC, JAPAN

	1960	1970	1978
U.S. Exports to the Middle East (as % of total U.S. exports)	3.3%	3.1%	7.6%
U.S. Imports from Middle East (as % of total U.S. imports)	2.6%	1.0%	5.7%
U.S. Trade with the Middle East (as % of total U.S. foreign trade)	2.9%	2.1%	6.6%
EEC Exports to the Middle East (as % of total EEC exports)	3.9%	2.0%	5.9%
EEC Imports from the Middle East (as % of total EEC imports)	5.1%	3.6%	7.8%
EEC Trade with the Middle East (as % of total EEC foreign trade)	4.5%	2.8%	6.9%
Japan's Exports to the Middle East (as % of total Japanese exports)	4.4%	2.8%	10.0%
Japan's Imports from the Middle East (as % of total Japanese imports)	8.5%	12.6%	27.4%
Japan's Trade with the Middle East (as % of total Japanese foreign trade)	6.4%	7.1%	17.3%
Middle Eastern Exports			
% to U.S.	7.5%	3.8%	9.4%
% to EEC	27.8%	29.1%	33.1%
% to Japan	6.2%	18.3%	18.7%
Middle Eastern Imports			
% from U.S.	16.0%	18.0%	15.0%
% from EEC	27.3%	24.7%	37.8%
% from Japan	4.2%	7.3%	13.6%
Middle Eastern Foreign Trade			
% with U.S.	11.7%	10.9%	12.2%
% with EEC	27.5%	26.9%	35.4%
% with Japan	5.2%	12.8%	16.1%

(Elaborated on the basis of figures from United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, years 1961, 1971, 1978.)

More significantly, the U.S. competitive position in the Mid-East, in relation to the EEC and Japan, has declined precipitously. In 1960, 11.7 percent of Mid-East trade was with the U.S., 27.5 percent with the EEC and 5.2 percent with Japan. By 1980, EEC had increased its share to 35.4 percent. Japan had jumped to 16.1 percent, while the U.S. share still vegetated at about 12.2 percent. In overall trade terms, the U.S. is becoming more dependent on trade with "developing countries" which now account for 38 percent of U.S. exports and are the fastest growing export market for American exports. If the displacement occurring in the Middle East spreads, the U.S. economy wil be in serious trouble, given its mounting trade deficits—largely from growing oil imports. Thus the massive markets of the Middle East are a growing and increasingly important area of U.S. interest and involvement, an area economically lucrative and militarily weak, a combination which easily invites power projections by U.S. policy makers.

Apart from trade, the Mid-Eastern countries are major suppliers of oil—providing almost 20 percent of U.S. supplies, almost 70 percent of EEC supplies and over three-quarters of Japan's. Without Mid-East oil, Japan and Europe's economies would collapse in a few months and the U.S. would be in dire straits. (See Table 2.) Access to markets and raw materials are areas of concern to overall U.S. policy. In addition, however, three sets of socio-economic forces have particular interest: namely, the defense industry, the petroleum companies and the big banking houses.

Table 2

NEAR AND MIDDLE EASTERN CRUDE OIL IMPORTS AS % OF TOTAL SUPPLY FOR U.S., EEC, AND JAPAN

	1977
U.S.	19.1%
EEC	68.7%
Japan	77.8%

(Elaborated on the basis of figures from OCED, *Oil Statistics*, 1977.)

Of particular importance for U.S. trade with the Middle East is the sale of weapons: "In the first half of the 1970's, U.S. arms sales in the Middle East averaged $3.2 billion *per year*—more than the total sales ($2.3 billion) over the previous 15 years. Arms sales almost tripled again from 1975 to 1979, to an average $8.9 billion per year. As a percentage of total U.S. arms sales, the region jumped from 19.7 percent in the 1955-69 period to nearly 52 percent in 1970-74 and 69.4 percent in 1975-79. The Middle East share of worldwide U.S. military grants and credits in 1979 was 89.3 percent.[1]

Apart from the growing importance of the Mid-East arms market for the defense industry, the oil industry is increasingly dependent on the Mid-East for a growing share of its profits. In fact, Mid-East oil, which accounts for only 1.8 percent of U.S. investments, accounts for 33.8 percent of total U.S. foreign earnings (see Table 3).

Table 3

U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST [2]

	1973	**1974**
U.S. Direct Investments in the Middle East (as % of total U.S. investments abroad)	2.5%	1.8%
U.S. Adjusted Earnings in the Middle East (as % of total U.S. foreign earnings)	12.9%	33.8%
Rate of Return of Adjusted Earnings		
of Total U.S. Investments Abroad	16.4%	21.2%
of U.S. Investments in Middle East	84.5%	399.5%

(Elaborated on the basis of figures from Lupo, Leonard A. and Julius Freidlin, "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1974," in U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, Oct. 1975, Vol. 55, No. 10.)

Finally, the newest and most active capitalist sector involved in the Mid-East are U.S. bankers. Western banks, particularly English and U.S., have been the major recipients of Mid-East oil surplus which they have recycled as loans to debt-ridden Third World countries at lucrative interest rates.

Table 4

DEPLOYMENT OF OIL EXPORTERS' SURPLUSES

	1977	1978	First 9 Mos. 1979
Total Deployment (in billion US$)	33.5	13.2	33.2
% to U.K.	12.2%	-2.0%	39.8%
% to U.S.	27.4%	-1.7%	4.8%
% to other countries	59.4%	103.0%	57.5%
% to International Organiz.	.8%	.7%	-.7%
Of Total Deployment			
% in banks	23.6%	43.1%	34.3%
% in property and equity in U.S. and U.K.	17.0%	24.2%	2.7%
Of Deployment within U.S.			
% in treasury bonds, notes and bills	38.0%	-192.3%	-6.3%
% in bank deposits	4.3%	53.8%	68.8%
% in property and equity	57.6%	238.5%	37.5%

(Elaborated on the basis of figures from *Middle East Economic Digest*, special report on banking, May 1980.)

This power bloc of oil companies, private banks and defense industries projects its power into the U.S. executive branch. The major threat to their profits derives from revolutionary movements in the region which will nationalize oil profits, decrease military purchases and reinvest oil earnings in domestic productive activity. The obvious reason behind the massive U.S. military build-up is the vital interest that this power bloc has in the existing social order and relations of production. In addition to these large-scale profitable aspects of U.S. policy, the unprofitable areas of U.S. investment must also be considered, namely, the U.S. subsidy for the Israeli military machine. Israel accounted for almost 70 percent of all U.S. aid in the Middle East. This investment amounted to 3.4 billion dollars, largely because of Israel's military-strategic importance as a bulwark of anti-communist, anti-Arab nationalism. (See Table 5.) The economic investment has a politico-military pay-off. The basis of this high subsidy is largely the result of the

very influential Israeli lobby, which has successfully sustained the U.S. commitment over and against whatever opposition has emerged from corporate interests linked to Arab wealth.

Table 5

U.S. AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST

	1973	1976
Total U.S. Aid to the Middle East (in billions)	1.3	3.4
% to Israel	32.9%	68.0%
% to Egypt	.9%	13.8%
% to Iran	21.3%	1.2%
% to Jordan	9.9%	5.9%
% to Morocco	3.2%	3.8%
% to Turkey	25.2%	2.0%
% to rest of Middle East	6.6%	5.3%

(Elaborated on the basis of figures from Congressional Quarterly. *The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, 1977.*)

Since 1976, the U.S. has maintained its economic aid to Egypt, and increased it particularly since the Arab boycott of Egypt, which came as a result of the Camp David Agreements.

These economic interests and the social and political forces that back them provide the basis for discussion of the growing U.S. military intervention in the Middle East and form the overarching reality behind the rhetoric of "national security."

U.S. Business and Foreign Policy

At first impression, U.S. corporations seem to call upon a shift in domestic policy to solve a potential Middle East crisis. "Doing this

means the U.S. must continue to push the U.S. inflation rate down rather than restimulating it; it means developing a rational energy policy, including accelerating oil decontrol; it means producing a coherent export policy and a consistent foreign policy. In short, it means rebuilding U.S. industrial strength."[3]

However, the strongest emphasis is placed upon a better coordination of U.S. foreign policy according to the needs of U.S. corporations abroad.

Until last year, business was reticent to exercise U.S. military power abroad: "Though most favor a reassertion of U.S. power and more awareness of the economic stakes abroad, few want any return to gunboat diplomacy or subversion of unfriendly regimes by the Central Intelligence Agency. 'If we tried to rule the world with an iron fist', says Edwin Van der Bark, senior vice-president for world exploration and production for Phillips Petrolleum Co., 'I think that would probably hurt business more than it would help.' "[4]

However, this latter position began to shift soon after the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. On November 7, 1979, soon after the event, the *Wall Street Journal* remarked in an editorial: "Given the importance and volatility of the Middle East, the need for some kind of military presence there has been apparent for a long while—certainly since the Shah failed. In the long run, this calls for a larger navy which the Administration has not requested. In the short term, it calls for redeployment of forces toward the major trouble area, which the Administration has not ordered."[5] And Irving Kristal, contributor to the *Wall Street Journal*, went further to state: ". . . as the post World War II international order falls apart—not only in the Middle East but probably in Latin America as well—. . . what will be relevant is an American foreign policy in which power, and the readiness to use it boldly, will play a far more central role than has ever before been the case in our history."[6]

U.S. businessmen at the moment are trying to find a balance between two extreme positions: they are no longer willing to rely merely on the natural laws of the market to maintain their economic interests abroad, but at the same time realize that military might alone will not secure their positions abroad. As Philip Moon, senior vice-president of the National Bank of Detroit stated last year: "Using military power abroad might make us feel more secure, but it won't make us more welcome."[7]

In this emerging balance, U.S. military presence in the Middle East is increasingly accepted as a necessity. And, as Sam Nakagama,

vice president and chief economist for Kidder, Peabody and Co., recently remarked: "President Carter had previously declared that the United States would use military force if necessary to maintain the flow of oil from the Gulf, but the emerging commitment to Saudi Arabia is turning rhetoric into reality."[8] However, the author states, a contradiction arises from the root of the crisis and the way it is being resolved: "Any further rise in the trajectory of military spending will inevitably add to inflationary pressures in the United States."[9]

The answer to this problem, the author concludes, "must be found in a broader sharing of the burden of maintaining security in the Persian Gulf area, (. . . for) it is obvious that our allies in Europe and Japan have a far larger economic stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf than does the United States.

"Thus, it would not be too much to ask the Europeans and the Japanese to bear a larger part of the burden in preserving stability and keeping the oil flowing from the Persian Gulf."[10]

Thus, as conflicts in the Middle East intensify, internal economic stability within the United States comes to depend upon the degree to which other major industrial powers are willing to share the responsibility of enforcing stability through force in those areas which are vital to the Western world.

The position of U.S. business on the Middle East must be understood at the different levels in which it is expressed. The importance of the region to the U.S. economy is emphasized by U.S. corporations to underline the need for security in the area. Second, certain parameters are defined within which U.S. foreign policy can best accommodate the needs of U.S. business: security is sought, but at the same time it is emphasized that military adventures can be potentially harmful to the U.S. economy. This is the balance between two positions that was mentioned earlier. Third, these corporations do not formulate specific policies for the Middle East, but rather they seek to make clear within which parameters the U.S. government should weight its options in the area.

U.S. and the Mid-East

In recent years U.S. policy toward the Middle East has passed through three phases: (1) the politics of regional influentials, (2) disintegration and crises in the alliance, and (3) direct U.S. presence. The politics of regional influentials during the period 1970-77 had its

main emphasis on the promotion of a series of de-facto alliances with regimes which were either clients of the U.S. or whose ruling classes shared U.S. strategic perspectives. Each regime brought into the relationship specific sets of resources for sustaining U.S. economic and military interests. Those countries included Iran under the Shah, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Sadat's Egypt. The Shah proved extremely valuable not only as a stable source of oil, but also served as a gendarme in policing the Gulf states—sending troops to repress revolutionary nationalist forces in Oman. The Israelis served as a constant military-political pressure against any and all radical Arab nationalist movements—serving to buttress reactionary regimes and threatening others, thus indirectly and directly serving U.S. interests. As one commentator close to the Israelis has noted:

> Israelis argue . . . that their stability and military prowess has been an asset to moderate (sic) Arab states. They cite King Hussein's request, made via Washington in 1970 when Jordan was under attack by Syria, for Israeli air strikes against the Syrians. Israel instead concentrated forces on the Syrian border, and the Syrians withdrew. Some Israelis also contend that were it not for close Israeli-American ties, Washington's influence would not have revived in Egypt. After the 1973 war standoff, Egypt became convinced that only the United States could act as a broker for peace with Israel.[11]

Together Israeli and Iranian military forces were the glue that held the region within the U.S. sphere of influence. The later inclusion of Sadat's Egypt reinforced and extended the axis. Sadat's acceptance of the Camp David accords and the subsequent accommodation with Israel has been amplified and now includes joint military activities with U.S. armed forces from common bases within Egypt. The fourth element in the political alliances was Saudi Arabia, which maximized the availability of petroleum, subsidized reactionary regimes and financed right-wing, anti-communist movements. Together these forces, allied with the U.S., provided the political, economic and military miracle to promote U.S. hegemony without necessitating the overt presence of the U.S. This was especially important at the time because this was a period in which U.S. military forces were over-extended in Southeast Asia, domestic politics were strongly opposed to further direct U.S. state involvement and European allies and third world countries were hardly likely to support unilateral U.S. military initiatives. Up through the mid-1970's less than 15 percent of the U.S. public favored greater military

spending, while over 40 percent favored further cut-backs.[12] The alliance of these collaborator regimes was based on the pivotal role of Iran in sustaining both the military and economic ties, linking the Arab and Israeli groups into one formidable bloc subordinated to U.S. interests.

The crisis and disintegration of the Shah's regime led to an irreparable breach in the alliance: the emergence of an anti-U.S., anti-Israeli Islamic regime broke the bond that held together Saudi Arabia and Israel in the same camp. Henceforth, the Saudis felt increasingly vulnerable to pressures from Iran and Muslim forces within their own society, as the same plunder and inequalities existing in Iran were present in their Arabia. Moreover, Iran's renunciation of its role as regional policeman—and the de-facto disintegration of its military machine—undermined one of the major props sustaining the reactionary rulers in the Gulf states. U.S. defense, corporate and political interests could no longer be defended by what Brzezinski referred to as "regional influentials"—sub-imperialist forces. While the Iranian revolution precipitated the rupture in the alliance and dissolved the basis of U.S. policy, there were several underlying long-term forces which were and are active and which threaten to deepen the crisis for U.S. policy makers in the region. The growing accumulation of oil wealth is accompanied by growing social inequalities between two sets of forces—the ruling classes and the old and new productive and commercial classes which are excluded from the political process. The alienation of traditional pre-capitalist as well as modern classes has set in motion the rise of reactionary clerical, as well as modern, nationalist forces. The limited capacity of the narrowly based political regimes of the region to contain social and political discontent has been recognized by the U.S. Since U.S. economic and political interests are intimately tied to these regimes and since there no longer exist local or regional forces capable of policing the area, the U.S. has been forced to build up its military presence as the sole guarantor of its interests, cloaked in the usual jargon of "defending the area from Soviet expansionism."

Military Buildup to Protect U.S. "Vital Interests"

The disintegration of the alliance built to fortify and promote U.S. interests created a crisis; specifically, an enormous disjuncture between growing U.S. economic interests and a declining military-political apparatus with a capacity to defend and promote those interests. The centrality of U.S. economic interests was spelled out by then Secretary

of State Vance in a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council listing the basic interests that underlie U.S. foreign policy:

> We must maintain a defense establishment modern and strong enough to protect ourselves and our allies.
>
> We must protect American investment overseas and insure continuing access to vital raw materials.[13]

Military Buildup to Protect U.S. "Vital Interests"

The response from Washington to the collapse of the regional alliances and the role of "regional influentials" was the relatively rapid insertion of direct U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Though most of the press handouts continued to emphasize the defensive reactive nature of the military build-up, Presidential advisor Brzezinski clearly spelled out the use of power as a form of intimidation—to bludgeon and undermine efforts by countries who attempt to carry through changes that adversely affect U.S. interests. Explaining the concerted military build-up, he stated:

> We have to be able to project our power credibly, and to make it clear to all concerned that American power exists and that it could be used and that our decision makers will not shrink from using American power when either our vital interests or the vital interests of our friends are jeopardized. . . . In recent years, the Middle East . . emerged as a central strategic zone of vital importance to us and to Western Europe and to the Far East . . . we are now engaged in trying to fortify the stability and security of that part of the world.[14]

U.S. military presence in the Middle East was built in stages. Almost always, Washington justified each increase in military forces by referring to whatever conflict emerged at the moment.

The first major build-up occurred precisely in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, which overthrew the Shah. As early as mid-1977, Brzezinski had advocated the creation of a rapid deployment force for use in creating a "security umbrella over the Persian Gulf."[15] But with the Shah still operating as an effective policeman, and the Pentagon and State Department in opposition, Brzezinski's proposal did not take hold until the Shah's overthrow early in 1979. The first moves were to increase the U.S. naval presence and the sale of arms to allied regimes.

The establishment of rapid deployment forces began to become a political reality. The second phase of the U.S. military build-up coincided with Carter's attempt to inflate the significance of Soviet training groups in Cuba. The factual basis of this early effort to invent a "Soviet threat" to promote a U.S. military build-up was deflated rapidly, even by the mass media—which pointed out that they had been there for over 15 years. Nevertheless, the consequences of this political promotion were to accelerate the operational effectiveness of the interventionary forces (the Rapid Deployment Forces). Carter directed Secretary of Defense Harold Brown "to further enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interest and to act in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, sea and air units to distant areas—rapidly and with adequate supplies."[16] A month earlier, before Carter had invented the Soviet threat in Cuba, Secretary Brown told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "rapid response is likely to be crucial in a limited contingency" in the Persian Gulf and other regions. He went on to point out that the Pentagon's budget gave a "high priority to improving American military force."[17] Clearly, Carter's demagogic response to the non-existent Soviet threat in the Caribbean was a useful device in building up U.S. interventionary forces in the Gulf.

The third and most dramatic build-p of U.S. military build-up coincided with the Iranian hostage issue and the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Apart from the ill-fated U.S. military excursion into Iran, ostensibly to rescue the hostages, there has been a multi-pronged and sustained increase of all three branches of the U.S. armed forces in the region. Military bases have been established in Somalia, Kenya and Oman—convenient jumping off spots for combined land, sea and air operations. There has been a veritable armada of U.S. destroyers and air-carriers dispatched in the area—a throw back to the gun boat diplomacy so prominent in U.S. policy toward the Caribbean. The U.S. has 31 ships in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, including two aircraft carriers.

Large-scale arms sales and working agreements for joint military efforts have been worked out with Egypt; the Begin regime has volunteered to offer its forces to assist the U.S. militarily if needed. While Saudi Arabia has formally declined U.S. offers of troops and bases, U.S. forces in fact control and operate a substantial part of the Saudi Airforce, air defense, training and arming of its ground forces, etc. Despite Jordan's rhetoric, about half of its budget is covered by U.S. aid in exchange for which Jordanian officers serve to buttress the regimes

in Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Along with the transformation of the island of Diego Garcia into a major U.S. naval and air support facility, the U.S. has established a full-scale presence in the area.

The fourth phase in the U.S. military build-up coincided with the Iraq-Iran war. First, the U.S. used the conflict to begin an intense propaganda campaign to pressure Europe to become directly involved—joining the fleet. France and England agreed. Next, the U.S. sent and manned four radar war planes to the Saudis, in addition to two tanker planes and a guided missile cruiser. With Saudi Arabia leaning toward Iraq, the possibility of U.S. military involvement in regional warfare increases. More important, the placement of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia gives Washington greater leverage in totally integrating and subordinating Saudi foreign policy to the U.S. needs and in reshaping a new regional alliance. One Pentagon official, commenting on the radar plane transfer, noted:

> [The quick response] opens the door to much more extensive military collaboration with the Saudis.[18]

A White House Official was somewhat more specific:

> [Washington was now] in a much better position to move ahead on building a security framework for Southwest Asia.[19]

Clearly, the overall goals of the new military build-up is bearing fruit: breaking down regional solidarity, subordinating and tying Arab wealth and resources to a U.S. led alliance. By focussing on Soviet, Islamic and internal discontent. Washington has built up leverage where it had been losing. U.S. military power in the region allows Washington to take advantage of the vulnerability of politically isolated rulers in the Gulf and, under the guise of "protecting" them, to shape their economic policies (increase oil production, holding down prices) and political alignments—tie them closer to the U.S.-European-Israeli axis. As Fred Halliday has noted: ". . . the rhetoric about "outside" (i.e. Soviet) influence was designed to divert attention from the *reality* of U.S. military deployment and from the fact that the main threats were internal, from the population of these countries . . ."[20] The justification for this U.S. military encirclement of the Middle East was laid out in Carter's June 23, 1980 State of the Union speech, in which he clearly enunciated a doctrine embracing unilateral military intervention:

> Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force.[21]

The speech then proceeded to outline a complete militarized foreign policy, including a massive increase in military spending, registration for subsequent conscription, modernized nuclear forces, increasing naval forces in the Indian Ocean, navy and air bases in northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf, removal of restraints on the CIA and arms arrangements with Pakistan. Only the latter fell through. Carter's speech brought together various strands of his interventionist policy which had been building over the past two years. The sudden convergence of these policies into a single foreign policy address made abundantly clear to all willing to see the new reality that the United States was preparing for war with the Third World in general and revolutionary challenges in the Mid-East in particular.

"Soviet Threat" Invoked

The whole justification for this explicitly interventionary policy was the supposed growing menace of Soviet expansionism, highlighted by its Afghan policy. As Carter phrased it, "the greatest threat to world peace since World War Two." The most thorough refutation of Washington's justification for its own military expansionism was presented by the January issue of *The Defense Monitor*. After a comprehensive study of trends in Soviet influence in 155 countries since World War Two, it concluded: "Outside Eastern Europe, Soviet influence has lacked staying power. Inability to accumulate influence in foreign countries over long periods is a dominant feature of Soviet world involvement. Starting from a very low base of political, economic and military involvement, the Soviets have increased their influence in the world. Starting with influence in nine percent of the world's nations in 1945, they peaked at 14 percent in the late 1950's and today have influence in 12 percent of the world's nations. Of the 155 countries in the world today, the Soviets have significant influence in 19 . . . Soviet setbacks in China, Indonesia, Egypt, India and Iraq dwarf marginal Soviet advances in lesser countries. Temporary Soviet successes in backward countries (sic) have proved costly to the Soviet Union. They provide no justifica-

tion for American alarmism or military intervention . . ."[22] Washington's hyperbolic rhetoric concerning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its massive publicity campaign has been an ideological diversion to screen the massive U.S. military build-up in preparation for direct intervention and possible occupation of oil rich Middle East countries. This fact is understood by the business community: the day after Carter's bellicose speech, the financial pages of *The New York Times* announced "Stocks Rise Sharply in All Areas, Defense Issues Lead."[23] The militarization of U.S. political life is evidenced in the outlook projected by respectable mainstream business journals. *Business Week* noted:

> Again and again, as OPEC pushes the West toward the edge of economic survival, the option of a military response becomes more and more reasonable. As one monetary official put it recently: "OPEC price actions are really getting out of hand. If they don't call for a military response, I wonder what would. I don't know what would happen if we intervened militarily. I hope some intelligent people are discussing this seriously, so that if we have to act we won't go off half-cocked. I don't see much danger of crippling damage to the oil fields. Even if there were sabotage, it would have very temporary effects in the Arabian peninsula, where you can strike oil with a hatpin. I don't think many other OPEC countries would dare to shut down for very long, if at all, in the face of a determined, united NATO military action."[24]

Clearly, the Carter Administration in 1980 had moved fast and far from the rhetoric of 1977, during which time it had proposed demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, and cutting back U.S. military spending and sales to third world countries. Under the pressure of corporate and banking interests, whose increasingly vulnerable position was made manifest in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the collapse of U.S. regional alliances, Carter had no choice but to respond to the crises through a comprehensive remilitarization of U.S. foreign policy, disguising corporate pressure as Soviet expansionism. In retrospect, it is clear that Carter's human rights doctrine was a transitional policy reflecting a particular conjuncture within which Washington was dependent on regional alliances, lacking domestic and European support for a militant policy. Carter's opportune grabbing of a series of external issues to rearm and remilitarize public opinion over such issues as the Iranian hostages (rather than the corporations who were excluded and nationalized) is indicative of a concern not with "outside" threats but of

internal revolutions. The capacity of the U.S. to remilitarize the Middle East was hindered by the "Vietnam syndrome", the widespread anti-military sentiment among many Americans. Carter's shrewd manipulation of the hostage and Afghan issues, aided by the mass media and the corporate world, led to a drastic shift in public opinion.[25] (See figure 1.)

(Figure 1.)



Source: *The New York Times*, September 21, 1980, p. 58.

The second obstacle to the new U.S. military policy in the Middle East was the policy and involvement of European and Japanese powers. U.S. policymakers asked whether they would provide support and cooperate in joint ventures in policing the area? From the Pentagon's view, the "allies" have not assumed the political-military costs commensurate with the economic benefits that they have obtained in the Middle East. Robert Komer, the Under-secretary for Policy in the Defense Department, has voiced Washington's demand for joint military roles in the Persian Gulf:

> For a long time Europe has not borne the proportion of the common defense burden which would seem warranted by its political stake and economic growth. Japan has done even less.
>
> This was understandable when Europe and Japan were recovering from the ravages of World War II. Does it any longer adequately reflect the balance of mutual interests or that of our comparative strength? Indeed, we Americans are increasingly asking whether Europe is interested in its own defense as is the United States.[26]

Komer and the Carter policy were based on a reassertion of a dominant military role for the United States, supported and aided by Europe and Japan, based on the latter's growing economic exploitation of the region. Directing his remarks specifically about the Persian Gulf, Komer bluntly called on European governments to collaborate in the U.S. military build-up.

> But what will be Europe's role in this endeavor, since Europe is even more dependent on Middle East oil than the United States? We Americans feel entitled to ask our allies to share the burden of this joint responsibility, in terms of aid to threatened regimes, joint politico-economic measures and such military assistance in crises as is feasible.
>
> If the United States rearms, but much of Europe does not, I foresee sharp divisions between Europe and America which could undermine the security partnership which gives NATO its deterrent power.[27]

More recently, during the early phase of the Iraq-Iran conflict, the United States put heavy pressure on West Germany to send warships to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. When Schmidt resisted, one U.S. official was quoted as saying German references to the Constitution as a reason for keeping the navy from the area of the Gulf "is beginning to

irritate people. . . . It is legalistic, bureaucratic and open to question."[28] Washington's willingness to flaunt law and strong public pressures against intervention is matched by the willingness of the U.S. Executive branch to bypass Congress in the commitment of military personnel in war zones, contrary to Congressional legislation (War Powers Act, 1974) by sending pilots and personnel to Saudi Arabia.

European and Japanese reticence in committing themselves to the U.S. position is based in part on their growing competitive gains through an increasingly independent position in which a plurality of regimes reflecting different international alignments has emerged. The reconsolidation of political regimes under exclusive U.S. hegemony and linked to the U.S. politico-military apparatus could weaken the European and Japanese position in the area. Europe and Japan seem to best prosper with the relative weakening of neo-colonial regimes linked to the U.S.—just as the U.S. benefitted from the demise of colonial linkages that tied the regimes of the region exclusively to Europe.

While Europe and Japan have not been enthusiastic supporters of the revival of militarism and intervention in the Middle East, one country in the area has been offering itself as a strategic staging area—namely Israel. For some time, Israel has been the prime exponent for direct action, frequently offering itself as helpmate to U.S. military intervention. In the post-Vietnam period, Israel was hostile and dismayed by U.S. public opinion's aversion to military intervention. Given Israel's unwillingness to renounce its settler policies, it has become a pariah state in the universe of modern nation-states, depending primarily on military power and U.S. subsidies and arms to sustain itself. Lacking any political options, unwilling to take any diplomatic initiatives that conflict with its internal colonialist constituency, it has been working to convince Washington of the necessity of projecting its military power in the Middle East. The convergence between the Israeli brand of direct interventionism in the Third World and the drift of U.S. policy toward the right is evidenced in the common contempt with which both the U.S. right and the Israelis view anti-militarist programs and democratic controls in U.S. secret police operations abroad. As one reporter describes it: "Like American conservatives, prominent Israelis have deplored the 'emasculation' of American intelligence services and Pentagon failure to keep pace with Soviet military growth."[29] In the current drive to build up U.S. military forces in the Middle East, the Israelis can be counted upon to provide logistical support and military forces if necessary.

Basis of Policy of Direct U.S. Involvement

Two factors shape current U.S. policy in the Mid-East: (1) a power bloc containing powerful corporate interests, military strategists and policy makers who have major interests in the region and (2) the inability of U.S. policy makers to fashion local forces capable of sustaining those interests by themselves. The presence of U.S. military forces serves as a pole of attraction for all the politically isolated and vacillating regimes in the Gulf: it serves to discourage new regional alignments that might increase the energy costs to Western economies. The general structural weakness of U.S. allies—namely Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—has spurred Washington to accelerate its own build-up and to extend its state apparatus as a bulwark to the regimes. Moreover, the policy is not only to support the regime but to increasingly shape all aspects of their policy—to protect by limiting their area of international policy, namely their role in OPEC. Secondly, by projecting its power in the region, Washington prevents its allies (Israel and Egypt) and local state-capitalist regimes from establishing regional hegemonic positions. Washington's policy is to harness these regions to its needs and wants; to avoid local wars in which local interests take precedence over global U.S. concerns. Thirdly, U.S. military power offsets the economic advantages that have given Europe and Japan a competitive edge. Henceforth, the new military definitions created by the U.S. presence can be expected to include greater economic leverage for the U.S. and fewer political initiatives from the Europeans, especially those which conflict with U.S. policy. Specifically, while Washington has its armada in the Gulf "protecting" the flow of oil to Europe and Japan, it is unlikely that the latter will pursue any new policies on the Palestinian issue. Washington's "military protection" can be an element of pressure forcing the Europeans into the background. The unilateral build-up thus serves Washington's desire to promote its own set of military-corporate interests, even at the expense of its competitor allies. Fourthly, the present involvement of Washington in the Middle East has as its goal the political isolation of the Soviet Union: freezing it out of regional affairs that front on its border. Washington's policy rhetoric of non-interference applies only to the U.S.S.R. and not the the U.S.A. Washington is betting on translating Iraq's closer economic ties with the West toward an eventual political rapprochement. Likewise, there is hope in Washington that the war will lead to greater centralization of power in the hands of the standing army, leading to an eventual reopening of relations. These are middle range prospects that Wash-

ington is pursuing; in the short-run, its principal concern is to avoid having the current fragmentation and rivalry among Arab regimes spill over and adversely affect its corporate-military interests in the region. Rather, the hope is that fragmentation and rivalry can eventually be turned to advantage, as each regime exhausts its political and economic resources, and the people tire of empty religious, ethnic and bourgeois nationalist slogans.

Fifthly, Washington has a major liability in pursuing policies in the Middle East—the colonial-settlers of Israel inhibit overt military collaboration between the two countries. Hence, while Israel is useful as a pressure on Syria, the Palestinians, Lebanon, etc. and can be unleashed in a crisis (as a military staging area), its presence has to be kept in the background, guarding the West flank of the Mid-East, while U.S. forces occupy the eastern, Gulf zone. The unacceptability of colonial Israel as a police force for collaborator regimes in the Gulf area thus forces the U.S. to rely on its own forces, more tuned into supporting rather than replacing local rulers.

Finally, the demise of colonialism, the growing market power of Europe and Japan, the anti-imperialist and anti-military sentiment within the mass social democratic and communist trade unions and parties have limited Europe's effectiveness as a military partner to the U.S. in the Middle East. Europe and Japan have concentrated their statecraft on promoting economic relations and building commercial bases, counting on the strength of these relations and the economic dependence of the regimes to avoid consequential losses. Washington and its corporate supporters therefore cannot count on its allies for support and must depend on its own military forces if it is going to pursue policies linked to "projecting power" in the region. In response to Washington's perception of European and Japanese weakness, it has assumed the major role in elaborating a new military policy to sustain its economic interests. Europe and Japan hope to piggy-back along as free-riders, ready to jump off if confronted by major policy blunders.

Consequence of U.S. Policy

The immediate impact of the new U.S. policy of direct military involvement will be to strengthen Washington's political and economic position at the expense of Europe. Moreover, the 'threat of intervention" will increase U.S. political leverage with bourgeois-nationalist and other regimes in the area. The weakness of the policy is that it commits the

United States to regimes which have little historical viability—thus increasing the likelihood of the deployment of troops. In turn, the forcible intrusion of U.S. troops will be viewed throughout the region as an alien occupation army, with potential colonization projections. Thus an eventual U.S. direct intervention will serve to illegitimize regimes linked to it and unify otherwise fragmented and opposing religious groups, classes and ethnic collectivities. Short-term gains could lead to prolonged armed and political confrontations: short-term stability could be gained by large-scale upheaval.

Within the short-term perspective, the growing opening of Saudi Arabia to U.S. military forces and its increasing dependence on the extension of the U.S. military apparatus is leading to the growing subordination of Saudi policy to U.S. needs. If the current level penetration deepens, it could simply obliterate any notion of national sovereignty—Saudi Arabia might become the fifty-first state of the union, and the first Arabic speaking one. The integration of Saudi Arabia in a U.S. projected security alliance will certainly impose serious political constraints and onerous obligations which U.S. advisors will only be too willing to organize on behalf of their allies.

Imperialism lacks an original ideology which can appeal to the masses: it can only govern through force or by harnessing preexisting cultural formations which lend themselves to the defense of property and opposition to socialism. There is a great likelihood that Washington will pursue a policy of rapprochement with the Islamic Right—gaining military influence and economic opportunity in exchange for cultural domination. The revival of Islam, insofar as it develops in opposition to class politics, contains the seeds of this strategic alliance, especially as it lowers its goals to the cultural realm and renounces its "two devils" theory (opposition to industrial capitalism and socialism). Only by accepting the subordination of petty commerce and production to the imperatives of large-scale capital growth, can the Islamic Right hope to consummate an alliance with capital, local and foreign, powers to preserve spheres of control. The present conception in Washington is based precisely on this division of power and is behind Carter's statement that the U.S. welcomes the Islamic revival. The failure to break the current conflict will lead to a further exacerbation of the triangular struggle between pro-U.S. regimes/the Islamic Right/the Marxist Left. In the long run, the Islamic Right is not a viable political formula: it cannot retain or sustain production based on petty commodity production, it cannot defend the nation with religious texts and small-scale productive units. Planes and tanks are made in modern

factories by engineers and workers with technical and scientific skills. The demise of the pre-capitalist Right as a national, hegemonic force then could set the stage for a renewed confrontation between Marxist nationalist forces and pro-western forces. The presence of U.S. armed forces while strengthening the military capability of regimes will weaken their political appeal. The likelihood then is that a new regional security alliance orchestrated by Washington and including Saudi Arabia and Israel and bringing in its wake a host of lesser Gulf states might generate short-term stability at the cost of eventual regional upheavals.

Conclusion

U.S. hegemony in the Middle East has been eroded by the emergence of three forces: (1) the growing competition of western and Japanese capital; (2) internal revolutionary forces of a pre-capitalist and socialist nature; and (3) the growth of regional forces attempting to carve out their own spheres of influence. These developments have evoked an essentially military response from U.S. policy-makers. This effort has been aided and abetted by the increasing vulnerability of the Saudi regime and, until the assassination of President Sadat on October 6, by his effort to benefit from being the chosen client of the United States. The result has been the unmaking of the pan-Arab, nationalist alliances in favor of a return to the 1950's and earlier patterns of Western dominated regional alliances.

The intensification of competition among the advanced capitalist countries is a product of the uneven and dynamic growth which has occurred over the past 30 years. Europe and Japan have narrowed the economic gap between themselves and the U.S. and in the course of global expansion have increasingly found the international politico-military framework which the United States devised for "defense" a major constraint in developing their economic relations. It has become clear to the Europeans that the politico-military links that the United States had developed outside of Europe were also extremely useful in securing and favoring U.S. economic expansion. In this fashion, the alliances and East-West summit agreements for the United States were the functional equivalents of the colonial arrangement for the Europeans. For the Europeans to penetrate U.S. economic markets and investment territory, they have in some cases to undermine political and military alliances. This link between U.S. economic advantages and political alliances was pointed out recently:

> Politics, the Europeans believe, has worked for Americans in the past. Before Carter, Brezhnev's summit in Vienna, Creusot-Loire [French corporation] thought it was ahead in the running, an official at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris said. Then came Vienna, and Armco from the United States got the contract. I think that may have been a political decision.[30]

As a result, Europe has in part rejected the renewal of the Cold War and its concomitant boycott of the Soviet Union, picking up important trade contracts which were previously agreed to with U.S. companies, totalling in the hundreds of millions of dollars. While the U.S. embargo halved American trade with the USSR (from $1.7 billion to $857 million), France's trade rose from $3.8 billion to $4.7. West German exports to Eastern Europe totalled $8.7 billion, nearly three-fourths of the value of the goods Germany sent to the U.S., its major trading partner.[31] The same pattern occurred in other areas, including the Mid-East. In mid-October (1980), France signed a $1.4 billion contract to modernize and train the Saudi Arabian navy—after the Saudis had already signed for navy purchases from the United States.[32] The refusal of European capitalist countries to subordinate themselves to U.S. political-military strategy is a result of their recognition that in doing so they will be outmuscled economically. The growing political independence of Europe is in part an outgrowth of its efforts to seize new markets and its competition with U.S. corporations. The breakdown of the post-war neo-colonial system in the Mid-East constructed by the United States was both an opportunity and a threat to European and Japanese capital. Political change provided an opportunity to develop ties with newly independent rulers and displace U.S. corporations. On the other hand, lacking the military machinery of the United States, the Europeans did not have the capacity to ensure that the breakdown of the neo-colonial system did not spill over and endanger all capitalist relations. Europe was not inhibited from developing political ties with so-called "radical nationalist regimes" (anti-U.S. imperialist) to promote trade, just as the United States had earlier cultivated anti-communist nationalists who declared their independence from European colonialism. The relative loss of U.S. economic domination to Europe and Japan on a global level and in the Middle East in particular has forced it to shift back to projecting its *military power* as a way of reasserting its economic influence. For in that area, Europe and Japan are at a distinct disadvantage. The build-up of the military presence is a compensation for the lack of economic competitiveness. The military presence brings in its wake political linkages which turn on the economic spigot. The

long term economic crisis in the West, the high levels of inflation and unemployment and the continuing economic recession intensify the need for economic markets in the one area which is still booming—the Mid-East oil countries. The economic crisis heightens the need for each competitor to seek new outlets; in this regard the United States has chosen to pursue its economic advantage through military means.

The revolutionary upheavals in the region, principally in Iran, have eroded the energy "cushion" which has underwritten U.S. and European capitalist expansion. As one oil research and investment house has noted:

> There is no margin of safety in the world crude supply system to offset any one of a number of possible adverse developments.[33]

The analyst went on to point out that the changing structure of the industry—the growth of state owned producing companies had increased "risks." Citing the impact of the Iranian revolution, he concluded, "Any new development—political, mechanical, labor or military—could lead to a crisis of the first order."[34]

The U.S. projection of military power is aimed at preserving the status quo and preventing future losses that cannot be absorbed by Western capitalism without severely affecting major economic interests, profit margins and perhaps the stability of the existing political order. New revolutions in the Mid-East are thus closely linked with the continuation of Western capitalism. Facing the economic abyss, the U.S. projects military power as the final and only solution.

The growth of regional forces—such as Iraq attempting to establish hegemony in the region—is a threat to U.S. efforts to reassert its dominance. Ironically, however, the course of the ensuing Gulf War has as its major consequence the strengthening of the U.S. position on several counts: Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf have initiated a major opening to the U.S. Saudi Arabia's growing military ties with the United States and its agreement to increase oil production gave away a great deal of leverage for very little. The growing direct involvement of the U.S. in the Saudi military-state apparatus is, in effect, a loss of sovereignty in exchange for which the Saudi elite secures its voracious appetite for accumulating wealth. In exchange for securing the family wealth, regional Arab interests were squandered.

Under the facade of making the Saudis the new "Guardians of the Gulf," Western countries (the U.S. and French naval forces) are mounting a new colonial presence. As one Palestinian observed, "We

are . . . back to square one, just where we were before Abdel Nasser came to power and started chasing foreign powers out of this ares."[35] The major loser in the Gulf War is the PLO: under the pretext of the war, the United States has accelerated its military buildup in the area, strengthening its ties with Israel and Egypt and weakening pro-PLO initiatives from Western Europe; the war is weakening both supporters of the PLO and dividing Mid-East efforts away from putting pressure on Israel. Finally, the Iraqi occupation of Iranian territory provides a rationale for Israeli occupation of Arab territory.

In response to the threats posed by capitalist competitors, regional powers and internal revolutionaries, the United States has pursued a policy of consolidating and integrating Egypt and Saudi Arabia in a U.S. dominated alliance, which includes bases, troop training facilities and joint maneuvers—reminiscent of the heyday of CENTO, SEATO, NATO alliances. For the first time in decades, 1,400 U.S. ground forces are being deployed in desert training exercises with Egyptian troops.[36] With Egypt guarding the Western flank and U.S.-Saudi forces in the eastern flank, a new military axis has been established, one which, however, requires the direct involvement of the United States. The significance of this axis is that it unmakes the politics of regional nationalism that has been dominant since the 1950's. Together with the growing inter-penetration of economic ties, the closer integration of Saudis into the American military orbit, reinforced by the Egyptian connection, sets the framework for a new round of regional and global conflicts and interventions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Joe Stork, "The Carter Doctrine and U.S. Bases," *MERIP Reports*, Sept. 1980, p. 4.

2. Over 99 percent of U.S. adjusted earnings in the Middle East came from oil production. It is clear from Table 3 that in the Middle East a seemingly small investment leads to very high profits. Also, it should be remembered that these are conservative estimates of U.S. foreign earnings, for, as a *New York Times* article recently noted, "Western industrialized countries have consistently underreported their true income from foreign trade" (*New York Times*, September 29, 1980).

3. *Business Week*, Editorial, July 28, 1980.

4. *Business Week*, March 12, 1979.

5. *Wall Street Journal*, November 7, 1979.

6. *Wall Street Journal*, November 26, 1979.

7. *Business Week*, March 12, 1979.

8. *The New York Times*, November 2, 1980.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. *New York Times*, February 3, 1980, p. E3.

12. *New York Times*, September 21, 1980, p. 58.

13. "Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978," *The Secretary of State*, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Department of State, January 13, 1978.

14. *New York Times*, March 30, 1980, p. E4.

15. *New York Times*, January 25, 1980, p. A6.

16. *New York Times*, October 2, 1979.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *New York Times*. October 12. 1980. p. 22.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Fred Halliday, "The Gulf Between Two Revolutions, 1958-1979," *MERIP Reports*, No. 85, February 1980, p. 10.

21. *New York Times*, January 24, 1980, p. A12.

22. *The Defense Monitor Report*, Vol. IX, No. 1, January 1980, p. 1.

23. *New York Times*, January 24, 1980, p. D1.

24. *Business Week*, November 19, 1979, p. 190.

25. This is clearly shown in an article in the *New York Times* entitled "Iran is helping U.S. to shed fear of intervening abroad": "Administration officials, members of Congress, specialists on foreign policy and others, liberals as well as conservatives, speak of a political and psychological watershed far more important than the immediate concern over the American hostages in Teheran. They view the situation as a pivotal event marking the close of the post-Vietnam era.

" 'In terms of domestic politics, this has put an end to the Vietnam syndrome,' said a senior official who has served several administrations. (. . .)

"Now, officials explain, the public can see that defense spending relates to protecting oil supplies, and that gives it more of a bread-and-butter impact with more natural public support." (*The New York Times*, December 2, 1979). This shift in public opinion is evident from the following figure.

26. *New York Times*, February 10, 1980, p. 10.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *New York Times*, October 13, 1980, p. 16.

29. *New York Times*, February 3, 1980, p. E3.

30. *New York Times*, October 5, 1980, p. 6.

31. *New York Times*, October 5, 1980, p. 6.

32. *New York Times*, October 19, 1980, p. E5.

33. *New York Times*, October 27, 1980.
34. *New York Times*, October 27, 1980.
35. *New York Times*, October 19, 1980, p. E5.
36. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 17, 1980, p. 24D.

U.S. Military Planning for the Arabian-Persian Gulf and Third World Conflicts

MICHAEL T. KLARE

At a Pentagon news conference on February 3, 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger told reporters that the Reagan Administration would retain the Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.) which President Carter had established to protect U.S. interests in the Arabian/Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Third World. "There is no question at all," Weinberger said, "that it is essential for the U.S. to have strong forces that can be rapidly projected in response to crises we cannot foresee."[1]

Downplaying other causes of conflict in the Third World, such as the critical Palestinian Question, the Reagan Administration has forged its foreign policy around the premise that the Soviet Union is the motive force behind all nationalist upheavals abroad and the principal troublemaker in the Gulf area. Commenting on the Administration's policy initiatives in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Geoffrey Godsell commented on March 13:

> The immediate aim of the Administration's military moves is to make clear to the Soviet Union that the United States has the capability and the credibility to respond with force if Moscow: (1) threatens Western access to the vital oil of the Gulf; or (2) edges forward to establish a Soviet presence in an eventually disintegrating Iran.[2]

Underscoring the critical role intended for the R.D.F. in protecting U.S. oil imports, the Administration increased allocations in the Fiscal 1982 defense budget for both the R.D.F. itself and for construction of new U.S. basing facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and Egypt.[3] These four countries, which form the inner strategic ring for deployment purposes,

along with Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey, the leading U.S. military allies in the area, are all scheduled to receive increased U.S. military aid in Fiscal 1982.[4]

All told, the Administration plans to spend $222 billion on "defense" in Fiscal Year 1982, or $33 billion more than the amount requested by President Carter. A similar increment is planned for each of the next five years in what will constitute the largest U.S. military buildup since World War II, surpassing the Vietnam buildup by 300 percent in real, non-inflated dollars. This extraordinary program is being rationalized, of course, on the grounds that U.S. security is threatened by growing Soviet military power. An examination of the Pentagon's budget figures suggests, however, that the primary aim of the buildup is to expand U.S. intervention capabilities—as represented by the R.D.F.—and to restore America's status as the world's policeman.[5]

Although there are many profound differences between Carter's and Reagan's foreign policies, both have viewed the R.D.F. as the principal U.S. instrument for the protection of U.S. interests in the Gulf area and the Third World as a whole. The Rapid Deployment strategy was first developed during the Carter period, but has now been fully embraced by President Reagan. The origins of this strategy, and its potential implementation by the Reagan Administration, are the subject of the following two essays. In the first, I describe the development of the R.D.F. and its relation to overall U.S. military strategy, and in the second I discuss U.S. planning for possible intervention in the Gulf area. Both studies indicate a high degree of continuity in strategic thinking from the Democratic to the Republican Administration.

FOOTNOTES

1. Stephen Webbe, "U.S. Defense Secretary Calls for Elite Antiterrorist Unit," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 4, 1981.

2. Geoffrey Godsell, "U.S. Builds Shield for Southwest Asia's Oil," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 13, 1981.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. See: Michael Klare, " 'Readiness' is a Very Expensive Word," *In These Times*, May 20-26, 1981.

THE R.D.F.: NEWEST "FIRE BRIGADE" FOR U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE THIRD WORLD*

MICHAEL T. KLARE

Arming Against Third World "Turbulence"

In his State of the Union Message on January 23, 1980, President Carter vowed to forge a "cooperative security framework" with Middle Eastern nations to resist Soviet aggression in the region. The President's proposal, quickly dubbed the "Carter Doctrine," dominated public and Congressional discussion of military affairs for several weeks. Surprisingly, however, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown warned of an entirely different peril in the fiscal 1981 military "posture statement" released five days later. The greatest danger to American security, Brown said, was not the all-consuming threat of Soviet expansionism but the proliferation of uncontrolled "turbulence" in the Third World. "The number of unresolved international disputes increases," he said, "and old ones continue to fester." And because such turbulence threatened vital American interests—especially oil, the U.S. had to be prepared to use force in defense of these resources. "In a world of disputes and violence, we cannot afford to go abroad unarmed."

This largely unheralded "Brown Doctrine" was significant both in its divergence from White House statements and also in its extreme pessimism on the world situation. Whereas President Carter and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski focused almost exclusively on the threat of a Soviet military push into the Middle East, Brown saw upheavals emerging everywhere—and mostly from causes other than Soviet adventurism. "Turbulence, the threat of violence and the use of force remain widespread." These disorders "have many and varied causes," among which is our failure "to provide for the basic needs of people and narrow the explosive disparity between wealth and hunger." The Soviet Union, by attempting to exploit these divisions, has increased global instability. "But the Soviet Union is only a part of the problem," he observed. Equally important are "differences about the proper world distribution of income and natural resources."

* A slightly different version of this article appeared in *The Nation* of March 8, 1980.

Brown's identification of "international turbulence" as an autonomous threat to U.S. security and his appreciation of the structural causes of such instability constituted a radical departure in U.S. military thinking. Whereas all recent Pentagon annual reports concentrated on the "Soviet threat" and on efforts to rectify the East-West balance in Europe, Brown devoted much of his attention to the threats posed by Third World violence. "International economic disorder," he affirmed, "could almost equal in severity the military threat from the Soviet Union." The Brown Doctrine thus heralded a new era of American military involvement in the Third World.

At the core of this new outlook was a profound appreciation of America's growing dependence on foreign markets and sources of raw materials. "The particular manner in which our economy has expanded," Brown explained, "means that we have come to depend to no small degree on imports, exports and the earnings from overseas investments for our material well-being." Of such dependencies, none is greater than that on Middle Eastern Oil supplies. "A large-scale disruption in the supply of foreign oil could have as damaging consequences for the United States as the loss of an important military campaign, or indeed a war." Unfortunately, many of the areas of greatest importance to U.S. economic welfare are also the areas of greatest turbulence. "Nowhere is this more the case than in the Middle East," he warned, where growing "war, terrorism and subversion" threaten "temporary disruptions or a more permanent decline in the supply of oil."

The R.D.F.: Instrument of Intervention

Because such disruptions could have a catastrophic impact on the U.S. economy, in Brown's view America had to take immediate and substantial steps to protect itself against global turbulence. Among the steps he advocated were economic and political support for countries facing internal disorder, as well as military measures. First and foremost of the intitiatives proposed by Secretary Brown for control of foreign disorders was the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.). Originally announced by President Carter in August 1977, the force evolved into a general cure-all for the menaces facing America abroad. Plans called for keeping R.D.F. units on constant alert at bases in the United States, to be whisked to distant trouble spots at the very outset of a crisis.

For students of U.S. foreign policy, much of this—including the proposed solution—appeared vaguely familiar. In the late 1950s, critics of the Eisenhower Administration's "Massive Retaliation" defense posture argued that nuclear war did not constitute a credible deterrent to anything other than an all-out Soviet assault on the United States. In *The Uncertain Trumpet*, Gen. Maxwell Taylor asserted that the many "limited wars which have occurred since 1945—the Chinese civil war, the guerrilla warfare in Greece and Malaya, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hungary, the Middle East, Laos, to mention only a few—are clear evidence that, while our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the Great War—a World War III—it has not maintained the Little Peace: that is, peace from disturbances which are little only in comparison with the disaster of general war."

These concerns were pushed very much to the fore when the Rockefeller Brothers Fund commissioned Henry Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard, to prepare a position paper on military policy in the 1960s. In his report, Kissinger argued that "even if we succeed in deterring all-out war by the threat of total annihilation," America will remain in peril because "we cannot expect to counter limited military challenges by the response appropriate to all-out surprise attack." To complement our retaliatory capabilities, therefore, "it is imperative that . . . we develop units that can intervene rapidly and that are able to make their power felt with discrimination and versatility."

The concept of a rapid intervention force for use in countering Third World upheavals was adopted with considerable enthusiasm by the incoming Kennedy Administration. In protecting ourselves against the growing threat of "national liberation movements," then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told a Senate committee, America had two choices: "Either we can station numbers of men and quantities of equipment and supplies overseas near all potential trouble spots, or we can maintain a much smaller force in a central reserve in the United States and deploy it rapidly where needed." Given the enormous costs of the former approach, establishment of a "mobile 'fire brigade' reserve, centrally located . . . and ready for quick deployment to any threatened area in the world is, basically, a more economical and flexible use of our military forces."

To provide this "fire brigade" with the necessary global mobility, McNamara and Taylor (then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) proposed the acquisition of two new vehicles: the giant C-5A transport plane and the Fast Deployment Logistics (F.D.L.) ship. In its initial enthusiasm for the rapid deployment strategy, Congress voted $3 billion

for the C-5A (later raised to $6 billion to overcome persistent "cost overruns" encountered by the builder, Lockheed Aircraft). By the time the F.D.L. proposal came up for a vote, however, America was deeply embroiled in Vietnam and many lawmakers had begun to repudiate the policies that had led to our involvement in that conflict. In a report criticizing the F.D.L., the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: "Beyond the cost, the Committee is concerned about the possible creation of an impression that the United States has assumed the function of policing the world." Senator Richard Russell, who was chairman of the committee and normally a reliable supporter of military programs, further charged that by facilitating Pentagon planning for future interventions, the F.D.L. would make such adventures all the more likely. "If it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything," he told his colleagues in the Senate, "then we will always be going somewhere and doing something."

The "Vietnam Syndrome" and "Surrogate Gendarmes"

As America disengaged from Vietnam, opposition to a "go anywhere, do anything" stance was institutionalized in the War Powers Act and other legislative constraints on the President's war-making abroad. The prevailing mood of noninterventionism, characterized by some analysts as the "Vietnam Syndrome," forced Washington to seek alternative mechanisms for protecting critical interests abroad. Under the Nixon Doctrine, favored U.S. allies such as Iran were converted into "surrogate gendarmes" and charged with the responsibility of "maintaining order" in critical Third World areas. And as the local "peacekeeping" function was shifted to other powers, U.S. military leaders resurrected their original cold-war mission—defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack—as the principal rationale for higher military spending.

For most of the 1970s, U.S. war planning concentrated on hypothetical East-West conflicts in Europe, while Third World contingencies were accorded relatively little attention. The new NATO emphasis was widely endorsed in Washington, both because it avoided any hint of interventionism and because it assured bipartisan support for sustained military spending. But just as dissident strategists had questioned the exclusive anti-Soviet orientation of massive retaliation in the 1950s, so some U.S. leaders began to question the similar focus of U.S. war planning in the 1970s. Arguing that U.S. economic survival was

more than ever dependent on access to overseas markets and raw materials, these strategists campaigned to reverse the Vietnam Syndrome and to rehabilitate intervention as a legitimate means of coping with renewed "turbulence" in the Third World.*

Ironically, one of the first military figures to challenge the new orthodoxy was Maxwell Taylor, the leader of the original revolt against massive retaliation. In a prophetic 1974 article in *Foreign Affairs*, Taylor suggested that while an East-West war in Europe has a "low probability rating" (because both sides share such an overwhelming interest in preservation of the status quo), America will increasingly be threatened by "turbulent and disorderly" conditions in the Third World. "As the leading affluent 'have' power," he affirmed, "*we may expect to have to fight for our national valuables against envious 'have-nots.'*" (Emphasis added.) To prepare for such contingencies, Taylor advanced the same doctrine he had pioneered in the 1950s: "In the troubled world which I have postulated . . . we shall need mobile, ready forces to deter or, in some cases, suppress such conflicts before they expand into something greater."

Although anathema to many policy makers in the immediate post-Vietnam era, such thinking gained considerable favor among those strategists who viewed the "North-South" conflict—i.e., the struggle for control of the world's resources between the advanced industrial powers (the "North") and the underdeveloped "South"—as the most explosive threat to long-term U.S. security. This outlook was given further articulation in a widely discussed 1977 RAND Corporation report by Guy Pauker, "Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s." There is a growing likelihood, Pauker warned, "that mankind is entering a period of increased social instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of global order as a result of sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial democracies." In such a situation, he continued, "the United States would be expected to use its military force to prevent the total collapse of the world order or, at least, to protect specific interests of American citizens."

Updating the "Fire Brigade" Doctrine

Although many U.S. leaders eventually came to share this outlook, support for NATO remained the dominant theme in Carter's first three defense budgets. Gradually, however, several events altered

* See Klare, "Curing the Vietnam Syndrome," *The Nation*, October 13, 1979.

the Administration's stance on military policy. The first was the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, which toppled the Shah and thus shattered the Nixon Doctrine's strategy of relying on surrogate gendarmes to pacify the Third World. At the same time, disruptions in the supply of Iranian oil helped create a severe "energy crisis" in the United States and thus demonstrated once again how dependent we had become on imported petroleum. As a result of these two developments, the Carter Administration officially disavowed the Vietnam Syndrome and affirmed that America was now prepared to employ its own forces in defense of Middle East oil supplies. "Protection of the oil flow from the Middle East is clearly part of our vital interest," Secretary Brown announced in February 1979, and "in protection of those vital interests we'll take any action that's appropriate, including the use of military force."

At first, Administration leaders sought to restrict the application of this principle to specific threats against U.S. oil supplies. But continuing unrest in the Middle East and Africa, coupled with increasingly conspicuous Soviet involvement in South Yemen, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, led to growing pressure for a more activist U.S. military posture. In March 1979, *Business Week* published a special issue on "The Decline of American Power" which summarized the belligerent outlook shared by many business and political leaders. "Between the fall of Vietnam and the fall of the Shah," the issue began, "the United States has been buffeted by an unnerving series of shocks that signal an accelerating erosion of power and influence." While citing the growth of Soviet military power as a serious threat, the issue concentrated on the economic perils of continued U.S. reluctance to serve as the world's "policeman." "The military retreat that began with the U.S. defeat in a place [Vietnam] that held no natural resources or markets now threatens to undermine the nation's ability to protect the vital oil supply and the energy base of the global economy." Echoing Taylor's "haves versus have-nots" doctrine, the magazine suggested that we must undertake a "reassertion of U.S. influence around the world" in order to preserve "the way of life built since World War II."

These views were already widely held in Congress and the media when militant Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979. With that action, and subsequent scares of a new oil crunch, the strategic focus shifted away from NATO and toward a renewed commitment to curbing turbulence in the Third World. This did not mean that preparation for a war in Europe no longer commanded a hefty slice of the Carter defense budget—indeed, NATO-oriented programs probably accounted for 70 percent or more of total

U.S. military spending—but rather that the momentum in both strategic thinking and weapons development reflected new concern with Third World conflict. During the first three years of its mandate the Carter Administration emphasized programs designed to enhance the U.S. "capability to fight in Europe," Defense Secretary Brown explained on January 26, 1980. But plans for the fourth year, he added, provided for concentration of "special attention and resources on the improvement of capabilities to get personnel and equipment quickly to potential trouble areas like the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea areas."

Brown's proposed response to these perceived threats evoked a similar response of the pre-Vietnam era. McNamara's "fire brigade" concept matched perfectly Brown's Rapid Deployment Force, which like the Special Forces before it, was to serve as a general-purpose strike force for suppressing unforeseen disturbances abroad. To whisk these forces overseas and provide them with adequate forepower, Brown proposed two initiatives in the fiscal 1981 budget: a new intercontinental transport plane dubbed the C-X and a fleet of arms-laden cargo vessels known as "maritime prepositioning shops" (M.P.S.), which would be stationed near potential trouble spots in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea. The C-X were, of course, nothing but an updated version of the C-5A, while the M.P.S. were facsimiles of McNamara's F.D.L. vessels. Even the deployment scenario remained the same: at the onset of a crisis, the fire brigade would be flown in C-5As (and eventually in the C-X) to friendly airports near the combat zone, where they would pick up their heavy equipment from the F.D.L. (M.P.S.) and then move off to the battlefield. And, as in McNamara's time, getting to the battlefield *quickly* was very important: "Our needs in responding to non-NATO crises," Brown said on December 27, 1979, "center on our ability to move available forces over vast distances quickly enough, either to deter conflict or, if that's not successful, to prevail in conflict."

This emphasis on getting there quickly was one of the most ominous features of the new Brown policy. It derived, of course, from the Vietnam experience: the Pentagon was naturally wary of a long, drawn-out Third World conflict that would provoke widespread domestic opposition. Thus, in future crises, U.S. forces would seek to dominate the battlefield quickly so as—in Taylor's words—"to suppress such conflicts before they expand into something greater." But whatever the impetus for this policy, it obviously suggested a "hair-trigger" stance in which American forces would be sent overseas at the first sign of a crisis. Such a stance would, moreover, be consistent with the Carter

Administration's view of the Rapid Deployment Force: they were to be used to "deter" conflict—by physically occupying the battlefield before the battle got fully underway—as well as to counter aggression by others. This nonnuclear equivalent of what might be called a "first-strike" deployment doctrine was unveiled in a little-noticed address by Brzezinski to the Economic Club of Chicago in December, 1979: the R.D.F., he said, "will give us the capability to respond quickly, effectively, *and even pre-emptively* in those parts of the world where our vital interests might be engaged and where there are no permanently stationed American forces." (Emphasis added.)

The Dangers of Deterrence Policy

The danger of a U.S. first strike in some future Third World crisis becomes particularly frightening when we consider the dissimilarities of the present world environment and the world that faced McNamara and Taylor in the early 1960s. First, of course, there is the expansion of Soviet power. While Pentagon rhetoric of the 1960s was no less vehement in its portrayal of the "Soviet threat" than that of the 1980s, the actual military situation was quite different—whereas in 1960 Moscow had almost no capacity to conduct military operations outside of the immediate Soviet bloc, today the U.S.S.R. has a true ocean-going navy and a sizable air-transport capability (as demonstrated by Soviet supply operations in Angola, Ethiopia and South Vietnam). Furthermore, because Soviet territory stretches so deeply into Central Asia, Moscow can move large forces overland to potential conflict zones in the Middle East (as occurred in Afghanistan). And while no one can, at this point, predict Soviet moves in a future African or Mideastern crisis, it is obvious that the likelihood of Soviet military involvement must be factored into any calculations of possible conflict.

Second, the fighting potential of other likely adversaries has been transformed over the past twenty years. Largely through arms purchases from the major industrial powers—especially France, the United States and the U.S.S.R.—many Third World armies are now equipped with the most advanced and versatile arms available anywhere. Between 1973 and 1978, for instance, Middle Eastern countries alone acquired 8,758 tanks and self-propelled guns, 8,624 armored cars, 1,614 supersonic combat planes and 10,917 surface-to-air missiles. Thus, any U.S. forces sent into combat in these areas are likely to

encounter far heavier resistance than they would have faced ten or even five years ago. "When you begin looking at the mid-1980s," a top Pentagon official observed, "we aren't talking about barbarians with knives." Many Third World armies "have a lot of military equipment," and thus, "we can't stabilize an area just by showing the flag."

Brown was aware of the new realities. "We must recognize," he said, "the increasing sophistication and firepower capability of land forces, designed on the Soviet model, that might be confronted." To cope with this problem, he proposed that the R.D.F. include both "light" divisions, capable of seizing ports and airfields, and "heavy" divisions, capable of defeating enemy armored units. But even this combination, he admitted, might prove inadequate on some future battlefields. High-level Pentagon officials privately admitted that the United States might have to use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the annihilation of American forces sent to stop a Soviet drive into Iran or Pakistan.

It doesn't take much foresight to conclude that the combination of a first-strike deployment strategy plus well-armed opposition forces could prove potentially disastrous. One can easily imagine, for instance, that U.S. forces sent to rescue some Middle East potentate—say, the Sultan of Oman—would come under attack by the Soviet-equipped forces of one of the radical Arab regimes—such as South Yemen—thus triggering U.S. retaliation against that country, which could in turn trigger an oil embargo and possible Soviet involvement. At that point, *anything* would be possible—up to and including World War III.

THE U.S. ROLE IN ENERGY WARS IN THE ARABIAN-PERSIAN GULF

MICHAEL T. KLARE

U.S. Ready to Fight for Oil

Reducing U.S. oil consumption, former President Jimmy Carter once said "is the moral equivalent of war." Today, U.S. leaders no longer speak of the "equivalent" of war but of the very high likelihood of war itself. Following the outbreak of conflict between Iraq and Iran in September 1980, the Carter Administration considered forming a multinational naval force to guard the Strait of Hormuz (the strategic entryway to the Arabian-Persian Gulf) and other military measures designed to ensure the continued flow of oil from the lower Gulf. "We intend to keep the Strait open, " Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed on September 28. But with the war between Iraq and Iran soon stalemated and the Hormuz Strait still open, there appeared to be no need for American intervention—yet. Nevertheless, it seems increasingly likely that the next major international conflicts will be fought over oil; they will be, in other words, *energy wars.*

Energy wars are not entirely a new phenomenon. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the European powers fought with one another for control of African and Asian territories believed to contain deposits of coal, petroleum, and other strategic raw materials. Such skirmishing was particularly prevalent in the Arabian-Persian Gulf region following the discovery of petroleum in 1908, and many historians believe that the outcome of both world wars was significantly affected by the struggle over Middle Eastern oil supplies. But the situation we face today is, in the view of most analysts, qualitatively different from these earlier conflicts. Because *so much* of the world's available energy supplies is concentrated in Mideast oilfields— an estimated two-thirds of non-communist petroleum reserves—modern industrial civilization as we know it could collapse if these supplies were obstructed or destroyed. Given these stakes, it is not surprising that many strategists agree with OPEC President Mana Saeed al Otaiba that "if there's another world war, it will be over petroleum."

If talk of a world war over oil appears exaggerated to some, it most certainly does not to those responsible for planning America's

future military posture. "Protection of the oil flow from the Middle East is clearly part of our vital interest," former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown declared in 1979, and "in protection of those vital interests we'll take any action that's appropriate, including the use of military force." To provide Washington with an enhanced capacity to protect Mideast oil supplies, Brown established a 100,000-man "Rapid Deployment Force" (R.D.F.)* capable of being rushed to the Gulf area in response to Soviet invasion or other cutoff attempt. This force would rely initially on conventional weapons, but Pentagon officials admitted that "we are thinking of theater nuclear options" should alternative measures prove inadequate. U.S. war planners also talked—although not quite so openly—of "seizing Arab oil" in the event of another embargo or unacceptable price increases. Because any of these measures could trigger a global conflagration, it is essential to look closely at the justifications for going to war over oil, and to ask whether there are other ways to assure a continued supply of energy resources.

To a large degree, the risk of energy wars in the Middle East is the result of what has been called an "accident of geography": instead of being scattered randomly across the globe, the world's biggest deposits of recoverable petroleum are located in a handful of desert tracts surrounding the 600-mile long Arabian-Persian Gulf. Ordinarily, these fields produce some 22 million barrels of crude oil a day, or about one-third of total non-communist consumption. Most of this petroleum is carried by tanker across the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz into the Indian Ocean, and thence to refineries in Europe, Japan, North America, and other oil consuming areas. Because so much of our civilization runs on oil, and because so much of it comes from this one remote locale, the Strait of Hormuz has been called the free world's "jugular" and its protection considered a matter of economic survival.

And the oil jugular appears vulnerable. Not only are Russian troops poised a few hundred miles away in Afghanistan and Central Asia, but the Gulf area itself is torn by long-standing political, religious, and economic conflicts. Border disputes and other interstate rivalries are legion: not only Iran vs. Iraq, but also Iraq vs. Kuwait, North Yemen vs. South Yemen, South Yemen vs. Oman, and the Arab world as a whole vs. Israel. Moreover, as former Secretary Brown put it, "the region is shaken by ethnic, religious, and internal political divisions." Iran remains in a state of "revolutionary chaos," and Saudi Arabia was shaken to its Muslim foundations by the rebel attack on Mecca in December

*See preceding study.

1979. As demonstrated by the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, these local conflicts can easily erupt into a larger conflagration, thereby threatening the flow of oil and inviting outside involvement.

Given the high stakes involved and the potential for catastrophe, protection of Mideast oil supplies has long been a major concern of Western military planners. Until 1979, however, the close-up defense role was delegated to Iran, which, under leadership of the late Shah, had agreed to serve as the "guardian and protector" of the Gulf once British forces had departed in 1971. In return for serving as a regional watchdog, Tehran was invited to purchase America's most advanced and versatile weapons, and was showered with praise from the White House. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the dissidents who toppled the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1979 vowed that Iran would never again serve as surrogate "gendarmes" in the Arabian-Persian Gulf.

Planning for Intervention

The departure of the Shah forced Washington to conduct its first major review of the Gulf policy since 1968, when then Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Great Britain would no longer serve as regional policeman. But while that earlier review, undertaken by Henry Kissinger, resulted in a decision to rely on local forces for regional security, the Carter Administration study, directed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, concluded that the United States must be prepared to perform a direct military role in the Gulf. As a result of this study, the White House announced in June 1979 that the United States would expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and speed up "contingency planning" for possible U.S. intervention in the Gulf area. Animating this effort was the belief, summarized by Mr. Brzezinski in an address to the Economic Club of Chicago, that the Middle East has become of equal strategic importance to the United States as Western Europe and the Far East, and that "a threat to the security of any one is an automatic threat to the security of the other two."

Planning for a stepped-up U.S. military presence in the Arabian-Persian Gulf was already well underway in the fall of 1979 when militant Iranian students seized the American embassy in Tehran and touched off a new Mideast crisis. Although not directly a threat to U.S. energy supplies, the embassy takeover intensified the instability of the Gulf region and highlighted the difficulties America faces in protecting Gulf oil supplies. (These difficulties became even more apparent in April

1980, when an American military effort to free the hostages ended in disaster.)

More important than the events in Iran, however, was the dramatic shift in Congressional and public attitudes towards the issue of intervention itself. The embassy seizure, Don Oberdorfer wrote in *The Washington Post*, "is one of those rare international 'hinge events' that change the way people think and governments act, therefore altering the course of history." Whereas previously Washington had been inhibited by public resistance to further Vietnam-type interventions abroad, during the Carter Presidency most American leaders came to see that military action may be necessary to defend vital U.S. interests—especially oil—in the face of continuing political, economic and social turmoil in the Third World. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, former Senator Frank Church, a "dove" on Vietnam, now saw that threats to "the vital interests of the United States, Western Europe and Japan in [Mideast] oil fields would necessitate military action."

With this sort of mandate, Pentagon strategists accelerated planning for future military action in the Middle East. To enhance U.S. capabilities for combat in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, Secretary Brown accelerated the formation of the R.D.F. and began negotiating with several African and Mideast governments for use of air and naval facilities. "The Iranian situation is one of a number of events that remind us," Brown explained on December 27, 1979, "that we need to be able to move forces quickly," either "to deter conflict, or if that's not successful, to prevail in conflict."

A few hours after Brown uttered these words, Russian troops poured into Afghanistan and the world experienced another "hinge event," the second in only two months. But while the principal effect of the Soviet invasion was to shatter what remained of détente and to introduce new tensions in East-West relations, it also completely transformed the strategic environment in the Arabian-Persian Gulf area. Whereas previous planning for energy wars in the Gulf had concentrated on the threats of internal unrest and localized inter-state conflict, it now became necessary to consider the implications of Soviet proximity to the oil "jugular." And while most analysts believed that Moscow was not prepared to risk a thermonuclear confrontation by moving any closer to the Gulf, it was obvious that Pentagon strategists could not afford to ignore such contingencies when planning for military action in that area.

The Soviet invasion forced Mr. Carter to make explicit what had

long been implicit in Administration policy. "Let our position be absolutely clear," he told a joint session of Congress on January 23, 1980, "An attempt by any outside force to gain control over the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." This pronouncement, quickly dubbed the "Carter Doctrine," touched off an intense debate in Congress and the press over the wisdom—and practicality—of using force in defense of Mideast oil supplies.

Characteristic of this debate were statements by some U.S. Senators questioning America's capacity to move large U.S. forces to the Gulf quickly enough to have any impact. One of the most skeptical observers, Senator Henry Jackson, asked Secretary Brown in January, 1980 "whether it's wise to lay down a doctrine when there is a serious doubt whether it can be upheld." In response, Pentagon officials gave journalists and Congressional leaders a series of off-the-record briefings on the steps it could take to counter a Soviet advance through Iran towards the Arabian-Persian Gulf. At the first sign of such action, *The Wall Steet Journal* reported on February 1,1980, Washington would assemble a combat force of 24,500 paratroopers and Marines for quick deployment to the Gulf, with the first units arriving a scant 24hours after the go-ahead signal. Meanwhile, combat planes flown from U.S. carriers in the Indian Ocean would bomb the mountain roads Russian forces would have to rely on in moving overland from Soviet Central Asia to Iran. Such "interdiction" operations would slow down the Soviet advance, and give Washington time to fly more troops to the combat zone. Once deployed, U.S. forces would, according to these officials, serve as a "tripwire" for more extreme action—including the use of tactical nuclear weapons—if the Russians failed to halt their advance. And while no one in Washington ever said that such munitions would *automatically* be used in such a contingency, Soviet leaders would have to face the *possibility* of their use, and presumably would therefore be deterred from persevering in such a risky maneuver.

A U.S.-Soviet clash in the Arabian-Persian Gulf was, of course, only the "worst case" scenario American war planners had to contend with. Far more likely, in fact, was another border war that could spill over into Saudi Arabia and threaten what remained of Gulf oil production. Such a conflict could pit Iraq against Kuwait, South Yemen against North Yemen, or Oman against South Yemen. Moreover, an internal upheaval in any of those countries could spill over into Saudi Arabia and ignite a regional conflagration. *Any* of these contingencies would

threaten Mideast oil production and conceivably trigger U.S. military action.

American policy regarding an *external* threat to U.S. allies in the Gulf was unambiguous: "We need to be able to come quickly and with decisive force to the aid of allies and friends in that area," former Secretary Brown told Congress on January 28, 1980, "so as to deter, and if necessary, defeat military incursions from outside." Were Saudi Arabia to come under attack, U.S. paratroopers would be flown directly to the region from bases in Italy and the United States, while more heavily equipped Marine units would be carried by ship from the Mediterranean and Western Pacific. To ensure that these forces could be resupplied as needed, U.S. officials signed agreements with Oman, Kenya, Egypt and Somalia permitting access to airfields and ports in those countries in the event of a U.S. intervention in the Gulf. Washington also expanded the joint U.S.-British base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

There remained the question of an internal threat to the Saudi monarchy. Here the Carter policy was far more ambiguous. Presumably, Washington would come to the aid of the Saudi ruling family if it were menaced by an isolated insurgent force. But in the event the Saudi family itself split up into rival groupings, U.S. leaders would be faced with the painful choice of remaining disengaged while Saudi Arabia was torn apart, or of choosing between rival forces and thus risking being drawn into a bitter civil war. Nor was this the only upheaval that could happen. A strike by foreign laborers in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia could trigger a generalized insurrection; renewed religious strife—such as that experienced in Iran—could spread throughout the Gulf. *Any* of these upheavals could threaten Mideast production, and thus prompt Washington to consider military action to protect the oil flow. Depending on the circumstances, such action could range from a full-scale intervention (say to prevent a radical takeover in one of the smaller sheikdoms); or a prolonged counterguerrilla war (against, for instance, radical separatists in Dhofar province of Oman).

Scenarios for "Seizing Arab Oil"

In all of the official scenarios, it was assumed that should the Saudis (or one of their close allies) come under attack by hostile forces it would request American assistance. But U.S. strategists had always considered (albeit discreetly) what might happen if the Saudis *them-*

selves threatened U.S. interests—by ordering a new oil embargo, by posting unacceptable price increases or by aligning with radical Arab forces in an attack on Israel—and the United States moved to *seize Arab oil fields* in the face of local opposition. Such contingencies did not, of course, figure in official Pentagon statements and documents. But the concept of "seizing Arab oil" was always present, and would loom ever larger with increased Western dependence on Mideast oil.

Talk of seizing Arab oil was heard at many a Washington cocktail party following the fourfold OPEC price increase of 1974. It was Henry Kissinger, however, who first gave official credibility to such speculation. Asked by *Business Week* on January 1, 1975, if Washington would consider military action in response to another round of price increases, Secretary Kissinger replied that "it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price"—a dispute which could be settled through negotiation—but "it's another where there is *some actual strangulation of the industrialized world.*" (Emphasis added.)

Kissinger's comment provoked an immediate storm of controversy in the Middle East. (President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, for instance, warned that Arab producers "would blow up oil wells" in response to such a move.) In the successive weeks, Kissinger sought to soften criticism by insisting he had no specific contingencies in mind. But however qualified, his statement established a rationale for military action against the Arab oil producers. In succeeding weeks, this rationale was further expounded by U.S. strategists in numerous magazine articles.

In a much-quoted essay in the January 1975 issue of *Commentary*, Professor Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University argued that military action might be necessary to prevent America from "bleeding to death" through "the vast financial drain resulting from present oil prices." To prevent any further "hemorrhaging," Tucker proposed that the United States occupy the area extending "from Kuwait down along the coastal region of Saudi Arabia to Qatar." This coastal strip, he continued, "has no substantial centers of population and is without trees," thus its occupation by U.S. forces would present none of the impediments found in Vietnam. And because this area harbors some 50 percent of total OPEC reserves, its control by the United States would "break the present price structure by breaking the core of the cartel politically and economically."

By bringing such proposals out into the open, Tucker, who had previously opposed expanding U.S. military commitments abroad, legitimated a much wider discussion of such scenarios. Within weeks,

the press was full of articles on the feasibility of oil interventions. In the March 1975 issue of *Harper's*, "Miles Ignotus" (the pseudonymn of a Washington-based defense analyst) expanded Tucker's thesis by calling outright for a U.S. action to seize Arab oil fields: "The only feasible countervailing power to OPEC's control of oil is power itself—military power."

Like Tucker, Ignotus suggested that the best locale for such action would be Saudi Arabia, with its proven reserves of 200 billion barrels. Other advocates of intervention, however, proposed other sites for such action, including Libya (proven reserves: 25 billion barrels) or Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (total reserves: 120 billion barrels). But whichever site was chosen, the logic remained the same: "When the very existence of an international economic system is put in jeopardy by the [economic] aggression of Arab oil states," Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr. wrote in *Human Events*, "we are morally as much at war as after Pearl Harbor," and thus a "warlike" response was justified.

Impediments to Military Action

In responding to such proposals, most critics concentrated on the *impracticality* of seizing oil fields intact. If "armchair strategists still maintain that Saudi Arabia's oil fields can be seized by the U.S. with relative ease," *Newsweek* senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave wrote after visiting the oil fields in 1975, "they are wrong." Some 700 wells, he noted, are scattered over an area the size of Western Europe; these wells are connected by 7,000 miles of pipeline—most of it above ground—to 150 processing plants and pumping stations. These facilities, if destroyed by sabotage, "would take years—not months—to put in order." In the final analysis, de Borchgrave asserted, "Intervention would precipitate the very event it is supposed to prevent: the economic strangulation of Western industrialized society."

This conclusion was backed by a more recent study conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. The CRS study, by John M. Collins and Mark R. Clyde, was undertaken at the request of Congressional leaders who wanted to know if America had the *military capacity* to seize and operate Saudi oil fields in response to an embargo or other cutoff in production. After reviewing the problems cited by de Borchgrave, they concluded that even in the "best case" scenario (i.e., no Soviet involvement), U.S. forces would be inadequate to seize and protect all the critical in-

stallations involved. "Military forces needed to seize and secure a lodgment on Persian Gulf shores could cope with cratered airfield runways and ruined port facilities, but could neither restore petroleum installations nor operate the system."

Such studies, widely reported in the military press, acted as an inhibition on the further elaboration of intervention schemes. But the impulse to "seize Arab oil" remained strong, and there were plenty of studies showing that de Borchgrave, Collins, and Marks underestimated America's capacity for overcoming these impediments. It is essential, therefore, that we go beyond the issue of efficacy to ask if there were *other reasons* for opposing military intervention in the Arabian-Persian Gulf.

First, even if an oil intervention were successful, *would it justify all the risks and costs involved*? Let's assume that U.S. forces capture Saudi oil installations intact and that sufficient U.S. personnel were available to replace Arab oil workers. Even if other hostile powers (the USSR, Iraq, Syria) were deterred from an immediate challenge to a U.S. takeover, America's military problems would just begin. To protect some 700 wells and 7,000 miles of vulnerable pipeline against sabotage would require a permanent occupation force of several divisions—perhaps 200,000 or more soldiers—who would have to be supplied from bases thousands of miles away in the Pacific and Atlantic (just providing *drinking water* for such a force would prove a Herculean and perhaps an impossible task). Furthermore, tankers traveling to distant ports would have to be escorted through possible minefields in the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea, and would require continuous protection against terrorist attacks elsewhere. All this would require an effort comparable (in money and manpower) to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

And that would be just the beginning: every Arab nation, of whatever ideological orientation, would be forced to counter such an intervention with an embargo on remaining oil supplies, through economic warfare (by dumping surplus "petrodollars" on the world's monetary markets), and by possible military retaliation against U.S. assets and allies elsewhere. To protect all these interests would require a mobilization of forces unlike anything seen since World War II. Front-line units would have to be withdrawn from Europe, Japan, Korea, and other strategic locales to fill the immediate manpower need, thus exposing the West to attacks elsewhere. At some point, Washington might feel compelled to use nuclear weapons in defense of one or another besieged outpost or ally, thus risking a global nuclear confla-

gration. And *no one could predict the duration of such clashes*: strikes, sabotage, terrorism, hit-and-run attacks, and guerrilla warfare could continue for years, sapping the Western economies and disrupting world trade.

Negotiation Better than War

Finally, we must ask: *is there an alternative to war*? Most U.S. strategists believe that the West can be assured of access to Mideast oil *only* if we're prepared to fight for it. But the devastating effects of the current Iranian-Iraqi conflict demonstrate just how difficult it can be to protect major oil installations against modern weapons. Surely, in the wake of this war, all potential belligerents will see the benefits of a negotiated solution to outstanding conflicts. Indeed, whatever objectives Iraq harbored in invading Iran, they cannot possibly outweigh the economic loss of several years' oil production and thus the collapse of Baghdad's ambitious industrialization program. Hopefully, this sobering lesson will deter future conflicts and thus preclude the need for outside intervention.

But what about the Russians? And what about the risk of another oil embargo? Many strategists believe that Moscow can be deterred from invading the Arabian-Persian Gulf by U.S. threats to foment trouble in other locales—e.g., Eastern Europe or the Far East—where the Russians are far more vulnerable. Likewise, most analysts believe that OPEC's prosperity has become far too dependent on Western economic stability for Arab leaders to risk their own demise by shutting off the supply of oil.

Such arguments do not, of course, guarantee that the worst will not come to pass. On the other hand, advocates of U.S. military action cannot promise uninterrupted access to Mideast oil, either. At best, such action would assure partial deliveries at the cost of a permanent military presence; at worst it would produce a global recession and possibly a new world war. On balance, therefore, it is obvious that going to war is not the best way to assure continued petroleum supplies from the Arabian-Persian Gulf, and that other, non-military measures should be sought instead.

APPENDIX I

PRESIDENT CARTER'S * STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS January 23, 1980

Following is President Carter's State of the Union address to the second session of the 96th Congress on January 23, 1980.

These last few months have not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our union.

The 1980s have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values, and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills. At this time in Iran 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is. Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges:

- The steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders;
- The ovewhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and
- The press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world—exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together—squarely and courageously.

We will face these challenges. And we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our nation has never been

* Released by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. The policies outlined in this presidential address are generally known as "The Carter Doctrine."

aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail. We continue to pursue these specific goals:

- First, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States;
- Secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure as quickly as possible their safe release;
- If possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens;
- To enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world;
- To convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

Now, as during the last three and one-half decades, the relationship between our country—the United States of America—and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages is released. But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union. Now, as during the last three and one-half decades, the relationship between our country—the United States of America—and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

- In the 1940s, we took the lead in creating the Atlantic alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.
- In the 1950s, we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we re-armed, to assure the continuation of that containment.
- In the 1960s, we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin and we faced the Cuban missile crises, and we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.
- And in the 1970s, three American Presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt this growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior

that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive—not only for the sake of our two nations, but for the security and peace of the entire world.

In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That is why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation talks—treaties Salt I and Salt II. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort—to control nuclear weapons—will not be abandoned.

We superpowers will also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure. But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned.

But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic sanctions on the Soviet Union.

I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States.

I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products.

I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items.

And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?

The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas.

During the past 3 years you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world:

- We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the 5-year defense program. It's imperative that the Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981 encompassing a 5% real growth in authorizations without any reduction.
- We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas.
- We have helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances. And recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized intermediate-

range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

• We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.

• We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the western Pacific.

• We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

• We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action—consistent with our own laws—to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.

• In the weeks ahead, we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region.

• We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.

• Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation, which we represent, and those of our allies in Europe and the Pacific and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East

and southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they're doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer forces are adequate for current defense needs. And I hope that it will not become necessary to impose the draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the selective service system must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information. And we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear—we can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engage in promoting world peace.

We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence, which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation, which we represent, and those of our allies in Europe and the Pacific and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and southwest Asia.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years as a mighty nation, we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present

danger to our nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

As you well know, I have been working with the Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past 3 years to meet this need. We have made progress together. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation. Our nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in the United States, and our nation's most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8% and gasoline consumption by 5% below what it was the year before.

Now we must do more. After consultation with the governors, we will set gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 States, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met. I've established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 million barrels a day—well below the level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an oil import fee if necessary. I'm prepared to lower our imports still further if the other oil consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing immediately.

The single biggest factor in the inflation rate last year—the increase in the inflation rate last year—was from one cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil and at the same time, to reduce inflation.

As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But all of us can conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you—in fact all the people of America—to help our nation. Conserve energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 indeed a year of energy conservation.

Of course, we must take other actions to strengthen our nation's economy.

First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the federal budget.

Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we will build also on the historic national accord with organized labor to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary government regulation.

Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new program to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste." We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980s.

And **fifth,** we must use the decade of the 1980s to attack the basic structural weaknesses and

problems in our economy, through measures to increase productivity, savings, and investment.

With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade—just as our foreign and defense policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world.

We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America, and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad. Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us:

> You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer.

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980s with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want:

- An America strong and free;
- An America at peace;
- An America with equal rights for all citizens and for women guaranteed in the United States Constitution;
- An America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen;
- An America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities and on our farms;
- An America that helps to feed the world;
- An America secure in filling its own energy needs;
- An America of justice, tolerance, and compassion.

For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people. Together as one people let us work to build our strength at home. And together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world. Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement. ■

APPENDIX II

EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT: THE REAGAN CODICIL

The policies outlined in the preceding presidential address have come to be known as "The Carter Doctrine." The interventionist policy that the previous Administration adopted in pursuing U.S. interests in the Arabian-Persian Gulf area is made explicit in Mr. Carter's statement: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Successive Administrations have made ready for pursuit of such an interventionist policy in the Gulf area by acquiring military bases in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Horn of Africa. In addition U.S. arms transfers to regimes in the area considered friendly to America escalated. Finally, President Carter decreed the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.) which could take off from either U.S. or regional bases to support a friendly Gulf regime which the Administration considered to be threatened by forces outside its borders.

The Reagan Administration has followed in the footsteps of its predecessor by negotiating for new bases, buiding up the R.D.F. and seeking arms transfers to friendly Gulf regimes. However, not only is the Reagan Administration prepared for military intervention against a perceived *external* threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, but President Reagan has taken this policy one step further by making official a position U.S. strategists have been easing into, without direct presidential sanction, as already noted by contributors to this study. He has declared his readiness to intervene militarily in the event of what he might see in the future as an *internal* threat in the area to U.S. interests. President Reagan announced this officially expanded policy for intervention against a possible internal bid for change of regime in a Gulf country—namely Saudi Arabia—at a news conference held October 1, 1981, in Washington, D.C. Although only Saudi Arabia was mentioned by name by the President as a possible site of U.S. intervention, the principle, once enunciated by the chief of state, puts the U.S. on record that it is ready to pursue military options in the internal affairs of other

countries if these countries seek popular change of regime that the U.S. might consider a threat to its own interests.

"The Reagan Codicil" to "The Carter Doctrine" puts the welfare of the peoples of the Arabian-Persian Gulf area—indeed the welfare of the peoples of the entire Middle East—in additional jeopardy by telling them that their right to self-determination must be compromised by the perceived threat to U.S. interests in their respective countries. President Reagan explained his new policy in two statements he made in answer to reporters' questions at his news conference. The verbatim exchange, according to *The New York Times* of October 2, was as follows:

> **Question:** Are you aware that the same people right now in the State Department who now want you to sell Awacs planes to Saudi Arabia, four and a half years ago wanted that very same weapon system sold to the Shah of Iran—just before the Shah fell. Given the fact that when the Shah fell, the United States lost much top secret military equipment in Iran—Pheonix missles and F-14 fighters—can you now guarantee the Congress and the people of the United States that the Awac system, if it's sold to the Saudis, will not compromise American security, or will not fall into the wrong hands?
>
> **Answer:** I can make that guarantee—that it will not compromise our security. I don't believe it'll fall into enemy hands, but, it would not compromise our security even on that, if it had.
>
> Now, with regard to four and a half years ago: I wasn't here then and Iran—*I have to say that Saudi Arabia we will not permit to be an Iran* [emphasis added].
>
> **Question:** Mr. President, you said a few minutes ago that you would not allow—you would not permit—what happened in Iran several years ago to happen in Saudi Arabia. How would you prevent that? Would you take military intervention, if that was necessary to prevent it?
>
> **Answer:** I'm not going to talk about the specifics of how we would do it, except to say that in Iran I think the United States has to take some responsibility for what happened there—with some very short-sighted policies and let a situation come to a boiling point. But there was no need to do that.
>
> But in Saudi Arabia, I just would call to your attention it is not only the United States, it's the whole Western world. There is no way, as long as Saudi Arabia and the OPEC nations there in the East—and Saudi Arabia's the most important—provide industry the bulk of the energy that is needed to turn the wheels of industry in the Western world. *There's no way that we could stand by and see that taken over by anyone that would shut off that oil* [emphasis added].

THE CONTRIBUTORS

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